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ABSTRACT 
 
Little has been written about Israel's obligations in the Palestinian Territory 
after the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 that highlighted an argument on whether 
Israel is still an occupying power or not. This argument was highlighted again in a 
more expanded form following the Israeli military escalation and incursions in the 
Palestinian towns in 2002 and after the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 
2005. Although the Oslo Accords created a new situation, including the establishment 
of the Palestinian Authority that bore certain responsibilities in the Territory, the new 
situation brought no changes with regard to the status of the Palestinian territory as 
occupied territory under International Law. 
 
The arguments suggest that if Israel is deemed an occupying state in the 
Palestinian Territory after the signing of the Oslo agreement, it should abide by 
International Law and so it is responsible for the implementation of International 
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory. 
 
In order to achieve its goals, the study follows an analytical critical approach 
for the theoretical framework governing occupation and its application on the Israeli 
Occupation of the Palestinian Territory. It is significant to note here that the research 
is based mainly and for most on the international conventions that compose the 
International Humanitarian Law and the International Human Rights Law. 
 
The scope of the study is limited geographically to the Palestinian Territory, 
occupied in 1967, including the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, in 
addition to that any events before 1967 have no place in this study, except where it is 
needed to clarify applicability of International Law on the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Following the signing of the Declaration of Principles (hereinafter DoP) 
between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereinafter PLO) in 1993, 
an argument was highlighted on whether Israel is still an occupying power or not. 
 
This argument was highlighted again in a more expanded form following the 
Israeli military escalation and incursions in the Palestinian towns during the Al Aqsa 
Uprising (Intifada) that erupted in the wake of the provocative tour of the Israeli 
opposition leader then Ariel Sharon to the Al Aqsa compounds in Jerusalem on 
September 28, 2000. After the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip (hereinafter 
GS) in 2005, the question of the status of Israel as occupation power was also revived. 
 
The responsibility for human rights violations in the Palestinian Territory was 
not addressed in the Oslo Accords despite their inclusion of articles calling on both 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority (hereinafter PA) to respect human rights norms. 
 
The arguments suggest that if Israel is deemed an occupying state in the 
Palestinian Territory after the signing of the Oslo agreement, it should abide by 
International Law (hereinafter IL) and so it is responsible for the implementation of 
International Humanitarian Law (hereinafter IHL) and International Human Rights 
Law (hereinafter IHRL) in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (hereinafter OPT). 
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The involvement of the Palestinians in the Oslo Accords cannot be considered 
as absolving Israel of its obligations as an occupying power. Here rises the question, 
"Does Israel bear some kind of responsibility for the violations committed by the 
Palestinian Authority (hereinafter PA) in the OPT, taking into consideration that most 
of these violations are linked to the security obligations of the Oslo Accords?" 
 
One might comment that now in 2009 and after the many developments that 
led to the stalemate of the peace process, the Oslo agreements that started in 1993 and 
have so far failed to achieve a Palestinian state, are no longer valid or of value to be 
discussed in the thesis. Perhaps, there is part of fact here; however; it cannot be 
ignored that the Oslo process has created undeniable facts on ground, including the 
creation of the PA that assumes government responsibilities in certain areas. 
 
Furthermore no party - Palestinian, Israeli, regional or international - has ever 
declared official invalidity of the Oslo Accords or the complete halting of the peace 
process. Rather all sides are calling for the resumption of the peace process and for 
the implementation of the Oslo agreements. 
 
The thesis, meanwhile seeks to support or disprove the following premises or 
points: 
 
- Israel is still an occupying country after the signing of the Oslo Accords and the 
transfer of certain responsibilities and powers in the OPT to the Palestinians. 
 
 ix
- The implementation of the disengagement plan in the GS did not end the Israeli 
occupation of the GS. 
 
- The PA is not a sovereign body, accordingly it cannot adhere to conventions 
forming basis of IHRL and IHL, but it is bound by its provisions of customary origin 
applicable on non-state international actors or subjects. 
 
- As an occupying power, Israel is yet responsible for abiding by IHL and IHRL in the 
OPT. 
 
In fact, a lot has been written about the Palestinian cause along all its stages 
since the 1948 war that led to the creation of Israel and the expulsion of hundreds of 
thousands of Palestinians out of their homes and lands. 
 
Several approaches, meanwhile, can be followed to discuss issues of the 
Palestinian cause, including the historical approach, the analytical approach and the 
legal approaches that discuss the legality or illegality of the Israeli occupation of the 
Palestinian Territory or consider the legal status of the OPT along the different stages 
with the various developments. 
 
Another approach is to discuss the right of self determination for the 
Palestinian people and the possibility of the establishment of a Palestinian state. 
International, regional and local (Israeli and Palestinian) humanitarian and human 
rights organizations focused on monitoring the Israeli practices in the OPT and its 
violations of the IHL and the IHRL that were put in periodical reports. 
 x
 
Some of these international organizations include Amnesty International and 
Human Rights Watch. At the local Israeli level there are B'Tselem, Hamoked and 
Peace Now, while at the local Palestinian level there is Al HAQ Institution and the 
Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights, in addition to other human 
rights monitoring groups. 
 
In addition to a review of the legal and general situation in the OPT since the 
1967 war and a general analysis for the Oslo Accords, this study seeks to benefit from 
all types of literatures, including books, essays, analytical and critical opinions and 
articles and periodicals to reach answers for the questions of the study. 
 
The International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the "Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory" 
has received special focus in this study as it touched several issues that support the 
argument of the study on the applicability of IHL and IHRL in the OPT. 
 
In order to achieve its goals, the study will begin with the theoretical 
framework of the Law of War and its application on the Israeli Occupation of the 
Palestinian Territory in addition to the status of the Oslo Accords under International 
Law ((hereinafter IL). 
 
Then the study is to discuss the legal status of the Palestinian Territory since 
the 1967 war, taking into consideration the many developments in the West Bank 
(hereinafter WB) and the GS, including the West Bank-Jordan disengagement and the 
 xi
Palestinian Declaration of Independence in 1988, the transitional period following the 
signing of the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s and the implementation of the Israeli 
unilateral disengagement plan from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and its consequences. 
 
The study will then move to discussing the humanitarian and human rights 
obligations of Israel as an occupying power and discussing its violations in this 
respect. 
 
The last part of the study is to discuss the obligations of the PA after the Oslo 
Accords and the PA's human rights violations in accordance with the fulfillment of 
the Oslo security obligations. 
 
It will also include an analysis to scenarios of responsibility, other than the 
Israeli responsibility, in the OPT that would include the responsibility of the 
Palestinian Authority as an authority of "effective control" in the Territory and the 
responsibility of Hamas Movement in the Gaza Strip following the June 2007 
infighting. 
 
It is significant to note here that the research is to be based mainly and for 
most on the international conventions that compose the IHL and the IHRL. 
 
The scope of the study is limited geographically to the Palestinian Territory, 
occupied in 1967, including the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, in 
addition to that any event before 1967 have no place in this study, except where it is 
needed to clarify applicability of the IL on the OPT. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1. Occupation under International Law 
 
Wars are governed by IL1 rules that form what is called "laws of war", 
otherwise; barbarism and brutality would overwhelm.2 The main sources of the law of 
war are, as set by Starke, the Declaration of Paris 1856, the Geneva Convention 1864, 
the Declaration of St. Petersburg 1868, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the 
Geneva Gas and Bacteriological Warfare Protocol, 1925, the Submarine Rules 
Protocol 1936 and the four Geneva Red Cross Conventions 1949 that came with 
humanitarian purposes to "reduce or limit the sufferings of individuals."3 
 
The failure of the occupying states to apply the Hague Regulations on the 
territories that became under their control, following the WWI, the Geneva 
Conventions came to deal more with IL rules that govern occupation in what can be 
called the "law of occupation," giving more rights to the occupied population.4 
 
The law of occupation both allows the occupant to exercise certain powers in 
the occupied territory and limits the actions of the occupying power, with the goal to 
                                                 
1 The International Humanitarian Law along with the International Human Rights Law form the 
International Law. The statute of the International Court of Justice has stated in Article (38) the source 
of International Humanitarian Law that the court is to apply in its functions and they include 
international conventions, international custom, general principles of law, recognized by civilized 
nations. 
2 J. G. Starke, Introduction to International Law. London: Butterworths, 1967, 439. 
3 Ibid, p440  
4 Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 96-
98 
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ensure decent treatment of the occupied population to prevent any risks the situation 
leads to renewed conflict, keeping good ties between the occupying state and other 
foreign states and keeping way open for an opportunity for a peace agreement.5 
 
This Chapter focuses on the law of occupation with the goal to thoroughly 
examine the status of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territory in light of the 
rules governing occupation specified under The Hague Regulations of 1907 and the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949. 
 
The Chapter will also tackle the theoretical framework governing international 
treaties with the goal to get a clear image of the status of the Oslo Accords that are the 
focus of the thesis. 
 
1.1 Concept of Occupation 
 
This Section of the Chapter will deal with the theoretical framework of the 
rules governing occupation, war and armed conflict. The focus here will be on the 
definition of occupation under IL, the concept of war and armed conflict under IL, in 
addition to human rights situation during armed conflicts. 
 
1.1.1 Definition of Occupation 
 
The Hague Convention 19076 defined Occupation in Article (42), which says 
that a "Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority 
                                                 
5 Adam Roberts, “Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967.” The 
American Journal of International Law 84, no. 1 (1990), 45-46 
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of the hostile army." It further defined that the occupation extends only to the territory 
where such authority has been established and can be exercised." 
 
The ICRC says that a "(t)erritory is considered occupied when it is actually 
placed under the authority of foreign armed forces, whether partially or entirely, 
without the consent of the domestic government," and that the occupation extends 
only to territory where such an authority has been established and can be exercised.7 
 
The occupying power must make it clear that it has established an occupation 
of the territory and that the local authorities are unable to exercise their regular 
functions. When occupation takes place, no changes to the status of the occupied 
territory are made. Such a change "can only be effected by a peace treaty or by 
annexation followed by recognition … there is also no change on the nationality of 
the inhabitants."8  
 
The IL of Occupation applies as soon as a territory comes under effective 
control of an occupying force, even if no armed resistance or fighting is witnessed, 
according to Article (2) of the Fourth Geneva Convention that says, "the present 
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict 
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the 
state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all 
                                                                                                                                            
6 Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) Oct. 18, 1907. In Leoned 
Friedman, The Law of War: A Documentary History. (New York, 1972), 308-331. 
7 ICRC, "Civilians in the power of the enemy and international humanitarian law," available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/section_ihl_civilians_in_the_power_of_the_enemy?
OpenDocument 
8 Leslie C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict. (UK: Manchester University Press, 
2000), 257. 
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cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if 
the said occupation meets with no armed resistance." 
 
J. G. Starke distinguishes between two types of belligerent occupation: 
Invasion in which a complete control of the territory takes place following a stage of 
military operations and a complete transfer of sovereignty in which the control of the 
territory takes place by other “means of treaty of cession” or through a defeat that is 
followed by annexation. This distinction, given by Starke, is important as it helps 
define rights and duties of the occupying power in the occupied territory and ensures 
application of IHL in the occupied territory since under belligerent occupation, the 
occupying power is only entitled to exercise military occupation without any transfer 
of sovereignty of the territory or a change of nationality of the local residents.9 
 
The occupying power shall not force the protected persons to serve in its 
forces or to work in providing it with information about the forces of their country. 
Article (44) of The Hague Convention 1907 says, "(a) belligerent is forbidden to force 
the inhabitants of territory occupied by it to furnish information about the army of the 
other belligerent, or about its means of defense." And Article (31) of the Geneva 
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War stipulates 
that "(n)o physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in 
particular to obtain information from them or from third parties." 
 
However, Article (55) of the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949 entitles the 
occupying power to enjoy certain rights during its occupation time. The article says 
                                                 
9 Starke, Ibid, 448. 
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that the occupying power can get food and medical supplies for the use of its forces 
and administration personnel, but not for “export outside the occupied territory and 
not for the benefit of anyone beyond the occupying personnel, unless necessary for 
the benefit of the population under occupation itself” and after the needs of the 
civilian population are fulfilled. 
 
The state of occupation ceases when the occupying power “evacuates or 
retreats from the territory” at a time the local government assumes power. And so, 
persons accused or convicted during the occupation period and their relevant 
documentation should be transferred to the local authority.10 
 
1.1.2 War under International Law 
 
The traditional definition of war is combat between two armies, yet under IL, 
there is no specific definition for war. However, the laws of war (jus in bello) 
organize behaviour of the armed forces, the political authorities and even the 
behaviour of civilians in order to reduce to the greatest extent possible the horrors of 
war and so both civilians and fighters remain under protection of IL, based on 
customary laws and humanitarian principles.11 
 
The Permanent Court of Arbitration in the case of Russian Compensations in 
1912 defined war as an international fact in the first place. Others consider war as a 
legal case, including rights and duties amongst the fighting states, whilst others 
consider it an international affair, during which the two sides use violence. However it 
                                                 
10 Green, Ibid, 258. 
11 Green, Ibid, 15-19. 
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is considered legal for one side and a crime for the other side. Meanwhile, the role of 
IL during war is to define international responsibility for war and to organize relations 
between the sides involved in the conflict.12 
 
Charter of the League of Nations Union13 that followed the First World War 
(hereinafter WWI) did not prevent wars, but urged states to avoid wars and set up 
certain pre-conditions for wars. In Article (11) of the Charter, the state parties said 
that "any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of 
the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the 
League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the 
peace of nations." Article (12) of the Charter urged the parties to "submit the matter 
either for arbitration or judicial settlement or to inquiry by the Council, and they 
agreed in no case would they resort to war until three months after the award by the 
arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the report by the Council. In any case under this 
Article the award of the arbitrators or the judicial decision shall be made within a 
reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months after 
the submission of the dispute." 
 
According to Article (13) of the Charter of the League, the member states 
"agree that they will carry out in full good faith any award or decision that may be 
rendered, and that they will not resort to war against a Member of the League which 
complies therewith." Meanwhile, Article (15) stipulates that "If there should arise 
                                                 
12 Tayseer Nabulsi, Israeli Occupation of the Arab Land (PLO: Researches Center, 1981), 16-17 
(Arabic). 
13 The League of Nations was established after the end of the WWI in 1919 with the goal to promote 
peace amongst the world countries. The League's failure to prevent wars which was confirmed with the 
eruption of the WWII, led to the dissolution of the League to be replaced with the United Nations in 
1945. Charter of the League is available at: http://www.geocities.com/Heartland/Valley/8920/ 
European/leachart.html. 
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between Members of the League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not 
submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement in accordance with Article (13), the 
Members of the League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council." 
 
Any member state that resorts to war in breach of its pledges in the previously 
mentioned Articles would be deemed as declaring war against all the state members 
of the League and so will be subject to penalties set up in Article (16), including 
"severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between 
their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of 
all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the 
covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of 
the League or not. It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the 
several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air force the 
Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to 
protect the covenants of the League." 
 
The Geneva Protocol 192414 or Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes in October 1924 also urged countries not to resort to war 
except in certain cases it defined in Article (2) that says, "The signatory States agree 
in no case to resort to war either with one another or against a State which, if the 
occasion arises, accepts all the obligations hereinafter set out, except in case of 
resistance to acts of aggression or when acting in agreement with the Council or the 
Assembly of the League of Nations in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant 
and of the present Protocol." 
                                                 
14 Web site of Britannica encyclopedia. 
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Meanwhile, under Article (3) of the Protocol "states would agree to submit all 
disputes to the Permanent Court of International Justice, any state refusing arbitration 
was ipso facto the aggressor, and the League Council could impose binding sanctions 
by a two-thirds majority." 
 
Urging states' commitment to avoid wars, the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928 
announced the cancellation of membership of those countries that use war as a means 
to achieve their national interests. Meanwhile, in its Article (1), the agreement 
condemned members' option of war to resolve their international differences. 
 
The Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter UN), however, has not talked 
about war in any of its articles. The word "war" was mentioned only once in the 
preamble of the Charter when it talked about saving "succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war". Instead, the Charter used the expression "use of force" in Article (2) 
Paragraph (4) and "self defence" against any armed attack in Article (51). 
 
Furthermore; the UN Charter allowed use of force only in two cases, first, in 
the case of self defence that is one of the main principles under IL.15 Article (51) of 
the Charter stipulates that, "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the UN, until the Security Council (hereinafter SC) has taken measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members 
in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the SC 
                                                 
15 Nabulsi. Ibid. 31-33. 
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and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the SC under the 
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security." Second the case of threatening 
global security and joint interest of the member states as stipulated in the Charter’s 
Chapter (VII).16 
 
IL is a developing sector and is a very important methodology for "organizing 
mankind against universal destruction through war."17 Wolfgang Friedmann considers 
the development of a new kind of international law against the traditional regulations 
of diplomatic interstate relations; that is the international law of cooperation. He 
argues that the international social, political and legal revolution that was produced in 
the wake of WWII caused the European countries and the United States of America 
(hereinafter US) to reach a kind of state of balance that urged respect for peaceful 
settlement of international disputes. In the past, countries made efforts to codify "rules 
governing the conduct of warfare through the Hague Convention"18 with the goals to 
humanize warfare through law and to distinguish between just and unjust wars. But 
WWII completed the destruction the WWI had started, with the use of "air power on 
the land and on the seas." Meanwhile, the laws of neutrality started emerging. The 
establishment of the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization 
(hereinafter ILO) following WWI were meant to organize mankind to seek peace and 
                                                 
16 See Antonio Cassesse, "Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving towards International Legitimation of 
Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?” EJIL 10 (1999): 23-30. 
EJIL 1999, Vol. 10, p 23-24. 
17 Wolfgang Friedmann, “Half a Century of International Law”. Virginia Law Review 50-8. (1964): 
1333. 
18 Ibid, 1334. 
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welfare. However, the international "trend towards peaceful settlement of interstate 
disputes" was mostly engulfed with reservations.19 
 
Friedmann also argues that several major changes in the political structure of 
IL have dominated the evolution of IL after WWII, including, but not restricted to, the 
political and ideological split that threatened the universality of IL following the war, 
preventing the SC from functioning properly; wars are no longer the ultimate 
instrument of policy in the hands of sovereign national states due to the development 
of nuclear weapons that threaten civilization with destruction; the transformation of 
some underprivileged nations into sovereign states that have become members of the 
UN, aspiring economic development that urged for the establishment of new legal 
business relationships; the concentration of military and economic powers in certain 
states and development of communication narrowed differences between states. These 
changes altered the structure of IL that appears under two essential types of IL: "(T)he 
international law of coexistence and the international law of cooperation,"20 widening 
the scope on IL beyond the traditional regulations of diplomatic interstate relations, 
bringing many new fields within the scope of IL and so customs and treaties are still 
not a sufficient source of law. For the contribution to the development of IL, 
Friedmann advises looking at the UN resolutions or other authoritative international 
declarations outside the UN though some lawyers still doubt the extent of the binding 
nature of those resolutions. However, Friedmann says that nevertheless; the UN 
resolutions that "lay down certain principles over … natural resources or human 
rights" can reach consensus.21 
 
                                                 
19 Ibid, 1336-1337. 
20 Ibid, 1340. 
21 Ibid, p1345. 
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1.1.3 Human Rights Protection during Times of Armed Conflict 
 
The wider term “armed conflict” is currently used instead of the term war, 
which no longer takes the traditional form of a face-to-face confrontation between two 
armies, whilst armed conflict under IL includes all types of international and non-
international armed conflicts between states and/or armed groups, and so, it is not 
limited to wars. 
 
It is quite well known that IHL applies in times of war and IHRL applies in 
times of peace and war. During armed conflicts, many international conventions apply 
as to protect civilians and properties. Those conventions include the Fourth Geneva 
Convention of 1949, the Hague Regulations of 1907, Convention on the Protection of 
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 1954, Convention on the 
Prohibition of Military or any other hostile use of Environmental Modification 
Techniques of 1976, Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventions which may be deemed excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate 
Effects of 1980, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction of 1993 and 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
anti-Personnel mines and on their Destruction of 1997. 
 
Most conventions have become Customary Law by time.22 The International 
Court of Justice (hereinafter ICJ) in its advisory opinion "Legal Consequences of the 
                                                 
22 Since 1946, The Hague Regulations of 1907 have been viewed as embodying customary 
international law; the 166 high number of states parties of the Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949 
have strengthened arguments that the Conventions are, in whole or in substantial part, declaratory of 
customary international law and some of the provisions of the 1977 Geneva Protocol I are viewed as 
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Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian territory"23 made reference to 
Israel's obligations under The Hague Regulations24, and the UN SC has always 
"maintained that Israel's authority in the occupied territories is subject to the Fourth 
Geneva Convention."25 
 
The adoption of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in 1949 was deemed one of the most important developments in the 
Law of War since 1907. The 1949 Convention was meant to replace the previously 
reached Geneva Conventions for the Year 1929: the First Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick Armed Forces in the Field; 
the Second Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea and the Third Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Meanwhile, the 
Convention on protection of civilians during war was new, representing the first 
attempt to protect civilians during conflicts as it came in the wake of the sufferings 
inflicted in occupied territories during the WWII. The Geneva Convention applies to 
any international armed conflict even if none of the involved parties recognized the 
state of war in its conventional form,  26  and so the term "armed conflict" is used 
instead of the term "war", especially as conflicts after the year 1945 did not witness 
                                                                                                                                            
embodying customary law. (Source: Adam Roberts, "Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-
Occupied Territories Since 1967", The American Journal of International Law 84-1, (January 1990): 
53-54). 
23 The International Court of Justice, the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, July 9, 2004, (2004 I.C.J. 136. 
24 See, ICJ Advisory Opinion. Ibid, paragraphs 89-101. 
25 Michael J. Dennis, "Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of Armed 
Conflict and Military Occupation," The American Journal of International Law 99-1 (2005): 121. 
26 Edward Kwakwa, The International Law of Armed Conflict: Personal and Material Fields of 
Application, (the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), 16-17. 
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war in its conventional form –a confrontation between two armies, moreover; the term 
"adverse party” was used instead of the term "enemy".27 
 
One of the most important developments in the history of IL was the attempt 
to control armed conflict when the International Conference for Human Rights in 
Tehran in 1968 called for the respect of human rights during armed conflict. The 
conference stressed the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
other international treaties in this respect, urging all people and governments to 
comply with the declaration and to exert more effort to provide all humans a decent 
life with freedom and dignity. Although the conference's decisions were not binding, 
the UN General Assembly (hereinafter GA) asked the UN Secretary-General to turn 
those decisions to the relevant international organizations for implementation. 
Meanwhile, the conference has directed attention to the need to protect people, 
struggling against colonial regimes and against regimes that discriminate against 
minorities.28 
 
In 1977, the Geneva Convention was updated with the creation of two 
additional protocols. Protocol I deals with international armed conflicts, whilst 
Protocol II approved for the first time the importance of applying humanitarian 
objectives during times of non-international armed conflicts that had previously been 
mentioned only in the Geneva Convention Article (3), and so, Protocol I has created a 
fundamental change in the law of international armed conflict by considering the 
                                                 
27 Green, Ibid, 44. 
28 Ibid, 46-47. 
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national liberation movements, fighting for self determination as international 
conflicts where international law should apply.29 
 
1.2 1967 War and Israel’s Belligerent Occupation 
 
Twenty years after the 1948 war that led to the creation of the state of Israel 
and the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their homes and land, 
Israel launched a new war to annex the rest of the Palestinian land of the WB and the 
GS, along with the Egyptian Sinai and the Syrian Golan Heights. 
 
This section of the chapter will focus on Israel's justifications for launching its 
war on the Arab countries in 1967 and the status of the Israeli occupation under IHL 
with a brief look at the situation of Jerusalem after Israel's annexation. 
 
1.2.1 Israel’s War Justifications 
 
In a bid to justify its attacks on the Arab countries and resorting to military 
force in 1956 and 1967, Israel claimed at the SC session on the 1967 war that it was 
retaliating to an Egyptian initiated attack.30 The 1967 war led to Israel's occupation of 
Arab land, including the WB, the GS, the Sinai and the Golan Heights. 
 
After the International Emergency Forces withdrew in May 1967, Egypt 
announced its right to impose its sovereignty on its land and regional waters. Due to 
the state of belligerency between Egypt and Israel, the former did not allow passage 
                                                 
29 Ibid, 51. 
30 Nabulsi. Ibid. 44. 
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of Israeli ships across its regional waters which Israel considered an act of aggression. 
Israel also considered Egypt's closure of the Straights of Tiran another act of 
aggression that justified its right to self defence according to UN Charter Article (51). 
Another justification Israel used for its military attack was the withdrawal of 
international emergency forces and the massing of Egyptian forces in Sinai that forced 
it to launch a preemptive attack. Israel also considered the military operations of the 
Palestinian revolutionaries against Israeli targets before the 1956 and 1967 wars as 
another reason to launch its attacks, insisting on its right to self defence even though 
the attackers were not regular armies.31 
 
Although Article (51) of the UN Charter allows states to resort to military 
action only as a means of self defence against an "armed attack”, some scholars, 
however; support a preemptive military strike if an attack is "clearly imminent". 
Perhaps this notion helped prevent condemnation of Israel's strikes at the UN GA and 
SC. However; the position of the UN with regard to the six-day war in 1967 was 
taken only on November 22, 1967, when the SC adopted Resolution No. 242.32 
 
Several facts, however; support the opposite notion that Israel's exploitation of 
Article (51) of the UN Charter as a justification for its strike during the 1967 war was 
unjustified. 
 
First; Egypt had the right to protect its land borders and regional waters, 
especially as the truce between Israel and the Arab countries at that time, had not 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 44-61. 
32 Geoffrey R. Watson, The Oslo Accords: International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace 
Agreements. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000), 29-30. The UNSC Resolution No. 242, can be 
viewed on the UN official web page: http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1967/scres67.htm. 
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removed the state of belligerency. Second; it was revealed after the war that neither 
Egypt, nor any other Arab country, was preparing to attack Israel. Third; Israel's use 
of armed force in 1956 and 1967 against the Arab countries in retaliation for the 
attacks of the Palestinian revolutionaries was a violation of IL as the UN Charter bans 
the use of military force against member states according to Article (51) and Chapter 
(VII) of the Charter. As already stated Israeli justifications do not meet standard 
criteria because these operations were conducted by members or small groups that did 
not belong to any Arab country, moreover; the operations of those groups were 
considered legal as they were resisting aggression that targeted the entire Palestinian 
people.33 
 
Furthermore; Israel's right to self defence according to IL allows it only to 
defend against attack, but not to retain territory gained by military force.34 
 
It thus becomes clear that Israel's resort to the use of force was meant to annex 
more Arab land and not a matter of self defence as it alleged; and so Israel's use of 
force against the Arab countries in 1967 can be deemed as an aggressive act in 
violation of Chapter (VII) of the UN Charter although the UN did not issue a 
resolution in condemnation of Israel as it did following the 1956 war.35 
 
                                                 
33 Nabulsi. Ibid. 49-63. 
34 Moussa Qudsi Dweik, Jerusalem and the International Law. (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Center for 
Social and Economic Rights, 2002), 32. (ARABIC). 
35 Nabulsi. Ibid. 70. 
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1.2.2 Israeli Occupation under International Law 
 
The duties of the occupying country towards civilians in the occupied territory 
are defined in the Hague Convention of 1907 Articles (42-56) and in the Fourth 
Geneva Convention of 1949 Articles (27-34 and 47-78). However, any deals between 
the occupying country and the local authorities in the occupied territory can in no 
means deprive civilians in the occupied territory from the protection afforded by IHL, 
according to Article (47) of the Geneva Convention, in addition to that protected 
people under no circumstances lose their rights according to Article (8) of the Geneva 
Convention.36 
 
John Quigley37 argues that the derogation of rights of the protected persons in 
an occupied territory can be in three different ways: First; by changes the occupying 
state might impose, second; by any deal or agreement between the occupying power 
and the local authorities, and third; by annexation by the occupying power. Quigley 
argues that Article (47) of the Geneva Convention protects the protected persons from 
any provisions in any agreement between Israel and the PLO that might be oppressive 
or violates the rights of the Palestinian people who are protected by the Geneva 
Civilian Convention, and so, Israel is responsible for ensuring protection of the 
occupied people "regardless of the terms of any agreement Israel might conclude with 
the PLO." 
 
                                                 
36 ICRC web site: “Occupation and International Humanitarian Law,” 4/8/2004: http://www.icrc.org/ 
Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/634KFC. 
37 John Quigley, “The P.L.O.-Israeli Interim arrangements and the Geneva Civilian Convention,” in 
Human Rights, Self Determination and Political Change in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, ed. 
Stephen Brown, (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997), 27-28. 
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Occupation, however, does not require a declaration of a special kind whilst 
the reasons behind the presence of foreign forces in the territory are not specified. At 
the same time, IHL considers the occupying country as "responsible for maintaining 
public order and security in the occupied territories."38 
 
The common Article (2) of the Geneva Convention confirms that the 
Convention applies to every armed conflict, whether a declared war or if the “state of 
war is not recognized” by one of the warring parties. The second paragraph of the 
Article extends the implementation of the convention to cases in which the occupation 
does not meet armed resistance. 
 
Whether Israel recognizes its status as an occupying power or not, does not 
change the fact that the OPT in 1967 is still under occupation, although such a 
recognition can facilitate the process of the implementation of IL in the Territory 
because "the recognition of the state of its being an occupying power can be the first 
step in the process of the implementation of the Law of Occupation."39 
 
Since its occupation of the Palestinian Territory in 1967, Israel has repeatedly 
violated the principles of IHL on numerous alleged security pretexts. 
 
As an occupying power, Israel is obliged according to Article (43) of the 
Hague Convention to maintain "security and public order, while respecting, unless 
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country," in the areas it controls. Article 
                                                 
38 HPCR, “Israel's Obligations under IHL in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,” Harvard University 
(January 2004): 2. 
39 Assem Khalil, "Is Israel Obliged to Implement International Humanitarian Law?" International 
Politics Journal 201 (April 2004). 
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(2) of the Geneva Convention, says the agreement shall also apply to all cases of 
partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said 
occupation meets with no armed resistance." 
 
However, Israel has since worked on changing the laws in force in the OPT by 
issuing thousands of military orders in the WB and the GS under claims of public 
security and order.40 
 
Since its occupation in 1967, Israel has not admitted to being an occupying 
power and so refused to implement IHL in the Territory, especially the Fourth Geneva 
Convention. Israel’s justification is based on the claim that in 1967, Jordan and Egypt 
never had "legal sovereignty" of the WB and GS, respectively, and this means that 
Israel has not occupied land that belongs to another sovereign state. Consequently, 
Israel considers itself as administrating the land, not occupying it, a situation that does 
not require the implementation of IHL.41 
 
On August 11, 1967, Israel issued Proclamation No. (3), which said in its 
Article (35) that the military court should implement the Fourth Geneva Convention 
Relative for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. However; the Israeli 
occupation authorities cancelled this article after issuing military order No. (144) in 
October 1967. Israel continues ignoring implementation of the Geneva Convention in 
                                                 
40 Amin Makki Madani, “The International Conventions and Human Rights under Occupation – 
Palestine,” Lawyers Magazine 9-10 (1998): 846-856 (ARABIC). 
41 Ibid. 850-851. 
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the OPT despite the many calls by international bodies on Israel to abide by the 
convention regulations in the OPT.42 
 
The Israeli courts distinguish between the binding Customary International 
Law that automatically becomes part of the domestic law of a state and the treaty-
based laws that Israel considers having no binding status "unless incorporated by 
statute." However; the Israeli High Court applies de facto the humanitarian provisions 
of the Geneva Convention that unlike de jure do not make it possible to "persecute the 
government violations of these acts judicially."43 
 
Israel's stand defies those of the International Community that confirms that 
IHL, including the Fourth Geneva Convention, applies to the Territories Israel 
occupied in 1967. This international stand is stressed in many resolutions of the UN 
SC and GA, all of which confirm that the Geneva Convention applies to the OPT, 
including the eastern part of Jerusalem.44 
 
Moreover; the protracted nature of the Israeli occupation in the Palestinian 
Territory imposes on Israel the responsibility for the implementation of human rights 
in the territory as argues several scholars.45  
                                                 
42 Raja Shehadeh, “An Overview for the Interim Regime Established Pursuant to the Oslo and Cairo 
Agreements,” in International Human Rights Enforcement: The Case of the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories in the Transitional Period. 1-5. The proceedings of a conference organized by the Centre 
for International Human Rights Enforcement and convened by Pax Christi International in Jerusalem, 
September 17th and 18th, 1994, Jerusalem: Centre for International Human Rights Enforcement 
(1996): 7. 
43 Khalil, 2004,Ibid. 
44 Madani. Ibid, 851. 
45 See Adam Roberts, “Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967,” 
American Journal of International Law 84-1 (1990): 44-103; Eyal Benvenisty. The International Law 
of Occupation. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Human Rights Council, “Human 
Rights Situation in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
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The Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territory is in fact distinguished with 
its long term with "no sign of ending", as expressed by John Dugard in his annual 
report on the human rights situation in the OPT for 2008.46 
 
The possibility of witnessing a protracted occupation was first envisioned by 
the Geneva Conventions47 that defined in Article (6) the applicability of the 
Convention with one year after the hostilities cease. Meanwhile, the protracted nature 
of the Israeli occupation does not reduce its responsibilities, but rather increases them 
as a result of the continuing occupation.48 
 
Even if the status of the Israeli occupation of the Territory after the Oslo 
Accords could be argued to be only temporary until the agreements are implemented 
and a Palestinian state is established, such an argument cannot absolve Israel of its 
obligations under IL in the Territory. 
 
The SC Resolution No. (1483)49 of 2003 on the situation in Iraq confirmed 
applicability of IHL during temporary occupation described as transformative in Iraq. 
 
The Oslo Accords have introduced a new political and legal situation in the 
OPT, whilst Israel resumed its power in the Territory. As well, a new local 
                                                                                                                                            
the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, John Dugard”. 
(A/HRC/7/17). (21 January 2008). 
46 John Dugard. Ibid; paragraphs 7-8. 
47 Benvenisti, Ibid. p144. 
48 Adam Roberts. 1990. p55-57. 
49 Security Council Resolution (1483) of 22 May 2003; available at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/ 
UNDOC/GEN/N03/368/53/PDF/N0336853.pdf?OpenElement. 
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government was in the being of creation in Iraq, where the occupying powers 
maintained power. 
 
The occupation powers in Iraq claimed their presence in the country was 
temporary and transformative with the goal to replace the dictator regime with a more 
democratic one and the (1483) Resolution confirmed applicability of IHL during this 
temporary occupation. 
 
The resolution stipulates that the US and Britain are occupying powers in Iraq 
and are obliged to implement the IHL and the IHRL despite an earlier letter on May 8, 
2003 to the SC President from the representatives of both states, pledging to "abide by 
their obligations under IL, including those relating to the essential humanitarian needs 
of the people of Iraq,"50 and although the two countries did not admit their occupation 
to Iraq and considered their presence in the country as temporary to achieve certain 
goals with regard to transforming the regime in the country. 
 
However, what can be deemed as a development in the IL in this respect is 
allowing the occupant to take part in deciding on the fate of the occupied territory. 
The Oslo process allowed Israel to decide the status and future of the Palestinians in 
the WB and the GS and the (1483) Resolution came to allow the US and UK 
occupying powers to take part in deciding the future of Iraqi people. 
 
                                                 
50 Letter from the Permanent Representatives of the UK and the US to the UN addressed to the 
President of the Security Council. May 8, 2003, (S/2003/538) available at: (http://www.globalpolicy. 
org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/0608usukletter.htm) 
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However in this respect, several scholars considered that acting upon Chapter 
(VII) of the UN Charter, the SC derogates the IL,51 which urges the occupying power 
to maintain the status quo in the occupied territory by respecting the existing law in 
the territory and trying to make as very few changes as possible. 
 
In order to ease the conflict between the principles of IL and the goals of 
transformative occupation, Adam Roberts proposed easing this conflict in two ways: 
First, the application of IHRL; second, seeking involvement of international 
organizations, especially the UN with the goal to legitimize "certain transformative 
policies during an occupation."52 
 
1.2.3 Annexation of Jerusalem 
 
The de facto authority of the occupier in the occupied territory that is 
confirmed in Articles (42 and 43) of the Hague Convention does not give the occupier 
the right of sovereignty on the occupied territory since the de facto term means that 
the authority transition is not legal.53 
 
Since its annexation of Jerusalem, following its occupation in 1967, Israel has 
been taking a group of procedures to emphasize its complete sovereignty over the 
Holy City. 
                                                 
51 See, Adam Roberts, "Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human 
Rights," The American Journal of International Law 100-3 (2006): 580-622; Marten Zwanenburg, 
"Existentialism in Iraq: Security Council Resolution 1483 and the Law of Occupation," The 
International Review of the Red Cross 86-856 (2004); 745-769; and Eyal Benvenisti, "The Security 
Council and the Law on Occupation: Resolution 1483 on Iraq in Historical Perspective," The Israel 
Defence Forces Law Review 1 (2003): 19-38. 
52 Roberts. 2006. Ibid, 580. 
53 Othman Takrouri and Yassin Omar, The West Bank and the Law of Belligerent Occupation, 
(Jerusalem: Studies Center, Advocates' Syndicate, 1986), 28 (ARABIC). 
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The status of Jerusalem was defined in the UN GA Partition Resolution No. 
(181), issued in November 1947, stipulating the creation of two states in Palestine, 
one Jewish and one Arab with a "Special International Regime for the City of 
Jerusalem". In 1949 and after Israel occupied the western part of the city, the UN GA 
Resolution No. (303) reiterated the UN commitment to internationalization of 
Jerusalem, and designated it a "corpus separatum", which means an entity standing 
alone. 54 
 
After the 1967 war and Israel's occupation of the eastern part of Jerusalem, 
along with the rest of the OPT of the WB and the GS, every incoming Israeli prime 
minister, in regard to the occupation of Jerusalem in 1967, “reiterated Israel’s 
intention to keep Jerusalem the undivided capital” of Israel55, and have since taken a 
series of measures, aimed at “unifying” Jerusalem. Those measures included a 
Knesset decision on June 27, 1967 to alter the Judicial Systems Law for the year 1948 
with adding Act (11B) to bring the East Jerusalem areas into this system. The Knesset 
had also made another alteration on the Israeli Municipalities Law (Law No. 6 for the 
year 1967) to grant authority for the Israeli Minister of Interior to announce expansion 
of the boundaries of Jerusalem municipality by annexing more land. However, Israel 
has not used the word annexation in “any of its orders or laws issued to unify the 
city."56 
 
                                                 
54 Geoffrey R. Watson, The Oslo Accords: International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace 
Agreements, (Oxford University Press, 2000), 286-289. 
55 Katherine M. Metres, “Israeli Ethnic Cleansing Undiminished in Jerusalem,” Washington Report, 
(Sep/Oct. 1994): 85-86. 
56 Dweik. Ibid, 19. 
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The Israeli Basic Law57, adopted on July 30, 1980, also confirmed Israel's aim 
to keep Jerusalem "unified" and under its control. Paragraph (1) of the "Basic Law: 
Jerusalem, Capital of Israel", says that Jerusalem is the complete and united capital of 
Israel, whilst paragraph (2) emphasizes Israel’s intentions to have Jerusalem as its 
capital by locating the main power and government institutions of Israel in Jerusalem 
as it says that Jerusalem is "seat for the President, the Knesset, the Government and 
the Supreme Court." Furthermore; paragraph (4) confirms that the government 
allocates special funding for the development of Jerusalem and its inhabitants. This 
funding includes the annual "Capital City Grant" upon the approval of the Finance 
Committee of the Knesset. 
 
Israel's goal of this section of the Basic Law was to tell the world that East 
Jerusalem and West Jerusalem is one unified city and the capital of Israel, enjoying a 
special status inside Israel.58 
 
A census was conducted in Jerusalem immediately after its occupation in 
1967, upon which Israel issued blue Israeli ID cards for the Palestinian residents of 
the city who were included in the census. Whilst those Jerusalemites, who were not 
present in the city at the time of the census for reasons of study or work abroad or 
even for wartime flight, were not issued such identities, denying them the right to live 
in their city as they were deprived residency status. Consequently, "this way, some 
8,000 Jerusalemites lost their right to live in their city"59 
 
                                                 
57 Israeli Knesset official web page. 
58 Ossama Halabi, The Legal Status of Jerusalem, (Beirut: The Palestinian Studies Institution, 1997), 
23-24 (ARABIC). 
59 Metres, Ibid. 
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In 1990, Israel rejected resolutions by the UN SC60 that East Jerusalem was 
under a belligerent occupation and asked the UN Secretary-General to "report 
appropriate measures to be taken." Israel claimed that East Jerusalem was "under its 
sovereignty," meaning that the rules of belligerency did not apply.61 
 
On December 20, 1990, the SC adopted Resolution No. (681), expressing 
grave concern over Israel's rejection of the previous resolutions No. (672) and (673) 
and urging “the Government of Israel to accept the de jure applicability of the Geneva 
Convention of 1949, to all the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 and to abide 
scrupulously by the provisions of the convention.” 
 
Israeli measures in Jerusalem violate IL, which is meant to prevent the forced 
annexation of land, giving Israel no legitimacy to its annexation of the Holy City. The 
UN Charter stipulates in paragraph (4) of its Article (2) that "All Members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." International prevention of 
forcible annexation of land was also confirmed in the UN GA’s Resolutions No. 
(2628) on November 4, 1970, (2799) on December 13, 1971 and (2949) on December 
8, 1972. 
 
                                                 
60 The UNSC Resolutions No. (672) on October 12, 1990 and (673) on October 24, 1990, were adopted 
in the wake of the 1990 shooting of 17 Palestinians in East Jerusalem. 
61 Quigly, Ibid, 38.  
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1.3 Treaties under International Law 
 
In order to understand the status of the Oslo Accords that were signed between 
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (hereinafter PLO), there is yet a need 
to understand the law governing treaties. 
 
This section of the chapter will first tackle the law and practice of treaties 
under IL with rules governing their validity and annulment. Then the section will 
move to discussing the status of the Oslo Accords in IL. 
 
1.3.1 Law and Practice of Treaties 
 
Article (2) paragraph (a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties for 
the year 1969 has defined a Treaty as "an international agreement concluded between 
States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a 
single instrument or two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation;" 
 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations for the year 1986 
also defined Treaties in Article (2) paragraph (a) as "an international agreement 
governed by international law and concluded in written form: (i) between one or more 
state and one or more international organizations or; (ii) between international 
organizations; whether that agreement is embodied in a single instrument or in two or 
more related instruments and whatever its particular designation." 
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In his book Introduction to International Law, J. G. Starke defined a treaty as 
an "agreement whereby two or more States establish or seek to establish a relationship 
under international law between themselves."62 
 
The previous definitions tell us that an international treaty should meet certain 
conditions: First; an international treaty should be governed by IL; second; 
international treaties should be reached between international sides or bodies; which 
means that only states or international organizations can be involved in treaties, whilst 
non-international bodies cannot sign international treaties; and third; international 
treaties should be concluded in a written form in order to have solid proof on what 
was agreed upon and so to protect rights and duties.63 The value of a written text 
exists in referring to them when states are asked for application.64 
 
International entities of special status are qualified to be part of a treaty. These 
entities include national liberation movements that are also obliged to implement 
humanitarian law and establish diplomatic ties, and so, a state that recognizes a 
national liberation movement can have a treaty with it.65 
 
Treaties can include different aspects of life such as politics, military, 
economy, education and they go under different names depending on the rate of their 
                                                 
62 J. G. Starke, Introduction to International Law, (London: Butterworths, 1967), 336. 
63 Ghassan Jundi, International Treaties Law, (Amman, 1988), 8-24. 
64 Mark E. Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties, (Kluwer Law International, 1997), 26. 
65 Jundi. Ibid, 38-41. 
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formality or their procedures. Starke, however; states eleven types of treaties as 
follows:66 
 
1- Convention: An international agreement is meant to set up legal definitions 
to organize relations between state parties such as The Hague Convention 1907 and 
the Geneva Convention 1949. A convention can also apply to other non-party states. 
 
2- Protocol: An international agreement, amending or interpreting a previous 
agreement, such as the Paris Protocol for the year 1926 that is an amendment to the 
Basic Statute of the ICJ. A protocol is less formal than a treaty. 
 
3- Agreement: It is less formal than a treaty or a convention and it applies to 
agreements with few parties and not subject to ratification. 
 
4- Arrangement: It is more like an agreement, however; it is "employed for a 
transaction of a provisional or temporary nature." 
 
5- Procès-Verbal: It was originally used to summarize the conclusions of a 
diplomatic conference, however; now it is used to "record terms of an agreement 
reached between parties", such as the Procès-Verbal signed at Zurich in 1892 by the 
representatives of Italy and Switzerland to record their understanding of the 
provisions of the Treaty of Commerce between them. It is not subject to ratification. 
 
                                                 
66 Starke, Ibid, 340-344. 
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6- Statute: It is a collection of rules, relating to the "functioning" of an 
international body, such as the Statute of the ICJ. 
 
7- Declaration: It is usually used for documents, confirming joint legal or 
political principles, such as the Declaration of Paris 1856. It may or may not be 
subject to ratification. 
 
8- Modus Vivendi: It is an informal temporary agreement, waiting to be 
replaced with a more permanent and detailed one. It does not require ratification. 
 
9- Exchange of Notes (or of Letters): It is an informal way, whereby states 
subscribe to certain understanding or obligations as binding for them. Ratification is 
not required. 
 
10- Final Act: It is recording conclusions of a conference summoned to 
conclude a convention, such as the Final Act of the Conference of Countries 
Exporting and Importing Wheat in London in 1933. It is generally signed but not 
ratified. 
 
11- General Act: It is a treaty that can carry formal or informal character, such 
as the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes in 1928. 
 
Other forms of treaties can also be taken into consideration, including:67 
                                                 
67 Ibid, p344n. 
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- Charter: It is an international agreement, taking the name of its organizer, 
such as the Charter of the League of Nations 1919, the Charter of the UN 1945 and 
the Charter of the Arab League 1945. 
 
- Accord: It usually deals with political issues, such as the Accord between 
France and UNESCO in 1945 and the Oslo Accords, reached between Israel and the 
PLO in 1993. 
 
1.3.2 Validity and Annulment of Treaties 
 
Generally, the provisions of the treaty decide its duration as when to come into 
force and when to expire. Some treaties come into force the minute they are signed 
and others would yet need ratification or endorsement by the domestic law of the 
signing country. 
 
The terms of the treaty may define responsibility of the state party for the 
breach of the treaty, however, a breach by the state does not necessarily "engage its 
responsibility of international law", which arises only if the state breaches some "duty 
extraneous to the treaty."68 
 
However; many reasons can cause annulment of treaties, including the 
agreement of the sides on the cancellation of the treaty; unilateral withdrawal from the 
                                                 
68 Ibid, 256-257. 
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treaty of one of the signing sides; certain circumstances that might lead to the 
annulment of the treaty, including war or the impossibility to fulfill the treaty.69 
 
Draft Articles on Treaty Law adopted by the International Law Commission in 
1966 framed in Articles (45-49) rule on invalidity of treaties on ground of essential 
error, fraud, corruption and coercion. Meanwhile, treaties may be terminated by the 
following:70 
 
- Operation of law: Including extinction of any of the state parties; the 
outbreak of war between the state parties; and a fundamental change in the "state of 
facts which existed at the time the treaty was concluded." 
 
- Act of the state parties: A treaty can be annulled upon a mutual agreement 
between the state parties; or denunciation to the treaty by any of the state parties that 
shows intention of this state party to withdraw from the treaty. However; some 
treaties include a "clause allowing denunciation after a certain period." 
 
Generally, treaties pass through several stages until they come into force:71 
Firstly there are negotiations between the concerned sides, each of who should have 
appointed representatives to hold negotiations aimed at reaching a treaty. Bilateral 
treaties are generally conducted through negotiators, whilst multilateral treaties are 
conducted by a diplomatic conference. In both cases the representatives keep in touch 
with their governments for instruction and consultations. In the second case, Legal 
Drafting Committees are meanwhile appointed to review drafts of the other parties. 
                                                 
69 Jundi, Ibid, 187-218 
70 Starke, Ibid, 371-376 
71 Ibid, 346-363 
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Secondly, when the parties agree on the final draft of the treaty, it is presented 
for signature after the text is, not necessarily, made public for a while. As for a 
multilateral treaty, signature is made in a formal closing session as each representative 
signs on behalf of his country. The signature can be binding unless the agreement 
requires ratification, depending on the system of the state, which means that the 
signature is no more than an initial agreement on the text of the agreement since some 
states consider that an agreement is ineffective until it is ratified. 
 
Thirdly: Treaties should be registered with and published by the Secretariat of 
the UN as states the UN Charter Article (102) paragraph (1) that says, "Every treaty 
and every international agreement entered into by any Member of the United Nations 
after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be registered with 
the Secretariat and published by it." 
 
Finally, states can incorporate provisions they find necessary in their domestic 
law to ensure implementation of these provisions. 
 
1.3.3 Oslo Accords under International Law 
 
The Oslo Accords, signed between Israel and the PLO in 1993 received 
international support and endorsement. Perhaps the most important development the 
Oslo Accords have achieved was that they made it possible for the first time to 
consider creating a Palestinian entity that can assume certain powers, in addition to 
the possibility of holding general national elections (not only municipal ones) that 
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would require withdrawal or redeployment for Israeli forces in the Palestinian 
Territory.72 
 
The UN GA on December 14, 1993, expressed “its full support for the 
achievements of the peace process” and urged all the concerned parties “to implement 
the agreements reached.” This Resolution No. 48/58 of the GA, drafted by the US, 
Russia and Norway, was voted for by 155 world states against three, including Syria, 
Lebanon and Iran, as objecting with one abstentious (Libya). Such an overwhelming 
support for the resolution proves the interest of the world community in the 
implementation of the Accords.73 
 
However, as of the status of the Oslo Accords with regard to the IL, Kathleen 
Cavanaugh said these Accords fall "within the gray area of international law."74 
Cavanaugh considered that the intra-, not inter-state Oslo Accords between the 
Palestinians and Israel are not subject to IL, since they lack "enforcement 
mechanisms." However, she added that the Oslo Accords had received a de facto legal 
status, while displacing the "relevant international law in practice." 
 
She stated that the Oslo Accords could not fulfill the terms of IHL as interim 
agreements and so any permanent agreement to follow, basing on these interim 
agreements would not be expected to comply with IHL. 
 
                                                 
72 Shehadeh, Ibid, 5. 
73 Falk, Richard, “Some International Law Implications of the Oslo/Cairo Framework for the 
PLO/Israeli Peace Talks,” in Human Rights, Self Determination and Political Change in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories, Ibid, 10. 
74 Kathleen Cavanaugh, "The Cost of Peace: Assessing the Palestinian-Israeli Accords," Middle East 
Report 211, (1999): 11. 
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Cavanaugh also considered that the language of the agreements was left 
"vague or even contradictory." The Accords allow Israel to maintain control over 
Jewish settlements in the OPT, including the GS75, the WB and Jerusalem. At the 
same time these agreements promise the implementation of the UN SC resolutions 
(242) of 1967 and (338) of 1973 that call for Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian 
Territory, occupied in 1967. For example Article (IV) of the DoP says, "Jurisdiction 
of the Council will cover WB and GS territory, except for issues that will be 
negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the WB and the 
GS as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim 
period." Article (V) paragraph (3) defines the "issues" to be negotiated in the 
permanent status negotiations, saying, "It is understood that these (final status) 
negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, 
security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours, and 
other issues of common interest." 
 
Meanwhile, keeping Israel's control over Palestinian areas, where settlements 
exist, prevents the fulfillment of the aim of the negotiations that were to "lead to the 
implementation of SC resolutions (242) and (338) as indicated in Article (I) of the 
DoP. 
 
Furthermore; Cavanaugh argues that Israel's practices show that the Oslo 
Accords are above IL since Israel refers to the "violations of the Oslo" Accords 
instead of referring to IL, even when these agreements violate IL.76 
                                                 
75 Israel evacuated Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip and withdrew troops from the Strip in 2005 
within the implementation of Ariel Sharon's plan of disengagement from the Gaza Strip. This will be 
discussed further in Chapters to come. 
76 Cavanaugh, Ibid, 12. 
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Despite the wide international concern, given to the Oslo Accords, they cannot 
meet the conditions for an international treaty, especially as the Palestinian side in the 
accords is not a sovereign party, in addition to that the accords are not governed by 
IL, rather; parts of them are deemed a breach of IL. 
 
Richard Falk,77 meanwhile, argues that even though the Palestinian side in the 
peace process and the PLO do not possess a full status like any other sovereign state, 
several factors had played role in “internationalizing” the process, giving the PLO a 
"state-like de facto role in the process and making the resultant arrangements treaty-
like for most purpose." These factors, according to Falk include, signing an 
endorsement of the White House agreements; international emphasis on the “equality 
of the parties”; the Norwegian encouragement of the negotiations; the respect 
Customary IL gives to any outcome of negotiations on self determination conducted 
with “non-state actors”; and the UN’s “formal support” for the peace negotiations.78 
 
Falk’s argument points may fall within the tendency of the International 
Community to welcome any agreement reached between belligerent parties with the 
goal to resolving problems at a bilateral level or to end a state of violence, which by 
the way; helped Israel to breach IL in the name of the implementation of the peace 
accords. 
 
                                                 
77 On March 26, 2008, the UN Human Rights Council elected Richard Falk as the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967. He 
followed predecessor John Dugard in this position. Falk published his first official report on September 
16, 2008. 
78 Falk, Ibid, 15 
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This tendency, as expressed by Antonio Cassesse,79 stipulates that there are 
three sets of values, supporting the overarching system of inter-state relations in the 
current framework of the international community, “peace, human rights and self 
determination. However; any time that conflict or tension arises between two or more 
of those values, peace must always constitute the ultimate and prevailing factor.”80 
 
Although he agrees that the Oslo Accords do not possess the traditional sense 
as international treaties since only states possess that capacity, Geoffrey Watson 
argues that the Oslo Accords carry a binding character in many ways: The text of the 
Accords "strongly suggest(s) that the parties had in mind a legally binding 
arrangement."81 
 
Watson also makes benefit of the text of Article (3) of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties that says that, "it does not affect the legal force of agreements 
between states and other subjects of international law." Watson explains that the 
phrase "other subjects of international law" covers international organizations, the 
Holy See and other international entities, including "insurgents" which made some 
scholars consider the PLO as a subject of international law and so, the Oslo Accords it 
signed are "treaties under customary international law."82 
 
Although, according to traditional IL Israel is the only side that can be bound, 
the two parties are intended to be bound. But modern IL gives opportunity for a state 
to make "binding international agreements with a sub-state entity" seeking autonomy 
                                                 
79 Antonio Cassesse is the first President of the International Criminal Tribunal For the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY), 1993 to 1997. 
80 Cassesse, Ibid, 24. 
81 Watson, Ibid, p91. 
82 Ibid, 100-101. 
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or self determination. Watson also considers it as inappropriate to describe the Oslo 
Accords as a "delegation by Israel to the PLO," making the PLO a "puppet regime" 
that is disfavored by the laws governing belligerency laws.83 
                                                 
83 Ibid, 92-99. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2. The Legal Status of the Palestinian Territory 
 
This Chapter addresses the argument that Israel is still occupying the 
Palestinian Territory. It is going to look at the status of the OPT since 1967 as 
occupied territory with the various developments that took place until the signing of 
the Oslo Accords, answering the first question of the hypothesis of the study "Is Israel 
still occupying the Palestinian Territory?" 
 
2.1. Legal Status of Occupied Territories under International Law 
 
The focus of this section of the chapter will be on the occupied territories as 
seen by the Charter of the UN and the international conventions, especially The 
Hague Convention of 1907 and the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
 
The work of the International Committees of the Red Cross (hereinafter 
ICRC) is yet of significance that cannot be ignored. The last part of this section will 
focus on the ICRC intervention in occupied territories. 
 
2.1.1. Occupied Territories in International Conventions 
 
IHL defines belligerent occupation and sets rules laying out the 
responsibilities of the occupying power towards the occupied territory and people. 
The main international conventions that apply in the occupied territory are the 1907 
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Hague Conventions, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War and Land that focus 
on protecting interests of the state, whose territory is occupied and the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War that 
focuses on the occupied people, who are referred to as the protected persons,84 in 
addition to the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and Protocol and the 1977 
Geneva Protocol I.85 
 
Section III of the Hague Regulations86 sets rules relating to the occupied 
territory. Article (42) defines the occupied territory as, "(t)erritory is considered 
occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army" and that 
"(t)he occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been 
established and can be exercised." Meanwhile, the occupying power should take all 
the required measures "to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and 
safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the 
country."87 
 
As soon as a territory falls under occupation as set out in Article (42), IHL 
applies to that territory. 
                                                 
84 HPCR, “Israel’s Obligations under IHL in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,” Ibid, 3. Protected 
Persons, referred to in the Geneva Conventions include civilians, wounded and sick in the field; 
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked at sea; and prisoners of war, aliens in the territory of a party to the 
conflict, persons in occupied territory, and internees, all of whom are entitled to the basic protection 
codified in Article (27), respect, protection, and humane treatment under all circumstances. (Source: 
Heike Spieker, “Protected Persons”, Crimes of War, A-Z Guide, http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/ 
protected-persons.html). 
85 Adam Roberts, “Prolonged Military Occupation: The Israeli-Occupied Territories Since 1967,” 
American Journal of International Law 84-1, (January 1990): 54. 
86 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations 
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907. 
87 Ibid, Article (43). 
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Other obligations, The Hague regulations imposed on the occupying state are 
included in articles (44-56). The occupying state shall not "force the inhabitants of 
territory occupied by it to furnish information about the army of the other belligerent 
or about its means of defense"88 and it shall not "compel the inhabitants of occupied 
territory to swear allegiance to the hostile Power."89 
 
The occupying power is also obliged to respect "(f)amily honour and rights, 
the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and 
practice," in the occupied territory."90 "The occupying State shall be regarded only as 
administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and 
agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied 
country."91 
 
The conventions ban any belligerent reprisals against the personnel, the 
wounded, the sick, prisoners of war, certain buildings and equipment and "persons 
and property of civilians" in the occupied territories.92 
 
IHL, meanwhile, urges the maintenance of the administrative and judicial 
status of the occupied territory, unless it is cancelled by the occupying state if it is 
found that it could threaten the occupying state's security or it might prevent 
implementation of IL as stated in Article (64) of the Fourth Geneva Convention that 
says, "The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the 
                                                 
88 Ibid, Article (44). 
89 Ibid, Article (45). 
90 Ibid, Article (46). 
91 Ibid, Article (55). 
92 Kwakwa, Ibid, 150. 
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exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in cases 
where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the application of the 
present Convention." 
 
IL of Occupation also applies even if no armed resistance or fighting is 
witnessed, according to Article (2) of the Geneva Convention that says, "(T)he 
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed 
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if 
the state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to 
all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, 
even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance." 
 
Meanwhile, the occupying power according to the first paragraph of Article 
(54) of the Geneva Convention "may not alter the status of public officials or judges 
in the occupied territories, or in any way apply sanctions to or take any measures of 
coercion or discrimination against them, should they abstain from fulfilling their 
functions for reasons of conscience." 
 
Article (65) of the Geneva Convention obliges the occupying state to release 
the penalty laws it imposes in the language of the original citizens of the occupied 
territory before they come into force. 
 
IL also forces the occupying authorities to follow legal procedures in bringing 
protected persons before a military court. The first paragraph of Article (71) of the 
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Geneva Convention says, "No sentence shall be pronounced by the competent courts 
of the Occupying Power except after a regular trial." 
 
Scholars differ in defining whether the occupying state has the right to issue 
laws or not. Some scholars say that the occupying power has very limited non-
sovereign authority on the occupied territory and so it does not have the right to issue 
any laws, whilst others see expanding interpretation of Article (43) of the Hague 
Convention to give the occupying power the right to issue laws, except any law that 
allows it to annex the occupied territory. Meanwhile, a third party believes that 
Article (43) applies for issuing laws and not for decrees.93 
 
Judicially, Article (54) of the Geneva Convention restricts the powers of the 
occupying state and obliges it to respect the judicial system in the occupied territory 
as the article prohibits the occupying state to "alter the status of public officials or 
judges in the occupied territories, or in any way apply sanctions to or take any 
measures of coercion or discrimination against them, should they abstain from 
fulfilling their functions for reasons of conscience." 
 
As soon as conditions of applicability of conventions are fulfilled, they enter 
into force.94 Article (2) of the Geneva Convention stipulates, "In addition to the 
provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall 
apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise 
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not 
recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or 
                                                 
93 Nabulsi, Ibid, 107-110. 
94 HPCR, “Review of the Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory,” Harvard University, (July 2004): 2. 
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total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said 
occupation meets with no armed resistance." 
 
Scholars consider IL, relating to the rights of the occupying state vis-à-vis the 
residents and property in the occupied territory as a treaty law that can be enforced by 
courts, however; they consider that the occupying power always tries to get what the 
IL prohibits and so, it tries to do so by using its legislative powers, bypassing IL.95 
 
Israel has always denied applicability of the Geneva Conventions on the 
Palestinian Territory although the UN and other international bodies have always 
confirmed applicability of the Conventions in the Arab territories and Jerusalem as 
occupied territories since 1967.96 
 
Israel’s argument on the inapplicability of the Geneva Conventions on the 
OPT is based on its interpretation of the convention’s Common Article (2). In light of 
its view to the status of the Palestinian Territory before the 1967 war,97 Israel argues 
that the Article, which states the scope of application of the convention,98 does not 
apply to the Palestinian Territory that before its occupation was not a sovereign state. 
 
Israel interprets the Article as conditioning ousting a sovereign state for the 
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Conventions to civilians in occupied territories, 
                                                 
95 Jacob Sundberg, “Belligerent Occupation and the Geneva Protocol, 1977: A Swedish Perspective," 
Law and Contemporary Problems 42-2, Changing Rules for Changing Forms of Warfare, (Spring, 
1978): 82. 
96 Nizar Ayyoub, The Legal Status of Jerusalem between the Mandate and the Political Settlement, (AL 
HAQ, 2001), 79-80 (ARABIC). 
97 See supra section (1.2.2) of this study. 
98 Roberts, 1990, Ibid, supra note (18). 
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considering the occupation as a temporary situation with the end of which, the 
occupied land will be returned to the legitimate sovereign.99 
 
The absence of a legitimate sovereign for whom the OPT can be returned, 
encourages the argument of Israel, which does not consider itself as occupying the GS 
and the WB, including East Jerusalem that were under the rule of Egypt and Jordan 
respectively.100 
 
In what can be deemed as refuting Israel’s convention inapplicability claims, 
the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, confirmed in Paragraph (101) that, “In 
view of the foregoing, the Court considers that the Fourth Geneva Convention is 
applicable in any occupied territory in the event of an armed conflict arising between 
two or more High Contracting Parties. Israel and Jordan were parties to that 
Convention when the 1967 armed conflict broke out. The Court accordingly finds that 
the Convention is applicable in the Palestinian territories which before the conflict lay 
to the east of the Green Line and which, during that conflict, were occupied by Israel, 
there being no need for any enquiry into the precise prior status of those territories.”101 
 
The article confirms that the parties of the 1967 war –Israel, Jordan, Egypt, 
Syria- were sovereign parties and are formally bound by the principal international 
agreements, governing occupation.102 
                                                 
99 Ibid, 64. 
100 HPCR, “Review of the Applicability of the International Humanitarian Law to the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories,” Ibid, 3-5. 
101 See, the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Wall, Ibid. 
102 Roberts, 1990, Ibid, 61-62, (with regard to the commitments of the four states to international 
conventions, Roberts explains the situation as follows: (a) None of the four states has ever been 
member of the Hague Conventions on 1907, however; they are all bound to it in view of customary 
Law status of the regulations annexed to it; (b) Israel and Jordan ratified the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 in 1951, Egypt in 1952 and Syria in 1953; (c) the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and 
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2.1.2 Occupied Territories in the UN Charter 
 
The UN Charter and the law known as jus ad bellum decide the legality of any 
occupation. Meanwhile, the law of occupation applies as soon as an occupation 
situation has taken place, whether this occupation has received SC approval or not.103 
 
Article (1) paragraph (2) of Chapter (I) of the UN Charter "Purposes and 
Principles" says that amongst the UN principles and purposes is developing friendly 
relations and respect amongst nations to ensure "equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples" and strengthen "universal peace." 
 
Article (2) paragraph (4) urges the UN member countries to "refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Purposes of the United Nations." 
 
Article (55) of Chapter (IV) of the charter "International Economic and Social 
Cooperation" confirms that the UN is also aimed at promoting "universal respect for, 
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction 
as to race, sex, language, or religion" 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Protocol were ratified by Egypt in 1955, Jordan in 1957 and Syria in 1958, whilst Israel ratified the 
Convention in 1957 and registered its accession to the Protocol in 1958; (d) Whilst Israel has never 
made any adherence to the 1977 Geneva Protocol I, Egypt signed it but not ratified, Jordan ratified in 
1979 and Syria acceded in 1983. 
103 ICRC, "Occupation and international humanitarian law: questions and answers," official web page 
http://icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/634kfc?opendocument. 
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Article (73) of Chapter (XI) of the Charter "Declaration Regarding Non-Self-
Governing Territories" says that, "Members of the United Nations which have or 
assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not 
yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the 
interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred 
trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace 
and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of 
these territories," 
 
In order to achieve those goals, the members would work on ensuring social 
and economic rights of the concerned people and their just treatment and protection 
against abuses; developing self-government and considering the political aspirations 
of the peoples.104 
 
Chapter (XII) of the Charter "International Trusteeship System" establishes, 
under the authority of the UN, an international trusteeship system, with the goal to 
promote "progressive development towards self-government or independence as may 
be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory." 
 
In an advisory opinion in the case of Namibia in 1970, the ICJ ruled that an 
occupying state is responsible for the implementation of obligations stated in human 
rights conventions in the occupied territory, considering those conventions as “general 
conventions” with humanitarian character that might affect the people of the occupied 
                                                 
104 UN Charter, Chapter (XI), Article (73) paragraphs (a, b, c, d, e). 
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territory if not implemented.105 In explaining the phrase “humanitarian character”, 
some scholars considered it to have the “general connotation of ‘human rights’”, 
which means that human rights apply to situation of belligerent occupation and armed 
conflict.106 
 
Meanwhile, since its admission to the UN membership on May, 11, 1949,107 
Israel has been obliged to abide by the UN Charter108 that is applied as a standard of 
human rights to the occupied territory.109 
 
Since the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territory in 1967, the UN GA 
and SC have repeatedly confirmed that the Palestinian Territory is occupied by Israel. 
The UN GA Resolution No. (58/292) in 2004 confirmed "that the status of the 
Palestinian Territory occupied since 1967, including East Jerusalem, remains one of 
military occupation … and that Israel, the occupying Power, has only the duties and 
                                                 
105 Legal Consequences For States Of The Continued Presence Of South Africa In Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution, 276 (1970)1971 I.C.J. 16, 1971 WL 8 
(I.C.J.). 
106 Linda Bevis, The Applicability of Human Rights Law to Occupied Territory: The Case of the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, (Ramallah: AL HAQ, 1994), 19-20. 
107 In fall of 1948, Israel had applied for membership in the UN but failed to win the necessary majority 
in the SC. In spring of 1949, the application was renewed This time, armistice agreements having been 
signed between Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon, Israel was admitted by 37 votes in favour, 12 
against, with 9 abstentions. (Source: Jewish Virtual Library, United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution (273) of May 11, 1949. Consider: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/UN/ 
unga273.html.  
108 Israel's admission to the UN membership was in fact conditioned by its respect to the UN Charter 
and resolutions as declared the Foreign Minister of the Provisional Government of Israel Moshe 
Shertok on November 29, 1948 (See Shertok's letter to the UN "Application of Israel for Admission to 
Membership in the United Nations: Letter dated 29 November 1948, from the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Provisional Government of Israel to the Secretary-General," can be found on the UN 
official web site: http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/2ee9468747556b2d85256cf60060d2a6/4a9a96807f 
788857052566c60059d4ff!OpenDocument. However, in his book Palestine, Palestinians and 
International Law, Francis Boyle argued that Israel has violated the UN Charter since its admission by 
rejecting the UN GA Resolutions No. (181) and (194). He says that the UN has the right to expel Israel 
from the organization, but as it is not possible to do so due to the inevitable US veto against such a 
decision, the UNGA can exercise its powers to suspend Israel's participation throughout the UN 
organization. 
109 Bevis, Ibid, 60 
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obligations of an occupying Power under the Geneva Convention … and the 
Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention …" 
 
The SC Resolution No. (1544) in 2004 reiterated Israel's obligation as an 
"occupying power" and referred to the Palestinian Territory as "occupied by Israel 
since 1967". 
 
At the same time, war and occupation do not absolve the occupying state of its 
responsibilities towards respect of human rights in the occupied territory, especially 
when the occupying state is signatory of a human rights treaty. For an example, Israel, 
as a signatory party after signing the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (hereinafter ICCPR) of 1966 and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter ICESCR) of 1966, is obliged to respect and 
implement the IL.110 
 
In its Advisory Opinion on the Wall in 2004 the ICJ said in Paragraph (112) 
that, "the territories occupied by Israel have for over 37 years been subject to its 
territorial jurisdiction as the occupying Power." 
 
This ruling, meanwhile; supports the argument that the IHRL and conventions, 
when Israel ratifies, apply to the OPT. Perhaps, the inter-relation between the IHL and 
the IHRL adds to the argument, since the former applies in situations of armed 
conflict and the latter is applicable in both situations of armed conflict and in times of 
peace. 
                                                 
110 Aisha Ahmed, Israeli Violations to the Palestinian Human Rights during 2006 and their effect on 
the performance of the Palestinian National Authority, (Ramallah: The Palestinian Independent 
Commission for Citizen's Rights, 2007), 14-15, (ARABIC). 
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“Israel denies that the ICCPR and the ICESCR, both of which it has signed,111 
are applicable to the occupied Palestinian territory. It asserts that humanitarian law is 
the protection granted in a conflict situation such as the one in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, whereas human rights treaties were intended for the protection of citizens 
from their own Government in times of peace."112 
 
In discussing the possibility of the applicability of human rights conventions, 
Israel ratified, to the Palestinian Territory, the court said “while the jurisdiction of 
States is primarily territorial, it may sometimes be exercised outside the national 
territory. Considering the object and purpose of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, it would seem natural that, even when such is the case, States 
Parties to the Covenant should be bound to comply with its provisions.”113 
 
2.1.3. ICRC Intervention in Occupied Territories 
 
The main and most important role of the ICRC during armed conflicts is 
supervision114 in addition to its role in the interpretation of the IHL. The ICRC 
interpretations of the international conventions are considered as official 
interpretations of the conventions. During the ninth meeting of the States Parties to 
the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines in Geneva between 24-28 
                                                 
111 On 3 October 1991, Israel ratified both the ICESCR and the ICCPR of 1966 and the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child of 1989. 
112 See ICJ Advisory Opinion, Ibid, Paragraph (102). 
113 Ibid, Paragraph (109). 
114 Kwakwa, Ibid, 168. 
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November 2008 and upon their request, the ICRC presented a legal interpretation of 
Article (5.5) of the Convention.115 
 
The more restrictive approach that is adopted by a number of military 
manuals, in interpreting the concept "control" is "a situation of occupation (that) 
exists only once a party to a conflict is in a position to exercise sufficient authority 
over enemy territory to enable it to discharge all of the duties imposed by the law of 
occupation." Meanwhile, the ICRC suggested in its commentary to the Forth Geneva 
Convention in 1958, another approach for interpretation that is "a situation of 
occupation (that) exists wherever a party to a conflict exercises some level of 
authority or control within foreign territory."116 
 
IL obliges states to take certain measures at both national and international 
levels to enforce the IHL, including disseminating the IHL, respecting and facilitating 
work of international fact finding missions and work of the personnel of the ICRC,117 
which has principal role in ensuring respect of IL.118 
 
State parties of international conventions are yet obliged to ensure respect of 
IL by other states to the convention. For example, in its Advisory opinion on the Wall, 
the ICJ stated that, “State parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 have in addition the 
obligation, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to 
                                                 
115 The ICRC statement on the issue can be found on the convention’s web site: 
www.apminebanconvention.org. 
116 ICRC, "Occupation and international humanitarian law: questions and answers," Ibid. 
117 Kwakwa, Ibid, 159-171. 
118 ICRC, "What is the difference between humanitarian law and human rights law?" available at: 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5KZMUY. 
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ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that 
conventions.”119 
 
However, the occupation, the ICRC confirms, is a temporary situation that 
interferes in the sovereign rights of the people under occupation, but this interference 
can never be interpreted as diminishing or terminating these rights of the occupied 
people.120 
 
The state of occupation ends when the occupying power withdraws its forces 
from the occupied territory and the local authority assumes power and exercises full 
and free sovereignty on the territory. Article (6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
provides, “In the case of occupied territory, the application of the present Convention 
shall cease one year after the close of military operations; however, the Occupying 
Power shall be bound, during the duration of the occupation, to the extent that such 
Power exercises the functions of government in such territory," by provisions of 
several articles of the Convention. Accordingly, the article stipulates that occupation 
ends in two cases; first, after one year of ending military operations and second, when 
the occupying power no longer exercises governmental functions in the occupied 
territory. 
 
The important principles governing occupation according to the ICRC, 
include, the obligations of the occupying power as defined in articles (42-56) of the 
1907 Hague Regulations; Articles (27-34 and 47-78) of the Fourth Geneva 
                                                 
119 See ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Wall, Ibid. 
120 ICRC, "Civilians in the power of the enemy and international humanitarian law", ICRC web page 
http://icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/section_ihl_civilians_in_the_power_of_the_enemy?OpenDo
cument. 
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Convention; certain provisions of the Additional Protocol I of 1977; Customary IHL 
and deals reached between the occupying power and the local authorities of the 
occupied territory that should not deprive the population of the occupied territory of 
the international humanitarian protection according to Article (47) of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention.121 
 
Meanwhile, in case of occupation state, several rules of law apply. The 
occupation power cannot acquire sovereignty over the occupied territory; the state of 
occupation is temporary and the occupying power enjoys rights that are only "limited 
to the extent of that period"; unless its security is threatened, the occupying power has 
to respect the laws in force in the occupied territory; restoring public order and safety 
is the responsibility of the occupying power; the occupying power is responsible for 
providing the people in the occupied territory with public health, food and medical 
care; the occupying power does not have right to force occupied people to enroll in its 
army; the occupying power does not have the right to transfer the people within or out 
of their country; nor does the occupying power have the right to transfer its population 
into the occupied territory; it is prohibited for the occupying power to take collective 
punishment measures against the occupied people or to take hostages; It is also 
prohibited for the occupying power to destroy or confiscate private property or 
cultural property of the occupied territory.122 
 
                                                 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid. 
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2.2. Status of Palestinian Territory under Israeli Occupation 
 
Since the Israeli occupation in 1967, the Palestinian Territory has witnessed a 
series of developments, including the first and second uprisings in 1987 and 2000 
respectively, the Jordan-West Bank disengagement and the Palestinian Declaration of 
Independence in 1988, the launching of the peace process in the early nineties and the 
Israeli unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005. 
 
This section of the chapter intends to check what changes those developments 
have brought with regard to the status of the Palestinian Territory as occupied 
territory. 
 
Unlike the previous sections, this section is divided chronologically. As the 
Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territory was clear before the launching of the 
Oslo process in 1994, the status of the Palestinian Territory after the creation of the 
Palestinian Authority became debatable. With the eruption of the Al Aqsa Intifada in 
2000 and the Israeli incursions into the PA areas in 2002, the situation became more 
complicated as Israel proved to remain controlling the territory. The 2005 pullout of 
Israeli troops and settlers from the Gaza Strip, however, renewed the debate over the 
status of the OPT. 
 
2.2.1. The Palestinian Territory (1967-1994) 
 
As soon as it took control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 1967, Israel 
issued three proclamations. In Proclamation No. (1), Israel announced assumption of 
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powers in the Palestinian Territory; Proclamation No. (2) announced that the Israeli 
Military Command assumes executive, legislative and judicial powers in the occupied 
territory; whilst Proclamation No. (3) announced establishment of military courts.123 
 
Shortly after the occupation, Israel started implementation of the British 
Defence (emergency) regulations in the Occupied Territory. The use of the emergency 
regulations increased after the first Palestinian uprising (Intifada) in 1987. Although 
Britain revoked those regulations with the end of the British Mandate on Palestine in 
1948 and Jordan never recognized those regulations as valid during its rule of the 
WB, Israel alleged they were still in effect and still part of the local law of the WB 
that IL allows the occupied state to continue to apply.124 
 
Israel declared its intentions to use laws it considers in effect before its 1967 
occupation of the Palestinian Territory in two separate Proclamations it issued in the 
WB and in the GS. The Israeli Military Proclamation No. (2)125 says in Article (2) that 
the laws that were in force in the area before the June 7, 1967 shall remain in force, 
unless they contradict with this Proclamation or any Proclamation or Order to be 
issued. Article (3) of the same Proclamation grants the Regional Commander 
governmental, legislative, appointive and administrative power in the Occupied 
Territory and so the executive, legislative and judicial powers came under the 
authority of the Military Command of the WB and the GS, except East Jerusalem, 
which was given a different administration and legal status. Upon this proclamation, 
                                                 
123 Raja Shehadeh, 1996, Ibid, 7. 
124 Martha Moffett, Perpetual Emergency, A Legal Analysis of Israel's Use of the British Defence 
(Emergency) Regulations, 1945, In the Occupied Territories, (Ramallah: Al Haq, 1989), 1. 
125 "Publications, Orders and Appointments", Issued by the Israeli military force leadership in the West 
Bank, Issue (1), (5 August 1967): 3-4. (ARABIC).The publication appeared in Arabic and Hebrew only. 
The English translation as appeared in Shehadeh, Ibid, and Feras Milhem, "The Origins and Evolution 
of the Palestinian Sources of Law," PhD diss., (Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Faculty of Law, 2004). 
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thousands of military orders have been issued during the occupation years both in the 
WB and the GS.126 
 
The Israeli occupation authorities established the Civil Administration in the 
WB and the GS in 1981 with the goal to administer the civil affairs in the territory and 
so to separate the military functions from civil ones. The Civil Administration was 
authorized to implement the laws in force in the WB and the GS.127 
 
A report by the JMCC128 argues that IL has allowed the occupying power to 
issue certain regulations only if its security needs new legislation or if the regulations 
are needed for the interest of the civilian population. Israel's reasons behind issuing 
the thousands of military orders, however; do not meet those conditions, but they 
were only meant "to change facts on the ground." Moreover; the report added, the 
Israeli military orders were issued as to legalize control of the WB and the GS and 
measures imposed on ground in the Palestinian Territory, including expropriation of 
Palestinian land, construction of the WB Wall, demolition of Palestinian homes and 
imposing economic restrictions. 
 
With the goal to make the Jewish settlers in the WB and Gaza settlements 
equal to the rest of Israelis, Israel implemented the Israeli administrative and legal 
system in the settlements in the territory and thus the Israeli law is absorbed into the 
occupied territory. 129 
 
                                                 
126 Milhem, Ibid, supra note (112) 127-128. 
127 Ibid, 129. 
128 JMCC, "Israeli Military Orders in the Occupied Palestinian West Bank: 1967-1992," Special Report 
from Palestine, (1995): 214, available at: http://www.jmcc.org/research/special/military.html. 
129 Milhem, Ibid, 145-148. 
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With regard to Jerusalem, Israel imposed the Israeli law on the eastern part of 
the city upon a series of legal steps it took with the goal to annex the Holy City.130 
 
Despite Israel's claims since its occupation to the Palestinian areas in 1967 that 
the IHL, especially the Fourth Geneva Convention, does not apply to the OPT, 
including East Jerusalem, the convention's High Contracting Parties stressed in their 
conference in Geneva on December 5, 2001, that the convention applies to the OPT in 
a statement that said, "the participating High Contracting Parties reaffirmed the 
applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
including East Jerusalem. Furthermore, they reiterated the need for full respect for the 
provisions of the said Convention in that Territory."131 
 
The conference also urged the high contracting parties to ensure 
implementation of the Geneva Convention in the OPT. 
 
The only time Israel considered applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
in the OPT was in Article (35) of Proclamation No. (3), announced in 1967, when 
Israel clearly indicated that the Convention applies in the WB and the GS. However; 
the article was removed, without explanation, upon military order No. (144), issued 
only about four months later. The reference to the Convention was not mentioned 
again.132 
 
                                                 
130 For further information about the Israeli annexation of Jerusalem after the 1967 War, see section 
(1.2.3) of this study. 
131 The declaration of the High Contracting Parties of the Fourth Geneva Convention Conference, 
December 5, 2001, can be traced on the UN official web page: http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/c 
25aba03f1e079db85256cf40073bfe6/8fc4f064b9be5bad85256c1400722951!OpenDocument. 
132 Shehadeh, 1996, Ibid, 7. 
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2.2.1.a 1987 Intifada 
 
With the eruption of the uprising (Intifada) in December 1987, several 
developments on the situation of the Palestinian Territory have taken place. On July 
31, 1988, less than one year of the eruption of the 1987 Intifada, King Hussein of 
Jordan declared political and legal disengagement between Jordan and the WB. 
 
In implementation of this decision, Jordan started revoking Jordanian 
citizenship of WB residents, who were hence granted temporary travel documents for 
two years instead,133 “subsequently extended to five years to Palestinian applicants” 
with the purpose to help their holders to travel freely throughout the world. However, 
the Palestinian holders of the documents were not recognized as Jordanian citizens 
although the documents were recognized as official ones.134 
 
The Jordanian step was followed several months later with a Palestinian move 
to declare a Palestinian State. During the nineteenth session of the Palestinian 
National Council (hereinafter PNC) in Algiers on November 15, 1988, leader of the 
PLO Yasser Arafat declared a State of Palestine as outlined in the UN partition Plan 
                                                 
133 Samih K. Farsoun, and Christina E. Zacharia, Palestine and the Palestinians, (US: Westview Press, 
1997), 205. 
134 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, “Reports Submitted by States Parties under 
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(181),135 that calls for terminating the British Mandate of Palestine by August 1, 1948, 
and facilitating the creation of two states, one Jewish and one Arab in Palestine.136 
 
The Declaration illustrated the PLO’s intention to build the Palestinian 
democratic state with "peaceful means" as stated the declaration when it said, "(t)he 
state of Palestine further declares, in that connection that it believes in the solution of 
international and regional problems by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations and the resolutions adopted by it."137 
 
The Declaration also took into consideration principles of human rights and 
democracy when it said the Palestinians should "enjoy full equality of rights. Their 
religious and political beliefs and human dignity shall therein be safeguarded under a 
democratic parliamentary system based on freedom of opinion and the freedom to 
form parties, on the heed of the majority for minority rights and the respect of 
minorities for majority decisions, on social justice and equality, and on non-
discrimination in civil rights on grounds of race, religion or colour or as between men 
and women, under a Constitution ensuring the rule of law and an independent 
judiciary and on the basis of true fidelity to the age-old spiritual and cultural heritage 
of Palestine with respect to mutual tolerance, coexistence and magnanimity among 
religions." The Declaration further said, "(t)he state of Palestine declares its 
commitment to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and to the policy and principles of non-alignment."138 
                                                 
135 "A Brief History of Palestine", web page of Baker Abdel Menem, Palestine's Ambassador to 
Canada, http://www.cyberus.ca/~baker/pal_hist.htm. 
136 See UNGA Resolution No. (181) on 29 November 1947. 
137 PNC, Political Communiqué and Declaration of Independence, November 15, 1988, (27 I.L.M. 
1660 (1988). 
138 PNC, Political Communiqué and Declaration of Independence, Ibid. 
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2.2.1.b Statehood Debate 
 
As the state of Palestine was declared, more than 114 world countries 
recognized it and one month after the declaration took place, the UN GA recognized 
the newly declared state of Palestine upon resolution No. (43/177) on December 15, 
1988.139 
 
Francis Boyle of the University of Illinois was one of the most enthusiastic 
supporters for the establishment of a Palestinian state. Boyle considers four elements, 
forming a state and applying to the Palestinian Territory.140 These four elements 
include “territory, population, government and the capacity to enter into relations with 
other states.” Boyle excluded borders, arguing that borders are not necessary for a 
territory to be declared a state, since Israel is a recognized state at a time it does not 
have defined borders. Moreover; Boyle argues that the borders are yet to be 
negotiated between Israel and the Palestinians. 
 
As the Palestinian people are an original population of the Palestinian 
Territory, they have always been supposed to establish a state. The PLO has always 
served as a government for the Palestinians. Boyle also considers the recognition of 
the UN General Assembly of the state of Palestine as “constitutive and universally 
determinative.”141 
 
                                                 
139 Francis Boyle, “The Creation of the State of Palestine,” EJIL. 1-1, (1990): 302. 
140 Ibid, 302. 
141 Ibid, 303. 
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James Crawford, however; was far more cautious in this concern. Crawford 
actually did not agree with Boyle’s argument.142 In addition to Boyle’s four elements, 
Crawford adds Independence and sovereignty as other elements to form a state in 
addition to other elements, including permanence, willingness and ability to obey IL, 
a certain degree of civilization, legal order and recognition.143 
 
In this respect, Asem Khalil, who also adopted arguments similar to Crawford 
and negated the existence of a Palestinian state since its declaration due to the 
continuation of the Israeli occupation, stressed on the right of Palestinians in self 
determination that is not exclusive to “those who make apart of state,” and so absence 
of state for Palestinians due to the occupation can in no means deprive the 
Palestinians their right in self determination.144 
 
The right of self determination is the legitimate basis for independence of 
peoples under occupation and it gives nations the right to freely decide their political 
independence and political future with no external intervention, in addition to 
choosing the political regime they see appropriate for them.145 
 
The right of self determination was guaranteed in several international 
documents, including the UN Charter Articles (1) Paragraph (2) and Article (55), and 
common Articles (1) of the ICCPR and the ICESCR. The same Article in both 
                                                 
142 See James Crawford, “The Creation of the State of Palestine: Too Much, Too Soon?” EJIL. 1-1, 
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Halabi Legal Publications, 2005), 336-337. (ARABIC). 
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covenants provides, "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural development." 
 
The UN GA Resolution No. (58/292) confirmed "that the Palestinian people 
have the right to self-determination and to sovereignty over their territory." 
 
As they are seeking independence and state, the Palestinians had accepted 
autonomy as a political means that can protect their rights and not a goal by itself.146 
However; the Palestinians' view to their state has changed as the years passed. As of 
1948 till 1974, the Palestinians only considered having a state in the whole of 
Palestine, whilst the 1967 war constituted no break on this view. Between 1974 and 
1988, the Palestinians considered establishment of a Palestinian state on any liberated 
part of Palestine as stated the “provisional political programme”, adopted by the PNC 
in its twelfth session in Cairo in June 1974. The 1974 development in the Palestinian 
view to statehood, resulted in granting the Palestinians an observer status at the UN in 
1976, declaring by the European Economic Community the Palestinian self 
determination as “one of the main planks of the middle eastern policy”, and after 
1988, the Palestinians started seeking a state in the WB and the GS with East 
Jerusalem as its capital. This change appeared in the communiqué that accompanied 
the 1988 Declaration of Independence,147 with which the Palestinians officially 
recognized Israel, relinquishing claims to 78 per cent of Palestine.148 
 
                                                 
146 David Newman and Ghazi Falah, “Bridging the Gap: Palestinian and Israeli Discourses on 
Autonomy and Statehood,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 22-1, (1997), 112. 
147 Newman and Falah, Ibid, 124. 
148 Sara Roy, “Palestinian Society and Economy: The Continued Denial of Possibility,” Journal of 
Palestine Studies 30-4, (Summer 2001): 5. 
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The issue of statehood was highlighted again after the signing of the Oslo 
Accords between Israel and the PLO and defining May, 4, 1999 as a deadline for the 
interim phase of the Accords. 
 
Some scholars raised the question of declaring an independent Palestinian 
state on that day, whilst others aroused another related question that is “(h)ow many 
times must a national liberation movement declare a state during its lifetime?!149 
 
Azmi Bishara argues that if the PA had proceeded with the declaration of a 
state on May, 4, 1999, it would have struggled for securing recognition of that state 
for such a unilateral declaration of Independence would not have been passed without 
problems. Israel itself would have created obstacles before the recognition, arguing 
that the Palestinian side was violating the peace process by such a move; furthermore; 
such a Palestinian State could not survive without an agreement with Israel that 
controls borders and territory and so is capable of imposing punitive measures in the 
Palestinian Territory including ending negotiations.150 
 
The issue of recognizing newly established states has developed along the 
years. “Recognition of states is not a matter governed by law, but a question of 
policy.”151 This means that there are no specific rules defining recognition of states. 
 
                                                 
149 Azmi Bishara, “4, May, 1999 and Palestinian Statehood: To or Not to Declare?” Journal of 
Palestine Studies 28-2, (Winter 1999): 5-9. 
150 Ibid, 10-11. 
151 Quoting H. Lauterpacht, Roland Rich, “Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union, Symposium: Recent Developments in the Practice of State Recognition,” EJIL, (1993): 
36. 
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With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the early nineties, 
dozens of new states were created, bringing new considerations with regard to the 
practice of state recognition.152 
 
A Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of the New States in 
Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union was issued by the European Council Foreign 
Ministers on December 16, 1991 as “Annex 1” on Recognition of States. The 
Declaration was accompanied by another document “Annex 2” under the title 
Declaration on Yugoslavia. 153 
 
According to the Declaration, the states, wishing to be recognized, should 
abide by several conditions, including respect of the UN Charter, democracy and 
human rights, guaranteeing “rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities”, 
commitment to peace and negotiations, disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. 
 
The Declaration also warns that the European “community and its Member 
States will not recognize entities, which are the result of aggression.” 
 
Roland Rich argues that those conditions make the process of recognition of 
states more difficult as the process would require additional requirements.154 
 
Annex (2) of the Recognition of States, meanwhile; sets more measures in the 
process for recognizing the Yugoslav Republics, the independence of which can be 
                                                 
152 Ibid, 37. 
153 European Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New 
States. December 16, 1991, (31 I.L.M. 1485 (1992). 
154 Rich, Ibid 43. 
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recognized only if those new states fulfilled certain steps: They should confirm that 
they wish to be recognized as independent states and they accept commitments in the 
Guidelines in Annex (1). 
 
2.2.2. The Transitional Period (1994-2000) 
 
By the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, a group of laws were applied on 
the WB and the GS, including the British Emergency Regulations, the Jordanian Law 
in the WB, in addition to the Israeli military orders and the Ottoman Law.155 
 
Proclamation No. (4), which introduces constitutional changes, does not 
revoke Proclamation No. (2), stipulating that the Area Commander assumes all 
powers over the territory. Proclamation No. (4) clearly shows that the military 
legislation remains in force and so, the Area Commander keeps all powers.156 
 
The Oslo Accords aimed at establishing a Palestinian autonomous authority 
"in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip for a transitional period not exceeding five 
years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 
and 338," as stated Article (1) of the DoP, reached between Israel and the 
Palestinians, represented by the PLO, in 1993. 
 
Proclamation No. (7) that the Israeli military authorities issued following the 
signing of the Oslo Accords with the title, "Proclamation Regarding the 
                                                 
155 "Palestine: The Legal Background," IDC Publishers, VE/IIB.593.1000 No. 666, The Netherlands, 
no date. 
156 Tamar Pelleg Sryck, "Powers and Responsibilities in the Palestinian Authority Territories", 
Proceeding at "International Human Rights Enforcement: The Case of the Occupied Palestinian 
territories in the Transitional Period Conference," (Jerusalem September 17-18, 1994), 16. 
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Implementation of the Interim Agreement", was intended to "confirm that the source 
of authority the PA was to enjoy according to the Agreements is that of Military 
Commander" and that the Interim Agreement should be implemented by Military 
Orders in order to become part of the Palestinian local law.157 
 
With regard to the legal situation after the signing of the DoP, the Interim 
Agreement said the Israeli military government "will be withdrawn but not 
dissolved." Article (1) paragraph (5) of the Interim Agreement says, "After the 
inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration in the West Bank will be 
dissolved, and the Israeli military government shall be withdrawn. The withdrawal of 
the military government shall not prevent it from exercising the powers and 
responsibilities not transferred to the Council."158 
 
The Interim Agreement also retains Israel's legislative, judicial and executive 
powers. Article (XVII.4.b) provides, "(t)o this end, the Israeli military government 
shall retain the necessary legislative, judicial and executive powers and 
responsibilities, in accordance with international law. This provision shall not 
derogate from Israel's applicable legislation over Israelis in personam." 
 
Feras Milhem argues that the word "necessary" in the article allows misuse in 
the exercise of the authority at a time the article itself gives Israel no authority in 
cases covered by the territorial and functional jurisdictions of the Palestinian 
Authority.159 
                                                 
157 Milhem, Ibid, 178-179. 
158 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Washington, D.C., 
September 28, 1995. 
159 Milhem, Ibid, 174. 
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With regard to the issue of implementation of human rights, the Oslo Accords 
almost did not refer explicitly to the enforcement of Human Rights in the Palestinian 
Territory;160 however, certain articles in the agreements have dealt with the issue 
though without much elaboration on details. 
 
Article (XIV) of the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area of May 
4, 1994 urged Israel and the PA to implement human rights as internationally 
accepted. The article says that "Israel and the Palestinian Authority shall exercise their 
powers and responsibilities pursuant to this Agreement with due regard to 
internationally-accepted norms and principles of human rights and the rule of law." 
 
The article can be deemed as a pledge by both Israel and the PA to respect 
human rights as part of the agreements both parties have signed on. 
 
The confirmation that both sides and their personnel should respect human 
rights appeared in Article (VIII) paragraph (1) of the agreement's Annex (I) that says, 
"Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the security and public order personnel 
of both sides shall exercise their powers and responsibilities pursuant to this 
Agreement with due regard to internationally-accepted norms of human rights and the 
rule of law and shall be guided by the need to protect the public, respect human 
dignity and avoid harassment.” 
 
                                                 
160 Edward Kaufman and Ibrahim Bisharat, "Introducing Human Rights into Conflict Resolution: The 
Relevance for the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process," Journal of Human Rights 1-1, (March 2002): 78. 
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The agreement's Annex (III) ensures human treatment of criminal suspects and 
restricts the use of force against them. Article (2) paragraph (7/h/1) says, "Both sides 
shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the treatment of individuals 
transferred under this Article complies with the applicable legal arrangements in 
Israel and in the Territory and with internationally-accepted norms of human rights 
regarding criminal investigations." 
 
The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip, signed in Washington on September 28, 1995, also urged for the respect of 
human rights by both Israel and the Palestinians as it says in Article (XIX) that "Israel 
and the Council shall exercise their powers and responsibilities pursuant to this 
Agreement with due regard to internationally-accepted norms and principles of human 
rights and the rule of law." 
 
Meanwhile, Israel and the PA are expected to abide by the IHRL in 
implementation of their commitment to the agreements both have signed on. 
However, the pledges of Israel and the PA to respect human rights extend to more 
than their pledges in the Oslo Accords. For the PA had expressed respect to human 
rights in different ways as set up by Irwin Cotler of McGill University:161 Palestinian 
pledges to human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International; statements by 
the PA confirming commitment to human rights; articles in the Oslo Accords urging 
Israel and the PA to abide by the internationally accepted principles of human rights 
and rule of law; pledges in the Palestinian draft constitution and Basic Law 
                                                 
161 Irwin Cotler, "Palestinian Undertakings to Respect Human Rights: Basic Sources," The Monitor, 
Palestinian Human Rights Monitor, (PHRM) 3, (May-June 1997): http://www.phrmg.org/monitor 
1997/may97-1.htm. 
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(hereinafter BL) to respect human rights; and the PA's responsibility to human rights 
enforcement according to the IHL.162 
 
2.2.3. Al Aqsa Intifada (2000) 
 
After several years of unfruitful negotiations that failed to bring peace, 
violence returned to the Palestinian Territory. Israel blamed the Palestinians for the 
failure of the Camp David summit in July 2000 by rejecting Ehud Barak’s proposal 
for settlement. 
 
Barak was considered to have granted the Palestinians more concessions than 
any other Israeli prime minister before him, though he had always been considered a 
hardliner, opposing the Oslo Agreements. When Barak became prime minister in 
1999, he sought to delay the third stage of redeployment in the WB and to offer his 
“take-it-or-leave-it proposals”, which the Palestinians discovered prevented the 
establishment of a viable or independent state.163 
 
This led to the eruption of the Al Aqsa Intifada on September 28, 2000 in the 
wake of the provocative tour by the Israeli opposition leader of that time Ariel Sharon 
to the Al Aqsa Compound. 
 
                                                 
162 A reference to the human rights in the Palestinian Basic Law and the PA undertakings to respect 
human rights norms will receive further discussion in section (4.2.1) of this study. 
163 Jerome Slater, “What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process,” The 
Political Sciences Quarterly 116-2, (2001): 179-189. 
 70
Analyzing the failures of the Camp David, Jerome Slater abandoned the 
possibility of having a “genuine settlement that is both fair and stable over the long 
run without a near complete Israeli withdrawal” to the pre-1967 borders.164 
 
The Camp David impasse and the Al Aqsa Intifada resulted in a sharp reversal 
of the human rights situation in the Palestinian areas. The state of violence and 
counter-violence claimed lives of dozens of people on both sides. With shelling and 
incursions, Israel nearly completely destroyed the infrastructure of the Palestinian 
areas, destroyed and damaged thousands of Palestinian homes, stores and workshops. 
Israel also paralyzed the Palestinian economy by imposing closures and curfews and 
uprooting trees. 
 
Richard Falk considered the Al Aqsa Intifada as a sort of right of resistance to 
occupation after Israel refused to “implement the underlying legal directives 
established by a consensus within the UN.”165 
 
Israel was considered as violating IHL, although it justified its violations on 
grounds of self defence, despite unjustifiably targeting civilians, in retaliating to 
rocket attacks. In his annual report for the year 2008 on the Human Rights situation in 
the Palestinian and other occupied Arab territories, the Special Rapporteur on human 
rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, John Dugard criticized 
                                                 
164 Ibid, 192. 
165 Richard Falk, “International Law and the Al Aqsa Intifada,” Middle East Report 217, Beyond Oslo: 
The New Uprising, (Winter 2000): 18. 
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Israel's disproportionate military response to rocket attacks and "its failure to 
distinguish between military and civilian targets."166 
 
Dugard accused Israel of violating fundamental rules of IHL, especially 
Article (147) of the Fourth Geneva Convention that stipulates: "Grave breaches to 
which the preceding Article relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, 
if committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention: willful 
killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully 
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or 
transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person 
to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or willfully depriving a protected person of 
the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of 
hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by 
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.” 
 
2.2.4. Gaza Strip after Israeli Withdrawal in 2005 
 
Since its occupation to the Gaza Strip in 1967, Israel has tried to isolate the 
Gaza Strip. The failure of the Second Camp David negotiations and the eruption of 
the Al Aqsa Intifada helped Israel escalate its measures, aiming to implement its plot 
to isolate the Strip. In order to accomplish this plot, Israel destroyed more than 1,300 
                                                 
166 See John Dugard, “Human Rights Situation in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories,” 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied 
since 1967, UN Human Rights Council. The report can be found on the following link: http://domino. 
un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/22f431edb91c6f548525678a0051be1d/f71be9fae0abbe1c852573ec006dde2e!O
penDocument. 
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homes in Rafah and razed thousands of dunums of farming land, evacuating about 
90% of the land in adjusting the borders with Egypt.167 
 
As of August 5, 2005 to September 12, 2005, Israel accomplished evacuation 
of its military posts and settlements from the Gaza Strip in implementation of the 
unilateral Disengagement Plan,168 set up by former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. The 
Israeli step aroused debate amongst scholars and analysts on the legal status of the 
Gaza Strip after this evacuation and whether it was an ending to the occupation or was 
nothing more than a kind of redeployment especially as Israel maintained control of 
Gaza’s land, air space and ports.169 
 
Article (6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides, "In the case of 
occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall cease one year after 
the close of military operations; however, the Occupying Power shall be bound, 
during the duration of the occupation, to extent that such Power exercises the 
functions of government in such territory, (by several provisions of the Convention)." 
 
                                                 
167 Ilayyan Hindi, Separation and Isolation Policy: A Reading in the Israeli Plot, (National 
Organizations Affairs Commission, 2000), 17, (ARABIC). 
168 The plan can be viewed at the official web page of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The 
Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan, 6 Jun 2004: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ 
Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israeli+Disengagement+Plan+20-Jan-2005.htm. 
169 See for example: Sara Roy, "Praying with Their Eyes Closed: Reflections on the Disengagement 
from Gaza," Journal of Palestine Studies 34-4, (Summer 2005): 64-74; Geoffrey Aronson, "Issues 
Arising from the Implementation of Israel's Disengagement from the Gaza Strip," Journal of Palestine 
Studies 34-4, (Summer 2005): 49-63; Zak M. Salih, "Panelists Disagree Over Gaza’s Occupation 
Status," Virginia Law School, (November 17, 2005), can be found at: http://www.law.virginia.edu/ 
html/news/2005_fall/gaza.htm. 
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The Palestinians accused the plan of being designed mainly to "serve Israel 
security interests not taking in(to) consideration the basic needs of the Palestinian 
people."170 
 
Meanwhile, the disengagement plan itself speaks about Israel maintaining 
functions in the GS. Addendum A, 3(1) says that "The State of Israel will guard and 
monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain 
exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in 
the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip." 
 
Principle Six of the plan says, "The completion of the plan will serve to dispel 
the claims regarding Israel's responsibility for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip." Iain 
Scobbie of the University of London considers Principle Six as ambiguous, since it 
talks about relinquishing responsibility for the population, whilst saying nothing about 
the status of the territory; especially as the plan also provides that "Israel will guard 
and monitor the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain 
exclusive authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in 
the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip."171 
 
Scobbie considers it a question of "effective control", relying on Article (42) 
of the Hague regulations 1907 that does not necessarily require the occupation forces 
to be "in actual control of all the territory and population, but simply have the 
potential capability to do so." 
                                                 
170 Muhamad Shtayyeh et al., Israel's Disengagement from the Gaza Strip: Implications for Social and 
Economic Development, (PECDAR, 2005), 8. 
171  Iain Scobbie, "Is Gaza Still Occupied?" Foreign Migration Review, Issue 26, August 2006, p18, 
http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR26/FMR2608.pdf. 
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In response to the Israeli Disengagement Plan, the PLO Negotiations Affairs 
Department in October 2004, issued a report, titled "The Israeli 'Disengagement' Plan: 
Gaza Still Occupied"172, suggesting that even after the implementation of the 
disengagement, the GS would legally remain an Israeli-occupied territory. 
 
The report suggested that through its plan, Israel seeks absolving itself of "all 
legal responsibilities as an occupying power," whilst maintaining "effective military 
control over the Gaza Strip and its inhabitants." 
 
Israel's retaining effective control of the GS, keeps Israel an occupying power 
and the Strip an occupied territory and so Israel is responsible for the implementation 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague Regulations in the territory. 
                                                 
172 PLO Negotiations Support Unit, "The Israeli 'Disengagement' Plan: Gaza Still Occupied," (October 
2004): available at: http://www.nad-plo.org/inner.php?view=disengagement_Fact_GAZA%20STILL 
%20 OCCUPIED. The report was mainly in response to comments by Dov Weisglass, Senior Advisor 
to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who earlier said, "The significance of the disengagement plan is 
the freezing of the peace process . . . . Effectively, this whole package called the Palestinian state, with 
all that it entails, has been removed indefinitely from our agenda. ... All with a presidential blessing and 
the ratification of both houses of Congress." 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. Israel’s Obligations as an Occupying Power 
 
The first two chapters have shown that Israel is still occupying the Palestinian 
Territory and that the signing of the Oslo Accords did not change the status of the 
Palestinian Territory as an occupied territory, in addition to that the Israeli withdrawal 
from the GS in 2005 made no change on the status of the GS as an occupied territory. 
 
This Chapter, meanwhile, is dedicated for discussing some of the Israeli 
obligations and violations as an occupying power in the Palestinian Territory. 
 
The Chapter is divided into three sections, the first of which is to focus on 
Israel's obligations and violations under IHL towards the OPT, the second section will 
consider Israel's obligations and violations under the IHRL towards the OPT and the 
third section is to tackle mechanisms for enforcement of human rights, including 
instruments of the UN Charter and conventional mechanisms. 
 
3.1 Israeli Obligations under International Humanitarian Law 
 
The Hague Convention of 1907 and the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 
are the main instruments to define obligations of the occupying powers. 
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Previous Chapters in this study have proved that the IHL applies in the OPT 
and Israel is obliged to fulfill its international obligations towards this Territory.173 
 
This section of the chapter is to somehow elaborate on the Israeli obligations 
under IHL in the OPT and its violations towards Palestinian civilians and detainees. 
 
3.1.1 Israeli Obligations in the OPT 
 
As an occupying power, Israel should abide by international conventions 
applicable in time of occupation. Israel is obliged to apply provisions of the Hague 
Regulations of 1907, which constitute customary law that is binding to all states and 
the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 that it ratified in 1951.174 In 
accordance with Article (1) of the Convention, Israel as a signatory state should 
"undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all 
circumstances." 
 
Despite Israel's rejection to the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the 
OPT, it refers to certain provisions in the Convention when it wants to validate 
actions concerning its security. Furthermore, the Israeli Supreme Court has several 
times referred to provisions of the Geneva Convention in reviewing Israel's conducts 
in the OPT.175 
 
                                                 
173 See Chapters (I and II) of this study. 
174 Israel declared reservation on the Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949 upon signature August 12, 
1949 and maintained these reservations upon ratification on June 7, 1951. The reservation/declaration 
text is available at: http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/NORM/35D52356F487FC85C1256402003F9563?Open 
Document. 
175 HPCR, "Israel's Obligations under IHL in the Occupied Palestinian Territory," Ibid, 8. 
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Basing on the doctrine of separation of powers,176 domestic courts in Israel are 
empowered to refer to the Hague Conventions as Customary Law, automatically 
incorporated into internal law, for reviewing Israeli military measures in the OPT, 
whilst they are not empowered to refer to the Geneva Conventions that Israel 
considers a treaty that will yet need a special legislation to be incorporated into 
internal law,177 nevertheless; Israeli courts refer to some provisions of the Geneva 
Convention with the agreement of the state's representatives though this cannot be 
considered as "uniform."178 
 
International humanitarian conventions also urge the invading forces to not 
cause the civilian population any damages than necessary and to respect family 
honour, lives of individuals, private property, religious beliefs and liberty of public 
worship.179 
 
Article (17) of the Geneva Convention says that "(t)he Parties to the conflict 
shall endeavour to conclude local agreements for the removal from besieged or 
encircled areas, of wounded, sick, infirm, and aged persons, children and maternity 
cases, and for the passage of ministers of all religions, medical personnel and medical 
equipment on their way to such areas." 
 
                                                 
176 Eyal Benvenisti, “The Attitude of the Supreme Court of Israel towards the Implementation of the 
International Law of Human Rights,” in Enforcing International Human Rights in Domestic Courts, ed. 
B. Conforti and F. Francioni, (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 208. See also, E. 
Benvenisti, “The Applicability of Human Rights Conventions to Israel and to the Occupied 
Territories,” Israel Law Review 26-1(1992): 24-35. 
177 Eyal Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation, (Princeton: Princeton University, 1993), 
118-119. 
178 Ruth Lapidoth, "International Law within the Israel Legal System," Israel Law Review 24-3-4, 
(1990): 469-470. 
179 Alfred Hopkinson, "The Treatment of Civilians in Occupied Territories," Problems of the War, 
Oxford University Press 2: 158-159. 
 78
Article (33) of the convention prevents collective punishment, stating that 
"(n)o protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally 
committed," and prohibited any "collective penalties … of intimidation or of 
terrorism." Article (50) of the Hague Convention of 1907 also talks against collective 
punishment.180 
 
Moreover; the IL obliges states to investigate their military actions during 
wartime, especially when there are civilian casualties.181 Eyal Benvenisti considers 
that when a state conducts this investigation, it protects itself in three ways; first, there 
will be no need for a tribunal in a foreign country; second, the results of the 
investigation can prove or refute any rising accusations or allegations; third, "a 
fundamental investigation can serve as a basis for finding people innocent of the 
charges."182 
 
3.1.2 Israeli Violations in the OPT 
 
In a statement, Al Haq Organization183 accused Israel of violating the 
international humanitarian conventions during its offensive on the GS in December 
                                                 
180 Article (50) of the Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its 
annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, stipulates, "No general penalty, 
pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for 
which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible." 
181 Eyal Benvenisti, "An Obligation to Investigate," Haaretz, January 28, 2009, available at: 
http://www. Haaretz/hasen/spages/1059435.html. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Al-Haq is an independent Palestinian non-governmental human rights organization based in 
Ramallah and it is the WB affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists - Geneva, and is a 
member of the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network (EMHRN), the World Organization 
Against Torture (OMCT), the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), Habitat International 
Coalition (HIC) and the Palestinian NGO Network (PNGO). 
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2008 and January 2009.184 The organizations said that Israel, as an occupying power, 
violated its international civil responsibilities that are guaranteed by IHL conventions, 
including The Hague Convention, the UN Charter and the Fourth Geneva 
Conventions.185 
 
In fact, during the occupation period since 1967, Israel has committed a series 
of breaches to the IHL in the OPT. This section is to focus on Israel's humanitarian 
breaches towards civilians during its 22-day offensive on the Gaza Strip in December 
2008 and January 2009, and breaches towards Palestinian detainees in Israeli jails. 
 
The focus on violations towards civilians and detainees in this section is due to 
two facts; first, the protection of both categories of civilians and detainees covers two 
significant parts of the Geneva Conventions; second, the violations towards civilians 
during the Gaza offensive is the biggest fresh violation to consider in this respect and 
the Israeli violations towards Palestinian detainees are a long-standing matter. 
 
                                                 
184 Israel launched its military offensive on the GS on December 27, 2008 and lasted for 22 days, 
during which time more than 1,330 Palestinians were killed and more than 4,300 were wounded. 
185 AL HAQ, “Occupier’s Civil Responsibility for the Offensive on the Gaza Strip”, 18/02/2009, 
available at:  http://www.alhaq.org/pdfs/18%2002%202009%20-%20occupation%20civil%20 
responsibility.pdf. 
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3.1.2.a Violations towards Civilians186 
 
Human Rights Watch issued a statement on January 10, 2009, accusing Israel 
of using the internationally-prohibited White Phosphorus munitions during its 
offensive in the GS and warned of the risk to Palestinian civilians.187 
 
The statement said the organization's researchers in Israel observed multiple 
air-bursts on January 9 and January 10 of artillery-fired White Phosphorus near the 
city of Gaza and the Jabalya refugee camp. The group also explained that Israel 
appeared to be using the ammunition as "obscurant" as to make smoke screens in hide 
military operations that is deemed a "permissible use in principle under international 
humanitarian law,"188 however; Human Rights Watch said the practice should be 
stopped in Gaza's densely populated areas. 
 
The statement concluded189 that although the White Phosphorus "is not an 
illegal obscurant or weapon", Israel’s use of it as an obscurant in densely populated 
areas of Gaza violates the obligation to take "all feasible precautions" to minimize 
harm to the civilian population during military operations and urged Israel to 
immediately stop using the substance in densely populated areas. 
 
                                                 
186 Civilians are one of the four categories of protected persons under IHL that defined civilians in 
Article (50) of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I). According to Article (50), a 
civilian is any person who does not belong to armed forces or carry arms during armed conflicts. The 
Article further provides in paragraph (3) that "(t)he presence within the civilian population of 
individuals who do not come within the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its 
civilian character." 
187 The statement titled "Q & A on Israel's Use of White Phosphorus in Gaza," can be found on the 
official web page of Human Rights Watch: http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/01/10/q-israel-s-use-
white-phosphorus-gaza. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid. 
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Although White Phosphorus munitions are not considered chemical weapons, 
the substance ignites easily in air at temperatures of about 30 Celsius (86 Fahrenheit) 
and its fire can be difficult to extinguish, causing undue suffering through severe 
burns.190 
 
Whilst international conventions have always urged for the protection of 
civilians during armed conflicts, several legal and human rights organizations 
confirmed that Israel has committed war crimes, reaching the status of genocide and 
crimes against humanity during its offensive on Gaza.191 A Protocol to the 1980 
Convention on Conventional Weapons192 forbids using incendiary weapons against 
civilians or against military targets amidst concentrations of civilians. 
 
Internal displacement for the Palestinian residents of the strip was also another 
violation to have been observed as a result of the Israeli offensive. This displacement 
was described as the largest forcible displacement for the Palestinians since the 1967 
war according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA).193 
                                                 
190 Global Security Organization, "White Phosphorus (WP)," January 2009: http://www.global security. 
org/ military/ systems/munitions/wp.htm. 
191 See for example: AL HAQ, "Legal Aspects of Israel's Attacks on the Gaza Strip during Operation 
Cast Lead," 7 January 2009; The Independent Commission of Human Rights, "The Israeli Aggression 
on the Gaza Strip: War Crimes and unprecedented Collective Punishment amidst Arab and 
International Silence," January, 2009; Amnesty International, "Israel used white phosphorus in Gaza 
civilian areas," January 19, 2009, can be found at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/ news-and-
updates/news/israeli-armys-use-white-phosphorus-gaza-clear-undeniable-20090119 and Amira Hass, 
"Gaza Residents: IDF Troops Posing as Hamas Men," Haaretz English-language website, January 11, 
2009, the story first appeared on: http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1054461.html, but removed 
several hours later upon order of the Israeli military censor. A copy of the article is available at: 
http://cryptogon.com/?p=6277. 
192 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use 
of Incendiary Weapons, Geneva, 10 October 1980, available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
military/library/policy/int/convention_conventional-wpns_prot-iii.htm. 
193 OCHA, Office of the Humanitarian Coordination Affairs, "Protection of Civilians Weekly Report," 
1-8 January 2009: http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_protection_of_civilians_weekly_ 
2009_01_08_english.pdf. 
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The OCHA report said that at the beginning of the offensive on December 27, 
2008, few hundred Palestinians sought refuge at five UNRWA schools, but as the 
Israeli ground incursion began, thousands of displaced residents arrived at the 
UNRWA facilities and by January 7, 2009, the day the report was issued, 
approximately 16,000 people were staying in 23 UNRWA facilities. 
 
Commenting on the Gaza offensive, the UN Special Rapporteur on Palestinian 
Human Rights Richard Falk said, "what made the Gaza attacks launched on 27 
December different from the main wars fought by Israel over the years was that the 
weapons and tactics used devastated an essentially defenceless civilian population. 
The one-sidedness of the encounter was so stark, as signalled by the relative casualties 
on both sides (more than 100 to 1; 1300-plus Palestinians killed compared with 13 
Israelis, and several of these by friendly fire."194 
 
3.1.2.b Violations towards Detainees 
 
The ICRC defined Prisoners of War as "captured members of armed forces 
and associated militias who meet the criteria laid down in the third Geneva 
Convention,"195 and that they are "entitled to the rights the Conventions grant them 
until they are released as soon as the hostilities end."196 
                                                 
194 Richard Falk, "Calls for investigation into Gaza attacks: Israel’s war crimes," Le Monde 
Diplomatique, March 2009, available at: http://mondediplo.com/2009/03/03warcrimes. 
195 ICRC, "Occupation and international humanitarian law: questions and answers," available at: 
http://icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/634kfc?opendocument. 
196. ICRC, Ibid. Article (4) of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
defines Prisoners of War as follows: 
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of the 
following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:  
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Article (76) of the Geneva Convention grants protected persons, jailed by the 
occupying power, the right to be separated from other detainees, right to medical care, 
good health and to "enjoy conditions of food and hygiene which will be sufficient to 
keep them in good health." 
 
                                                                                                                                            
1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer 
corps forming part of such armed forces.  
2. Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized 
resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own 
territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including 
such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:  
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;  
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;  
(c) That of carrying arms openly;  
(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.  
3. Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not 
recognized by the Detaining Power.  
4. Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian 
members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or 
of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have received 
authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose 
with an identity card similar to the annexed model.  
5. Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant marine and the crews 
of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under 
any other provisions of international law.  
6. Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously take up 
arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, 
provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war.  
B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present Convention:  
1. Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied country, if the occupying 
Power considers it necessary by reason of such allegiance to intern them, even though it has originally 
liberated them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it occupies, in particular where such 
persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed forces to which they belong and which 
are engaged in combat, or where they fail to comply with a summons made to them with a view to 
internment.  
2. The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present Article, who have been 
received by neutral or non-belligerent Powers on their territory and whom these Powers are required to 
intern under international law, without prejudice to any more favourable treatment which these Powers 
may choose to give and with the exception of Articles 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth paragraph, 58-67, 92, 126 
and, where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict and the neutral or non-
belligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic 
relations exist, the Parties to a conflict on whom these persons depend shall be allowed to perform 
towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the present Convention, without 
prejudice to the functions which these Parties normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and 
consular usage and treaties.  
C. This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and chaplains as provided for in 
Article 33 of the present Convention. 
 84
Article (85) of the Convention obliges the detaining power to "take all 
necessary and possible measures to ensure that protected persons …. be 
accommodated in buildings or quarters which afford every possible safeguard as 
regards hygiene and health." 
 
The Israeli violations of the rights of the Palestinian detainees start at the 
moment of the arrest, during which the Israeli soldiers often beat the detainees with 
gun butts, handcuff and blindfold them.197 
 
Psychological torture is yet another type of torture Israeli interrogators use as 
to extract confessions from Palestinian detainees. Forms of psychological torture 
include holding political detainees with criminal prisoners and drug addicts, making it 
impossible for the detainees to sleep under such conditions.198 
 
The interrogators also use another means of psychological torture by 
threatening of the rape or detention of a relative of the detainee.199 
 
With regard to the conditions in the Israeli jails, Israel violates Article (91) of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention, upon which every prison should contain a suitable 
medical clinic under supervision of a qualified physician to provide the prisoners with 
their need of medical care, in addition to healthy food. 
 
                                                 
197 Mahmoud Dagher, Human Rights Violations: Health Conditions of the Palestinian and Arab 
Detainees in the Israeli Jails, (El-Bireh: Health Work Committees, 2004), 147, (Arabic). 
198 Independent Commission of Human Rights, “Status of the Rights of the Palestinian Citizen,” 5th 
Annual Report, January-December 1999, 123 (Arabic). 
199 Al Jazeerah, "Israelis use prohibited interrogation means against Palestinian political prisoners", 
February 2009: http://www.aljazeerah.info/News/2009/February/2%20n/Israelis%20use%20prohibited 
%20interrogation%20means%20against%20Palestinian%20political%20prisoners.htm. 
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Treatment of prisoners is governed by Convention on the Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,200 that grants detainees rights in personal 
hygiene, clothing and bedding, food, exercise and sport and medical attention. The 
Convention also sets rules with regard to discipline and punishment, instruments of 
restraint, information to and complaints by prisoners and their contacts with the 
outside world. 
 
International conventions also protect prisoners against torture, which is 
defined, in Article (1) paragraph (1) of the Declaration on the Protection of all 
Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment,201 as "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether 
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official 
on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or 
confession, punishing him for an act he has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating him or other persons. It does not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions to the extent consistent 
with the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners." 
 
Paragraph (2) of the Article, meanwhile, describes torture as "an aggravated 
and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." 
 
                                                 
200 Convention on the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners was adopted by the First 
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held at Geneva 
in 1955, and approved by the Economic and Social Council by its resolution 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 
1957 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977. It is available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_ 
comp34.htm. 
201 The Declaration was adopted by the GA resolution 3452 (XXX) of 9 December 1975 and can be 
found at: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_comp38.ht). 
 86
Despite a ruling by the Israeli high Court in 1993, restricting interrogation 
methods used by Israeli interrogators against the Palestinian detainees, different 
means of torture and maltreatment, however; have since been observed during 
interrogation.202 
 
The torture methods the Israeli interrogators use against the Palestinian 
detainees include violent shaking, tying in different painful situations, covering the 
head and face with a bad-smelling sack, prevention of sleep, fierce beating, subjecting 
the detainee to high temperatures for a while and to very low temperatures another 
while.203 
 
Furthermore; a 1999 ruling by the Israeli High Court on illegality of measures 
Israeli interrogators use against Palestinian detainees prohibited the use of certain 
interrogation methods that constitute ill-treatment and torture.204 
 
3.2 Israeli Obligations under International Human Rights Law 
 
Israel ratified several international human rights conventions, yet it denies 
applicability of them or some of them to the OPT under many allegations. This 
section of the chapter is to discuss Israel's obligations and violations to three of the 
international human rights conventions it ratified with regard to their applicability in 
the OPT. These three conventions that were addressed in the Advisory Opinion of the 
                                                 
202 B'Tselem, “Human Rights Violations in the Occupied Territories,” (Jerusalem, 1992-1993): 11. 
203 B'Tselem, Hamoked, “Absolute Prohibition, the Torture and Ill-Treatment of Palestinian 
Detainees,” (Jerusalem, May 2007): 67-74. 
204 B'Tselem, “Torture and Ill-Treatment as Perceived by Israel's High Court of Justice,” (September 
1999): http://www.btselem.org/english/Torture/HCJ_Ruling.asp. 
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ICJ on the Construction of the Wall in 2004 are ICCPR205, ICESCR206 and Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter CRC).207 
 
3.2.1 Israeli Obligations in the OPT 
 
On 3 October 1991, Israel ratified ICCPR with reservation on Article (23) on 
the status of family and marriage rights208 and derogation from Article (9) on measures 
of arrest and detention209; ICESCR with no reservation and CRC with no 
reservations.210 
 
Israel's ratification of the human rights conventions is seen by some scholars 
as falling within the measures the IL allows the occupant to take with the goal to 
ensure the well-being of the occupied people, in accordance with Article (43) of The 
Hague Convention of 1907 and Article (64) of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
Moreover; the occupant is obliged to submit reports to the relevant committees of the 
                                                 
205 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/ 
menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm. 
206 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is available at: http://www.unhchr. 
ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm. 
207 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession 
by General Assembly resolution 44/25 on 20 November 1989 and entered into force 2 September 1990, 
can be found on the UN web site: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm. 
208 Israel's reservation states, "With reference to Article 23 of the Covenant, and any other provision 
thereof to which the present reservation may be relevant, matters of personal status are governed in 
Israel by the religious law of the parties concerned. To the extent that such law is inconsistent with its 
obligations under the Covenant, Israel reserves the right to apply that law." Available at: http://treaties. 
un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=322&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec. 
209 For further information about Israel's derogation from Article (9) of ICCPR, see E. Benvenisti, 
1992, Ibid, 29. 
210 These three treaties are not the only human rights treaties that Israel ratified. Amongst other 
international human rights treaties Israel ratified are the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) in 1979 with reservation on Article (22); the Convention 
of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1991; and the 
Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) in 
1991 with reservation on Article (28) paragraph (1). 
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conventions with regard to enforcement of these conventions in the occupied 
territories.211 
 
With regard to the relationship between the IHRL and the IHL, the ICJ in its 
Advisory Opinion in 2004 recalled a previous Advisory Opinion on July 8, 1996, on 
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, when it addressed the 
applicability of the ICCPR during armed conflict, stating that "the protection of the 
ICCPR does not cease in times of war," but agreed on the derogation of certain 
provisions during emergency, except with regard to the right to life that cannot be 
deprived.212 
 
The Israeli derogation from Article (9) of ICCPR on arrest measures was in 
fact seen as recognition from Israel that the covenant applies to the Palestinian 
Territory because Israel seeks absolving itself the legal consequences for its measures 
in detention of Palestinians from this territory. 
 
The ICJ, meanwhile; confirmed in Paragraph (106) the applicability of human 
rights conventions during armed conflict and set up three possible situations for the 
relationship between the IHRL and the IHL: “(S)ome rights may be exclusively 
matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of 
human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international 
law." 
 
                                                 
211 Benvenisti, 1992, Ibid, 31-23. 
212 See ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Wall, Paragraph (104). 
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Considering Article (2) Paragraph (1) of the ICCPR213 on the scope of 
application of the covenant, the court considers that the convention is “applicable in 
respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own 
territory.”214 
 
Commenting on Israel’s statement in 1998 that the covenants did not apply 
directly to the Palestinian Territory, the ICJ cited an answer by the Human Rights 
Committee to Israel’s position, confirming that the ICCPR applies to the Occupied 
Territory.215 
 
Although the ICESCR does not include any provisions on the scope of 
application of the covenant, the ICJ ruled that Israel is “under an obligation not to 
raise any obstacle to the exercise of such rights in those fields where competence has 
been transferred to Palestinian authorities.”216 
 
However; Israel denies applicability of those conventions on the Palestinian 
Territory on allegations that they apply only on the citizens of Israel during time of 
peace. 
 
In its report to the Convention on the Rights of Child Committee in 2000217, 
Israel failed to include information on the Palestinian children in the Occupied 
                                                 
213 Article (2) Paragraph (1) of the ICCPR of 1966, provides, “Each State Party to the present Covenant 
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” 
214 ICJ Advisory Opinion, Ibid, Paragraph (108-111). 
215 Ibid, Paragraph (110). 
216 Ibid, Paragraph (112). 
217 Israel was supposed to submit its first report to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
Committee in 1993, but it did that only seven years later in the year 2000. 
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Territory, alleging it is not legally bound to report on the situation in the OPT because 
the Territory has become under responsibility of the PA since 1995 though in fact 
Israel never stopped detention of Palestinian children after the signing of the DoP in 
the early nineties218 and thousands of Palestinian children219 have been detained since 
the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territory in 1967.220 
 
Obligations of member states towards the CRC are set in Part (1) of the 
convention. Paragraph (1) of Article (2) of the convention urges states to "respect and 
ensure the rights set forth in the present convention to each child within their 
jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her 
parent's or legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status." 
 
Article (2) Paragraph (2), meanwhile; urges state parties to "take all 
appropriate measures to ensure that the child is protected against all forms of 
discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, 
or beliefs of the child's parents, legal guardians, or family members." 
 
According to Article (3) Paragraph (2) of the convention, children are entitled 
to protection and care to ensure their well-being. 
 
                                                 
218 Adam Hanieh et al., "Paying the Price of Injustice: Palestinian Child Prisoners and the UN Human 
Rights System," Middle East Report  229, (Winter 2003): 28-29. 
219 The CRC of 1989 defines a child as "every human being below the age of eighteen years," however; 
Israel complies with this definition with regard to Israeli children only, whilst treating Palestinian 
children as adults as of the age of 16. 
220 Hanieh, Ibid, 27. 
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In general, Articles (1-41) talk about a variety of rights member states should 
provide to children, including freedom to express one's self, rights to education, 
health, protection against discrimination and exploitation. 
 
3.2.2 Israeli Violations in the OPT 
 
The Israeli human rights violations in the OPT take different shapes and are 
witnessed allover the Palestinian Territory, including the WB221 and the GS. Since 
Israel's occupation in 1967, the Palestinians of the WB and the GS have been subject 
to a series of violations to their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.222 
 
Even after Israel's 2005 withdrawal from the GS, human rights violations in 
the strip continued. Israel's control of main crossings of the strip, hindering movement 
of the residents into and from the strip was one of the main violations to the residents' 
right of free movement, guaranteed by human rights conventions.223 
 
The focus here will be on the Israeli violations to its obligations to the 1966 
Covenants and the CRC. The Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on the construction of the 
wall in the WB in 2004 will receive special focus in this section as it tackled a number 
of Israeli violations in this respect. 
 
                                                 
221 The WB here includes the eastern part of Jerusalem that was occupied by Israel in 1967 along with 
the rest of the Palestinian Territory. 
222 The Israeli violations in the OPT varied to include a large number of oppressive procedures that 
include, land confiscation for settlement construction and expansion; ethnic cleansing measures of 
house demolitions and illegal measures in Jerusalem; collective punishment measures, including 
roadblocks and closures; in addition to assassinations and control of natural resources 
223 See Article (12) of the ICCPR. 
 92
3.2.2.a Violation to 1966 Covenants 
 
In an attempt to absolve itself of any obligations in the wake of its illegal 
measures in the OPT, Israel has always justified its actions as being taken in self 
defence, a principle Israel first argued over the 1967 war.224 
 
Israel used the same excuse as to justify the construction of its wall225 on the 
WB land, arguing that it is building the wall for security purposes as to protect its 
citizens against any possible attacks by Palestinians. The wall, snaking along the WB, 
however; departed from the green line, refuting Israel’s self defense claims. 
 
In its 2004 advisory opinion on the wall, the ICJ ruled out Israel's self defence 
claims and said that Israel tries to impose facts on ground with regard to defining 
permanent borders along the route of the wall and it said that all states are under 
obligation not to recognize the illegal situation created by the construction of the 
wall.226 
 
The Palestinian argument before the ICJ with regard to Israel's self defence 
claims were based on several points including, (1) the Palestinian violence against 
Israel does not reach the level of "armed attacks" within the meaning of Article (51) 
of the UN Charter; (2) Article (51) does not allow self defence against future armed 
attacks; (3) self defence must be proportionate to the actual harm, whilst the wall is 
                                                 
224 See Chapter (I) of this study. 
225 The Palestinians use the term "apartheid wall", whilst Israel uses the term "security fence" or 
"security barrier". For the purpose of this study, the term "wall" is to be used taking into consideration 
the term used by the ICJ. 
226 Paragraphs (146 & 159). 
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not; and (4) As Israel's right to use force is governed by the jus in bello as lex 
specialis, any rights under Article (51) were displaced and could not be invoked.227 
 
The ICJ then found no relevance for Israel's self defence claims with Article 
(51) of the UN Charter that grants the right of self defence "if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."228 
 
In fact, the court highlighted a number of Israeli violations to the IHL and the 
IHRL that are related to the construction of the wall. 
 
The harm the wall causes the Palestinians refers to its interference with their 
freedom of movement, preventing their access to social life and work as it separates 
Palestinian families from their farmland, educational institutions, medical care and 
relatives.229 
 
Paragraph (133) of the Court's Opinion tackles several breaches to the rights 
of Palestinians in the wake of the construction of the wall, including isolating areas 
between the wall and the green line, restricting movement of the residents, such as in 
Qalqilya and Jerusalem. 
                                                 
227 Sean D. Murphy, "Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixie from the 
ICJ?" The American Journal of International Law 99- 1, (January 2005): 70-71. 
228 UN Charter, Article (51). 
229 Ruth Wedgwood, "The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Security Fence and the Limits of Self-
Defence," The American Journal of International Law 99-1, (January 2005): 54. 
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Meanwhile, Paragraph (134) concluded that Israel has acted contrary to 
various human rights conventions, including the ICCPR, the ICESCR and the CRC. 
 
According to the paragraph, the construction of the wall impedes free 
movement of residents, guaranteed by Article (12) Paragraph (1) of ICCPR; it also 
breaches ICESCR and the CRC by sabotaging the residents' access to work, 
educational institutions and health installations. 
 
The Court also cited relevance to the violation of the Palestinian right to self 
determination,230 that is guaranteed in Article (1) common to the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR, both ratified by Israel, and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 1960,231 which considered the exploitation and 
subjugation of peoples as a violation of fundamental human rights in contrary of the 
UN Charter232 and emphasized the people’s right to self determination and to 
“determine their political status.”233 
 
3.2.2.b Violation to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 
In a letter dated, 5 March 2009, President of the Defence for Children 
International (DCI)234 asked the Israeli Minister of Justice Daniel Friedmann to 
                                                 
230 See ICJ Advisory Opinion, Paragraph (88). 
231 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was adopted upon 
General Assembly Resolution No. (1514) on 14 December 1960, available at: http://www.un.org/ 
documents/ga/res/15/ares15.htm. 
232 Ibid, Paragraph (1). 
233 Ibid, Paragraph (2). 
234 The Defence for Children International is an international organization dedicated to the protection of 
the rights of the child in accordance with the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
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present explanations with regard to the increased number of detained Palestinian 
children, notifying the Committee on the Rights of the Child of the issue.235 
 
The DCI, meanwhile, expressed concern over the increased “number of 
Palestinian children, as young as 12, being arrested and detained” on allegations of 
throwing stones at soldiers or at the wall Israel is building in the WB.236 The statement 
estimated that seven girls and six boys, being held in administrative detention without 
charges, were amongst 423 Palestinian children, detained by February 2009. 
 
A report, prepared in cooperation between the DCI and Save the Children in 
December 2008,237 estimated 6,000 Palestinian children to have been detained by the 
Israeli forces since September 2000, adding that by December 2007, there were 311 
children in detention, 192 of whom were awaiting trial, whilst 101 were serving 
sentences, 18 of them administrative detention sentences. The report further added 
that the Israeli military system in the OPT has failed to apply basic rights, guaranteed 
by IL with regard to Palestinian child detainees.238 
 
The ICJ has emphasized the applicability of the CRC of 1989 in the OPT and 
ruled that Israel is violating the Convention, which is "applicable within the OPT.239 
 
                                                 
235 Copy of the letter is available at: http://www.dci-pal.org/English/Doc/Press/LetterToIsraeli 
Minister.doc. 
236 DCI statement “DCI Concerned by Sharp Increase in Detention of Children", 
available at: http://www.dci-
pal.org/english/display.cfm?DocId=1083&CategoryId=1. 
237 “Child Rights Situation Analysis: Right to Protection in the occupied Palestinian territory,” Defence 
for Children International/ Palestine Section and Save the Children, (December 2008): available at: 
http://www.dci-pal.org/english/publ/research/SRSAReport.pdf. 
238 Ibid, 79. 
239 See ICJ Opinion, Paragraph (113). 
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Meanwhile, considering Israel's report on the situation of children in 2001, the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child "expressed concern about the difference in the 
definition of a child in Israel as persons under 18 and in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory as persons under 16."240 In fact, with this definition given to the Palestinian 
children, Israel allowed itself to treat Palestinian children under 18 as adults with 
regard to detention and sentence. 
 
3.3 Human Rights Enforcement 
 
As human rights became a universal issue, concerning all nations, there has 
become an urgent need to ensure their implementation, which is now the concern of 
international organizations. This section of the chapter is to tackle a group of 
instruments for the enforcement and protection of human rights, including the UN 
Charter instruments, the conventional mechanisms and other mechanisms of concern. 
 
3.3.1 UN Charter Instruments 
 
Several UN bodies possess mechanisms to monitor the enforcement of human 
rights, including the UN Charter, the UN SC, the UN GA, the UN Secretary-General 
and the Economic and Social Council that established several committees with the 
goal to assist in its work, including, the Commission on Human Rights that 
established the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities and was later replaced with the Human Rights Council, the Commission on 
                                                 
240 Human Rights Council, "Compilation Prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, in Accordance with Paragraph 15 (B) of the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1 
(Israel)", Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, 3rd session, (Geneva 1-15 December 
2008), Paragraph (13) 
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the Status of Women and the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal 
Justice.241 
 
The ICJ also works on promoting enforcement of human rights through legal 
advisory opinions it presents in certain cases. 
 
The UN Charter includes several provisions that promote the respect of human 
rights. The Charter urges countries to cooperate for resolving "international problems 
of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and …. encouraging 
respect fur human rights and for fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to 
race, sex, language, or religion."242 
 
Article (2) paragraph (4) of the UN Charter completely banned use of force 
against any member state.243 However; the Charter later allows such use of force in 
situations of self defense244 and in protection of international peace and security as set 
in Chapter (VII) of the Charter "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, 
Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression." 
 
                                                 
241 UN official web site: http://www.un.org/rights/dpi1774e.htm. 
242 See UN Charter, Article (1) paragraph (3). 
243 Article (2) paragraph (4) of the UN Charter provides, "All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations." 
244 See UN Charter, Article (51) that provides, "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately 
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the 
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in 
order to maintain or restore international peace and security." 
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Article (13) paragraph (1) of the Charter urges the GA to make studies and 
recommendations with regard to encouraging the promotion and development of IL 
and human rights and fundamental freedoms.245 
 
Article (55) of the UN Charter also calls for respect of "human rights and 
fundamental freedoms" with the goal to create "condition of stability and well-being 
which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples." 
 
Meanwhile, Article (56) urges "(a)ll Members pledge themselves to take joint 
and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the 
purposes set forth in Article (55)" 
 
3.3.1.a UN Secretary-General 
 
The Secretary-General of the UN is the only one to represent the international 
body and he is deemed as a symbol of the "United Nations ideals and a spokesman for 
the interests of the world's peoples, in particular the poor and vulnerable among 
them."246 
 
                                                 
245 Article (13) paragraph (1) of the UN Charter provides, "The General Assembly shall initiate studies 
and make recommendations for the purpose of: a. promoting international co-operation in the political 
field and encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification; b. 
promoting international co-operation in the economic, social, cultural, educational, and health fields, 
and assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as 
to race, sex, language, or religion." 
246 The official web page of the UN: http://www.un.org/sg/sgrole.shtml. 
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Chapter (XV) of the UN Charter describes the Secretary-General as "chief 
administrative officer"247, who shall act in that capacity during meetings of the SC, 
GA, Economic and Social Council and to perform "such other functions as are 
entrusted" by these organizations to him.248 
 
Moreover; another role for the Secretary-General according to the UN Charter 
is to "bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion 
may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security".249 
 
Former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali250 was interested in 
promotion of international human rights norms that appeared in his statements. In one 
of his speeches, Boutros-Ghali said, "In 1948, the Universal Declaration made explicit 
the social dimension of human rights. That dimension was to be still more strongly 
reaffirmed in the Covenants of 1966, particularly the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, to whose importance I would call attention. It 
was in that context that the basic concept of the right to development came into being 
a few years later. In the name of that concept and its underlying values, we are now 
under a compelling obligation to tackle the problem of poverty in the world."251 
 
                                                 
247 UN Charter Article (97). 
248 Ibid, Article (98). 
249 Ibid Article (99). 
250 Boutros Boutros-Ghali of Egypt was the sixth Secretary-General of the United Nations (1992-1996). 
251 Statement by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General of the UN, World Summit for Social 
Development, 6-12, March 1995, available at: http://www.icsw.org/copenhagen_implementation/ 
background_information/boutros.html. 
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3.3.1.b Security Council 
 
In Chapter (VII), the UN Charter authorizes SC to decide when a situation 
requires the intervention of the Council to take an action or give a recommendation 
that can reach the extent of use of military force.252 
 
A military intervention by a third state with the goal to enforce human rights 
has become acceptable amongst some IL experts. The NATO military intervention in 
Yugoslavia in 1999 without the consent of the UN SC divided scholars into two 
camps. One camp agreed with the action, whilst the other camp disagreed on grounds 
that such an intervention firstly violates IL for bypassing the SC and secondly 
breaches state sovereignty.253 
 
Although the NATO action in Yugoslavia in 1999 was illegal,254 from an IL 
point of view, it can express development in IL and an exceptional practice. Talking 
morally, Antonio Cassesse argues that Human Rights organizations support what he 
calls positive peace, especially as the SC had recognized the committing of massacres 
in Yugoslavia.255 
 
                                                 
252 See Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Articles (39-44). 
253 See arguments by Bruno Simma, “NATO, The UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects,” EJIL 10-
1, (1999): 1-22 and Antonio Cassesse, “Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur: Are We Moving Towards International 
Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World Community?” EJIL 10-1, 
(1999): 23-30. 
254 The NATO action in Yugoslavia was deemed illegal by both Simma and Cassesse, Ibid. 
255 Cassesse, Ibid. 
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3.3.1.c General Assembly 
 
Chapter (IV) of the UN Charter defines the powers and responsibilities of the 
GA, upon which, the GA is authorized to take actions with regard to the protection of 
human rights, including making "recommendations to the members of the United 
Nations or the Security Council or to both,"256 with the goal to maintain international 
peace and security.257 
 
The UN Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter UNCHR) was responsible 
for monitoring and publicly reporting human rights situation in certain countries or 
"major phenomena of human rights violations worldwide."258 
 
In 2004, the UNCHR discussed possibility of introducing individual-
complaints mechanism for economic, social and cultural rights, as well as civil and 
political rights; but the commission did not succeed in reaching a decision due to 
differences amongst participating states that kept the issue open for discussion. The 
debate amongst states focused on textual differences of the two covenants, especially 
the interpretation of Article (2) paragraph (1) of the ICESCR259 that they deemed 
ambiguous for how can rights, depending on the availability of resources be rights in 
a meaningful sense, especially as these resources are limited. Furthermore; it is yet a 
big international challenge to achieve full economic, social and cultural rights allover 
                                                 
256 UN Charter, Article (10). 
257 UN Charter, Article (11). 
258 Un official web site: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/chr.htm. 
259 Article (2) paragraph (1) of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
provides, “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through 
international assistance and cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized 
in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures.” 
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the world since a large number of the world population are under poverty level, 
lacking the fundamental rights of education, health and housing.260 
 
The paragraph is yet deemed of particular importance for describing the nature 
of state's obligations of both conduct and result towards the covenant. The paragraph 
urges states to adopt legislative measures amongst other "appropriate means" for the 
implementation of the covenant with the goal to have legislative foundation for any 
measures to be taken in this respect, and that is to achieve the desirable results of the 
achievement of "the full realization" of the economic, social and cultural rights 
recognized in the Covenant.261 
 
During its meeting on 15 March 2006, the UN GA decided to replace the 
UNCHR with the Human Rights Council (hereinafter HRC),262 which became 
responsible for protection and respect of human rights and making recommendations 
on them.263 The council created the mechanism of Universal Periodic Review as to 
evaluate human rights situation in the 192 state members of the UN.264 
 
The Palestinian delegation to the tenth session of the HRC on 8 January 2009, 
criticized Israel for failing to refer to its human rights responsibilities and obligations 
                                                 
260 Michael J. Dennis and David P. Stewart, “Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Should There Be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, 
Housing and Health?” The American Journal of International Law 98-3, (July 2004): 514-515. 
261 Office of the High Commission of Human Rights, "CESCR General Comment 3, The Nature of 
States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, par. 1)," Geneva, Switzerland, (14 December 1990), available at: 
http://www.fao.org/righttofood/KC/downloads/vl/docs/AH351.pdf. 
262 See GA sixtieth session, official records, Wednesday 15 March 2006, New York, available at: 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/272/60/PDF/N0627260.pdf?OpenElement. 
263 See official web page of the Human Rights Council: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hr 
council. 
264 The Universal Periodic Review mechanism was one of elements the council set to guide its future 
work. For further information about the council's elements set for the council's "Institution-building 
package", visit: (http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_5_1.doc). 
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in the Palestinian Territory as an occupying power.265 The Council, meanwhile; urged 
Israel to respect and adhere to its obligations under the IHRL in areas under its 
control.266 
 
The Economic and Social Council is also one of the main UN bodies that 
supervise the UN welfare policy as it helps the GA in promoting international 
economic and social cooperation.267 
 
In its Resolution No. (1235) of 1967,268 the Economic and Social Council 
(hereinafter ECOSOC) authorizes the UNCHR to study cases of human rights 
violations in a certain country.269 
 
The more confidential Procedure (1503) of the Economic and Social 
Council270 allows the UNCHR to appoint an ad-hoc committee to conduct human 
rights "investigation with the consent of the State concerned."271 
 
In 1993, the GA established the post of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights to carry out the "good offices function in the field of human rights on behalf of 
the Secretary-General" and now it became responsible for protecting human rights.272 
                                                 
265 Human Rights Council, Universal Periodic Review, Report of the Working Group on the Universal 
Periodic Review (Israel), A/HRC/10/76, the UN General Assembly, (8 January 2009), 9. 
266 Ibid, 27. 
267 For further information about the Economic and Social Council, visit: http://www.un.org/ecosoc. 
268 ECOSOC Resolution 1235 (XLII), 42 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 17, U.N. Doc. E/4393 (1967), 
available at: http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.co.uk/pdf/bt/cassese/cases/part3/ch16/ 1602.pdf. 
269 ECOSOC Resolution No. (1235) paragraph (2), available at: http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.co. 
uk/pdf/bt/cassese/cases/part3/ch16/1602.pdf. 
270 ECOSOC Resolution 1503 (XLVIII) of 1970, available at: http://www.rewi.uni-jena.de/data/rewi_/ 
LS_Ruffert/SS%202008/IntOrg%202008/E-RES-1503-1.pdf. 
271 Ibid, paragraph (7). 
272 “The United Nations and Human Rights”, available at the UN official web page: http://www.un.org/ 
rights/dpi7774e.htm. 
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Upon Resolution No (2443) of 1968, the GA established the Special 
Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the 
Palestinian People and other Arabs of the Occupied Territories with the goal to ensure 
"respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories."273 
 
3.3.1.d International Court of Justice 
 
The ICJ is deemed as the UN's main judicial organ.274 Chapter (XIV) of the 
UN Charter considers all the charter's members as members of the ICJ275 that plays a 
dual role of "settling legal disputes between States submitted to it by them and giving 
advisory opinions on legal matters referred to it by duly authorized United Nations 
organs and specialized agencies."276  
 
The court's judgments on disputes between state parties are considered binding 
to both states.277 
 
As the PA is not a state party in the court, it cannot seek the court's opinion in 
issues concerning it, but Article (96) of the UN Charter authorizes the GA and other 
UN organs, "authorized by the General Assembly," to request the court to give an 
advisory opinion in legal matters "within the scope of their activities." 
 
                                                 
273 GA Resolution No. (2443), available at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/ 
NR0/244/03/IMG/NR024403.pdf?OpenElement. 
274 UN Charter Article (92). 
275 Ibid Article (93) Paragraph (1). 
276 ICJ official web site, "Frequently Asked Questions": http://www.icj-cij.org/information/index. 
php?p1=7&p2=2#1. 
277 See Article (94) of the UN Charter. 
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Accordingly, Article (34) of the statute of the ICJ278 says that international 
organizations can present "information relevant to cases before it …on their own 
initiative" and that was the case of the GA requesting the court's opinion on the legal 
consequences of the construction of the wall by Israel in the WB. 
 
The advisory opinion, given by the ICJ is yet deemed one of the weak 
mechanisms to ensure "compliance with norms of the International Humanitarian 
Law"279 as described by David Kretzmer in discussing the court's advisory opinion on 
the wall, noting that there should be stronger and more binding actions to prevent 
violations of the IHL and the IHRL.280 
 
3.3.2 Conventional Mechanisms 
 
With the goal to further promote respect for human rights, the UN urged for 
bringing fundamental human rights into a written document. The non-binding 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948281 has since become basis for more 
detailed and more binding human rights conventions. 
 
The GA proclaimed the Declaration "as a common standard of achievement 
for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of 
society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and 
                                                 
278 Statute of the International Court of Justice, available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index. 
php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0. 
279 David Kretzmer, "The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of International Humanitarian Law," 
The American Journal of International Law 99-1, (January 2005): 102. 
280 Ibid, 102-103. 
281 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 10 
December 1948 and it is available at: http://un.org/Overview/rights.html. The Declaration as a Custom 
is not within the scope of focus of this study, but the reference to it here is due to the fact that it 
constitutes basis for other binding human rights treaties within the focus of the study. 
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education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive 
measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective 
recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves 
and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction."282 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 along with the ICCPR 
and the ICESCR of 1966 are seen as milestones for the transition of states from the 
culture of violence to the culture of peace as some of their provisions were brought 
into local laws of the states, leading to the emerging of “a parallel transition from a 
culture of sovereign impunity to a culture of national and international 
accountability.”283 
 
Ways to enhance enforcement of human rights have always received 
international interest and so several international human rights conventions oblige 
state parties to report about their human rights situation,284 to committees, established 
for this purpose with regard to every convention. For example there is the Human 
Rights Committee to monitor enforcement of the ICCPR, the Committee on the 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Committee on the Rights of the Child. 
 
                                                 
282 Ibid, Preamble. 
283 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “The Responsibility to 
Protect,” Ottawa-Canada: The International Development Research Center, (December 2001): 14. 
284 Jose L. Gomez del Prado, “United Nations Conventions on Human Rights: The Practice of the 
Human Rights Committee and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in Dealing 
with Reporting Obligations of States Parties,” Human Rights Quarterly 7-4, (November 1985): 492. 
These human rights conventions include: The ICCPR of 1966; the ICESCR of 1966; the CRC; the 
International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CIDAW); the Convention against Torture 
and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and the International Convention on the 
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. 
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In fact, human rights conventions include articles, urging for the establishment 
of monitoring mechanisms by state parties and yet set conditions for these 
mechanisms. For example; such articles may define number and type of people the 
monitoring body should include; such as Articles (28-45) of the ICCPR.285 
 
With the goal to ensure enforcement of the ICCPR, the Human Rights 
Committee receives reports from state parties every five years and gets into public 
discussions with countries. Furthermore; domestic supervision on the implementation 
of the Covenant is also of significant role.286 
 
According to Christopher Harland, the importance of supervising the 
Covenant by domestic law refers to the fact that the Covenant covers a wide range of 
rights that are important to be protected since many countries are not obliged to 
implement IL "without domestic implementing legislations."287 
 
Harland further quoted from Israel's report, submitted under Article (40) of the 
Covenant, saying that the provisions of the Covenant are not part of the Israeli 
internal law since the international agreements are not part of Israeli internal law and 
that the "Knesset generally does not legislate by way of direct reference to such 
agreements."288 
 
                                                 
285 See also as further examples the ICESCR, Part (IV) Articles (16-25); CRC, Part (II) Articles (42-45) 
and CEDAW, Part (V) Articles (17-22) 
286 Christopher Harland, "The Status of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) in the Domestic Law of State Parties: An Initial Global Survey Through UN Human Rights 
Committee Documents," Human Rights Quarterly 2201, (February 2000): 187-188. 
287 Ibid, 189. 
288 Ibid, 226. 
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Reviewing the report submitted by Israel in 2003 on civil and political rights 
situation, the Human Rights Committee highlighted a group of concerns Israel failed 
to implement.289 
 
The Committee emphasized applicability of the ICCPR in the OPT,290 
rejecting the derogation of some provisions of the Covenant on pretexts of the 
existence of a state of emergency, such as for example Article (12) Paragraph (3); 
Article (19) Paragraph (3) and Article (21) Paragraph (3).291 
 
The Committee further expressed concern over the use of oppressive measures 
of the Israeli soldiers, including using Palestinians as human shields during military 
operations in conducing house-to-house searches.292 
 
With regard to the enforcement of the CRC, the Committee on Convention293 
obliges states parties to present reports on the situation of child human rights within 
their jurisdiction. 
 
But it seems that the self-reporting mechanism is yet a problem facing the 
treaty-based bodies that monitor states’ performance in human rights protection294 for 
it gives states an opportunity to ignore certain violations of child human rights. 
 
                                                 
289 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, 21, 8, 2003 (CCPR/CO/78/ISR), 
available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CCPR.CO.78.ISR.En?OpenDocument. 
290 Ibid, Paragraph (11). 
291 Ibid, Paragraph (12). 
292 Ibid Paragraph (17). 
293 Committee on the Rights of the Child is a body, consisting of 10 internationally elected independent 
experts on children’s rights. See Article (43) of the CRC. 
294 Prado, Ibid, 493. 
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The self reporting mechanism could have helped Israel to ignore giving 
information about the Palestinian children in the OPT though acknowledging 
applicability of treaties on a territory is deemed a positive step towards 
implementation of its provisions. Israel presented its report on the situation of child 
human rights in the year 2000, seven years later than it was scheduled to. Israel, 
nonetheless; excluded the situation of Palestinian children from its report and ignored 
the many calls by the committee to present such information on allegations it is no 
longer responsible for the Palestinian children after the establishment of the PA. 
Israel’s claims can simply be refuted by the fact that it continued to detain Palestinian 
children after the signing of the Oslo Accords. Furthermore; Israel applies its laws on 
the Palestinian land, where Jewish settlers reside and Israel considers its citizens; and 
so, Israel “recognizes the applicability of the CRC to the Occupied Territories, but on 
the basis of nationality, rather than territory, as required by the Convention.” 295 
 
Generally, reviewing reporting information, submitted on Israel by treaty 
bodies and special procedures, the Human Rights Council's Working Group on the 
Universal periodic Review in 2008, stressed all committees' concern about Israel's 
exclusion of the Palestinian Territory from its reports, confirming Israel's obligations 
to include population of all territories under its "effective control" upon each treaty.296 
 
                                                 
295 Hanieh, Ibid, 28-30. 
296 Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, "Compilation Prepared 
by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, in Accordance with Paragraph 15(B) of the 
Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1," 3rd Session, Geneva, (1-15 December 2008): 
Paragraph (1). 
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3.3.3 External Pressure 
 
With the development of international relations, many parties have become 
involved in the process of enforcement of human rights that became a universal 
interest concerning not only the country which observes such violations, but also the 
entire world. 
 
This development rises from the fact that the contemporary international 
relations look at human rights as a global civilized behaviour and a moral value.297 
 
This section is to consider means, other than the UN Charter instruments and 
conventional mechanisms, used with the goal to enforce human rights in a certain 
country. They include foreign pressures and the work of non-governmental 
organizations concerned with human rights protection. 
 
3.3.3.a State Conditionality 
 
The international relations of states allow the use of assurances amongst 
countries as a means to protect human rights.298 
 
Nowadays and upon current foreign policy of states, powerful countries give 
themselves the right to impose conditions for their relations with the less powerful 
countries. Human rights enforcement became one of the main conditions to ensure 
                                                 
297 See Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?" International Affairs: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs. 74-1, (January 1998): 1-24. 
298 International Commission of Jurists, "Diplomatic Assurances against Torture," AIRE Center 
Conference on Torture and Terrorism, Eminent Jurists Panel: Terrorism, Counter Terrorism and 
Human Rights, (February 1, 2006): available at: http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/UKHRWSubmission2.pdf. 
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political reform and establishment of democracy. The USA had used this policy many 
times by pressing the World Bank to suspend or delay funds for certain countries, 
citing human rights violations.299 
 
The European Union's (hereinafter EU) conditionality is, meanwhile; linked to 
concepts of good governance, sovereignty of law and democracy. Upon these 
conditions, the EU gives itself the right to suspend a cooperation deal with a country, 
proved to have violated human rights in someway.300 
 
Considering human rights enforcement as an integral part of its foreign policy, 
the EU in the early 1990s introduced the "Human Rights Clause" in its bilateral 
cooperation, trade and partnership agreements,301 providing "a mechanism by which 
the Community could, as a last resort, suspend or terminate agreements,"302 and 
opening "room for political conditionality within the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership,"303 
 
The Human Rights Clause is, meanwhile; deemed as a new model for 
international relations and cooperation of the EU that is no longer willing "to exert 
political hegemony."304 
 
                                                 
299 David P. Forsythe, "The United Nations, Human Rights and Development," Human Rights 
Quarterly 19, (2 May 1997): 346 
300 See Dorothee Schmidt, "The Use of Conditionality in Support of Political, Economic and Social 
Rights: Unveiling the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership's True Hierarchy of Objectives?" Mediterranean 
Politics 9-3, (Autumn 2004): 404. 
301 Vaughne Miller, "The Human Rights Clause in the EU's External Agreements," Research Paper, 
House of Commons Library, (16 April 2004): 9, available at: www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/ 
research/rp2004/rp04-033.pdf. 
302 Miller, Ibid, 11. 
303 Schmidt, Ibid, 404. 
304 Der Chin-Horng, "The Human Rights Clause in the European Union's External Trade and 
Development Agreements," European Law Journal 9-5, (December 2003): 700. 
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In this concern, some scholars consider that preferential trade agreements can 
play a significant role in the enforcement of human rights when they supply "hard 
standards that tie agreement benefits to member compliance with specific human 
rights principles."305 
 
Moreover and as more countries have become more interested in 
"humanitarian intervention", this concept was developed to also mean physical 
intervention of a third party with the goal to protect civilian population against 
atrocities of an oppressive party, such as bringing international forces or simply 
international monitors to areas of conflict. This action has become welcomed world 
wide under the term of "peacekeeping."306 
 
The deployment of international monitors in Hebron, following the 1994 
massacre conducted by a Jewish settler against Muslim worshippers307 was made 
possible due to a group of calls for the presence of a third party in the disputed 
Palestinian town as to protect Palestinian civilians against such future atrocities.308 
 
                                                 
305 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, "Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence 
Government Repression," International Organization 59-3, (Summer 2005), 594. 
306 Lynn Welchman, "International Protection and International Diplomacy: Policy Choices for Third-
Party States in the Occupied Palestinian Territories," in International Human Rights Enforcement: The 
Case of the Occupied Palestinian Territories in the Transitional Period, Ibid, 226. 
307 On February 25, 1994, Barouch Goldstein, an Israeli-American Jewish, off-duty Israeli reservist 
captain and member of the extremist Kach movement, opened fire on Muslim worshippers inside the 
Ibrahimi Mosque in the southern WB town of Hebron, killing dozens of people and wounding more 
than hundred others. Goldstein was also killed in the attack by the angry worshippers. 
308 For further discussion on the issue, see Lynn Welchman, Ibid, 225-277. 
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3.3.3.b NGOs Work 
 
Lately, the ICRC and non-governmental organizations have played a 
significant role in urging states to respect and abide by the IHRL during armed 
conflicts.309 
 
David Weissbrodt of the University of Minnesota argues that international 
human rights non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International 
Americas Watch, the International Commission of Jurists as well as the ICRC are 
playing a significant role in safeguarding human rights during situations of armed 
conflict, especially tensions not covered by the IHL, with the goal to fill the "vacuum 
left by the failure of the UN SC and other international mechanisms to deal 
successfully with armed conflict situations."310 
 
Reasons for those non-governmental organizations to use IHL to protect 
Human Rights were put by Weissbrodt in five points. First, the number of countries 
that ratified the Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949 is yet bigger than those, who 
ratified the ICCPR; second, the provisions of IHRL are not as specific as those of the 
IHL; third, abuses, such as arbitrary killings, ill-treatment and detentions; are more 
likely to take place during armed conflicts which is covered by IHL, whilst IHRL can 
be suspended in certain cases of emergency; four, during armed conflicts military 
                                                 
309 David Weissbrodt, "Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict: The Role of International 
Nongovernmental Organizations," Journal of Peace Research 24-3, Special Issue on Humanitarian 
Law of Armed Conflict, (September 1987): 303. 
310 Ibid,p297. 
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officials take IHL more seriously than IHRL; fifth, IHRL focuses mainly on the 
responsibilities of governments, whilst IHL addresses both sides of the conflict.311 
 
A survey for the Human Rights Quarterly in 1998 divided non-governmental 
organizations into four categories, according to their main activities in the field of 
human rights, including the fields of education, standard-setting, monitoring 
compliance with international standards, and enforcement.312 
 
The survey found that the organizations in the Global South "tend to pursue a 
wider range of goals than did Northern NGOs" as they focus mainly on advancing for 
adoption of more and new human rights standards, and promoting the rights in social, 
economic and cultural development and transforming the national institutions towards 
protection of human rights, whilst the more industrialized Northern ones mainly 
report that their main goals were promoting or protecting human rights.313 
 
Some scholars consider the participation of NGOs in the process of the 
treatment of the bodies of treaties is yet welcomed as it provides a new source of 
information and so making easier the process of analysis and reaching conclusions as 
they present alternative reports to those presented by their governments to the relevant 
human rights committees with the goal to bring attention to possible inaccuracies in 
the governments' reports.314 
                                                 
311 Ibid, 297-298. 
312 Summary of the survey results are found in: Jackie Smith, et al., "Globalizing Human Rights: The 
Work of Transnational Human Rights NGOs in the 1990s," Human Rights Quarterly 20-2, (May 
1998): 379-412. 
313 Smith, Ibid, 387-389. 
314 Scott Leckie, "The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Catalyst for Change in a 
System Needing Reform," in The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring, ed. Philip Alston 
and James Crawford, Cambridge University Press, (2000): 133-134. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4. Palestinian Authority Human Rights Obligations 
 
As previous sections have shown that the Israeli redeployment in the OPT and 
the creation of the PA did not bring any changes on the status of the Palestinian 
Territory as occupied territory, it is worth to consider new levels of responsibility for 
the implementation of human rights in the OPT that are created by the Oslo Process. 
 
With the launching of the peace process, the Palestinians and Israel have entered 
a new era of mutual recognition that was supposed to end the Israeli occupation of the 
Palestinian Territory in preparation to establish the Palestinian State. 
 
The transition from the state of occupation to statehood, according to the Oslo 
Accords, was agreed upon to take place in several stages, starting with the 
redeployment of the Israeli troops in the GS and Jericho area. The redeployment 
process in the WB should have finished by 1997 as negotiations on the final status 
issues were to begin in 1996. 
 
However; the failure of the peace process to achieve a Palestinian state or even 
to start negotiations on the final status issues, had shaken the stands of the PA and 
weakened support amongst Palestinians to the peace process in general. 
 
In return, the PA insisted to protect the legitimacy of its stands and existence 
that appeared in the conflict between Fatah, which dominates the PA, and the other 
factions, especially Hamas and the Islamic Jihad that oppose the Oslo process. This 
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conflict, however, obliged the PA to take oppressive measures against members of 
other anti-Oslo factions, reporting human rights abuses.315 
 
This Chapter is to get closer to the human rights obligations of the PA in areas 
under its jurisdiction. The PA's assumption of civil responsibilities in the Palestinian 
Territory has imposed on it certain obligations with regard to the implementation of 
IL. 
 
The Chapter will first tackle the PA's human rights obligations since the signing 
of the Oslo agreements with reference to the status of human rights in the Palestinian 
BL and then to move to discussing responsibility scenarios in light of the situation 
that the Oslo Accords created in the OPT. 
 
4.1 Palestinian Authority Obligations under Oslo 
 
In order to understand the PA's human rights obligations in the OPT, one has to 
understand the general legal status and responsibilities of the PA under Oslo as well, 
since human rights obligations are only part of these obligations and defined by them. 
 
The Oslo Accords have created a complicated situation in the OPT by dividing 
responsibilities between Israel and the PA without drawing a clear line between the 
responsibilities of each side which brought to the view a situation of correlated 
responsibilities. 
 
                                                 
315 See Khalil Shikaki, “The Peace Process, National Reconstruction, and the Transition to Democracy 
in Palestine,” Journal of Palestine Studies 25 (2) (1996): 5-20 
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The first part of this section will give a general look at the main points of 
concern of some of the signed Israeli Palestinian agreements with their consequences 
on ground and the second part will discuss the Palestinian undertakings to respect 
international human rights norms. 
 
4.1.1 Palestinian Authority Legal Status 
 
The establishment of a Palestinian state was the main goal for the Palestinians to 
get involved in the peace process with Israel that started with the signing of the DoP 
in 1993. This goal was confirmed by late Yaser Arafat316 in an article in the New York 
Times when he said that the Palestinians' goal of the peace process is mainly to 
establish "an independent and viable Palestinian state on the territories occupied by 
Israel in 1967."317 
 
In his article, Arafat further said the Palestinian vision of peace is the ending of 
occupation, the sharing of Jerusalem as one open city and capital of two states and 
enjoyment of "mutually beneficial economic and social cooperation."318 
 
Following is a general look at the principal points in some of the agreements, 
signed between Israel and the PLO in the nineties: 
                                                 
316 Yaser Arafat, who died on 11 November 2003, was Chairman of the PLO and he was elected 
President for the PA in 1996. 
317 Yasir Arafat, “The Palestinian vision of Peace,” The New York Times, February 3, 2002. available 
at: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/03/opinion/03ARAF.html?pagewanted. 
318 Ibid. 
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4.1.1.a Declaration of Principles 
 
Following a series of secret negotiations in the wake of the 1991 Madrid 
Conference, Israel and the PLO signed the DoP on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements on September 13, 1993.319 The DoP was signed in a ceremony, hosted 
by former US President Bill Clinton in Washington. The PLO was represented in the 
ceremony by Yaser Arafat, whilst late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin represented 
Israel. 
 
Several days before the signing of the DoP, Israel and the PLO exchanged 
letters of recognition, in which the PLO recognized Israel and denounced terrorism 
and violence; whilst Israel recognized "the PLO as the representative of the 
Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East 
peace process."320 
 
In fact the signing of the DoP has opened way for certain irreversible facts that 
Israel had to live with, including its recognition of the political rights of the 
Palestinian people, recognition of the PLO as representative of the Palestinian people 
and recognition of the territorial unit of the WB and the GS.321 
 
                                                 
319 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements on September 13, 1993; 
available at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration+ 
of+Principles.htm. 
320 The letters of recognition can be found on the official web site of the Israeli Foreign Ministry at: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israel-PLO+Recognition+-
+Exchange+of+Letters+betwe.htm. 
321 Khalil Shikaki, “The Future of the Peace Process and Palestinian Strategies,” Journal of Palestine 
Studies 26-1 (1996): 82-83. 
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The main points the DoP included were the establishment of a limited 
autonomous authority in the WB and the GS for five years;322 launching negotiations 
on the final status of the WB and the GS by the third year of the five-year transitional 
period,323 with the goal to reach settlement basing on the SC Resolutions No. (242 and 
338);324 agreement on limited Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho; and limited 
transfer of responsibilities to the Palestinians, including the fields of education, health, 
culture, social affairs, taxation and tourism; in addition to building a Palestinian police 
force.325 
 
Nine months after the implementation of autonomy, direct elections were to be 
run in the WB and the GS to elect the Palestinian autonomous council326 that was to be 
preceded by an Israeli redeployment in the WB and the GS.327 
 
Article (IV) of the Declaration stipulates that the "Jurisdiction of the Council 
will cover WB and GS territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the 
permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the WB and the GS as a single 
territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period." 
 
The responsibilities of the PA328 were only to maintain public order with the help 
of a Palestinian police unit to be established for this purpose, whilst its responsibilities 
                                                 
322 DoP; Ibid. Article (I). 
323 Ibid; Article (V). 
324 Ibid; Article (I). 
325 Ibid; Article (VI). 
326 Ibid; Article (III). 
327 Ibid; Article (XIII). The first Palestinian legislative and presidential elections were held on 20 
January 1996. 
328 The PA is also to be referred to here as the 'Council' due to the use of the term in some of the 
Palestinian-Israeli agreements. 
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do not include external security, settlements, Jerusalem or foreign relations, all of 
which were to remain an Israeli responsibility.329 
 
Article (IX) of the Declaration that empowers the Council "to legislate, in 
accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it," gives 
Israel the right to object any legislation the Council adopts during the transitional 
period as the article stipulates in its paragraph (2) that "(b)oth parties (Israeli and 
Palestinian) will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in 
remaining spheres." 
 
4.1.1.b Oslo II Agreement 
 
On 28 September 1995, the two Palestinian and Israeli sides signed the Interim 
Agreement, also called Oslo II Agreement,330 upon which the Palestinian Territory 
was divided into three areas: Area A, including the main Palestinian towns, excluding 
Hebron331; was placed under the PA's administrative and security control; Area B, 
including rural areas, was placed under PA's administrative control, while security 
remained under joint Palestinian-Israeli control; and Area C, including settlements, 
border areas and Jerusalem and its neighbourhoods; was kept under full Israeli 
control.332 
 
                                                 
329 DoP; Article (VIII). 
330 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; available at: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/THE+ISRAELI-
PALESTINIAN +INTERIM+AGREEMENT.htm. 
331 Special arrangements for the redeployment from Hebron were concluded in the Protocol Concerning 
the Redeployment in Hebron in 1997. 
332 See Article (XI) of the Oslo (II) Agreement. 
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Moreover; the agreement stipulates election of legislative council for the self-
rule areas333 and the PA, upon the agreement, should be responsible for protecting 
security and preventing any operations against Israel.334 
 
As with regard to the issue of human rights, the agreement stipulates that the 
two sides "shall exercise their powers and responsibilities pursuant to this Agreement 
with due regard to internationally-accepted norms and principles of human rights and 
the rule of law."335 
 
With regard to this article, some scholars argue that Israel's being an occupied 
state, governed by the 1907 Hague Convention and the Fourth Geneva Convention, 
yet continues to be responsible for the enforcement of human rights in the OPT and 
for ensuring that the PA respects human rights under its jurisdiction.336 
 
4.1.1.c Hebron Protocol 
 
Hebron was excluded in the previous agreements due to its sensitive situation 
that led to the signing of Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron on 17 
January 1997,337 upon which the southern WB town was divided into two sections: 
The Jewish section that includes the Old City and the Ibrahimi Mosque area was 
                                                 
333 The first PLC was elected on 20 January 1996. In the same elections Yaser Arafat was elected 
President for the PA. 
334 See The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: Annex I: 
Protocol Concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangements; available at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/ 
MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/THE+ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN+INTERIM+ 
AGREEMENT+-+Annex+I.htm#article2. 
335 Oslo (II) Agreement. Article (XIX). 
336 Asem Khalil, 2006, ibid, 282-283. 
337 Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron; available at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/ 
Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Protocol+Concerning+the+Redeployment+in+Hebron.ht
m. 
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called Area H-2 and the Palestinian section that includes the rest of the town was 
called Area H-1, with the erection of Israeli checkpoints in the seam line between the 
two Palestinian and Israeli sections.338 
 
The protocol, in fact, imposed very tough and complicated security 
arrangements with the goal to protect some hundreds of Jews, living in the center of 
the city, making the daily living conditions of the Palestinian residents unbearable. 
 
Furthermore; the Protocol was viewed as bringing no change on the fact that 
Israel keeps its de facto control over the WB and the GS.339 
 
4.1.1.d Wye River Memorandum 
 
One of the significant agreements that was signed between the Palestinian and 
Israeli sides and seen as encouraging human rights abuses was the Wye River 
Memorandum,340 signed in Washington on 23 October 1998.341 
 
Scholars also argued that although the fundamentals of the Wye Memorandum 
are not different from the previous Palestinian-Israeli agreements, the memorandum 
yet imposes more security obligations on the PA with the goal to destroy the 
opposition parties to the Oslo Process.342 
                                                 
338 See Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron, Ibid. Paragraphs (2-5). 
339 See; Edward W. Said, "The Real Meaning of the Hebron Agreement," Journal of Palestine Studies. 
26-3 (1997): 31-36. 
340 Wye River Memorandum, October 23, 1998; available at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace% 
20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/The%20Wye%20River%20Memorandum. 
341 Human Rights Watch, “An Analysis of the Wye River Memorandum,” (1 November 1998). 
available at: http://www.hrw.org/en/news/1998/11/01/analysis-wye-river-memorandum. 
342 See; Naseer H. Aruri, “The Wye Memorandum: Netanyahu's Oslo and Unreciprocal Reciprocity,” 
Journal of Palestine Studies 28-2 (1999): 17-28. 
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Article (II) Paragraph (C-4) on security arrangements in the memorandum urges 
the Palestinian police to "exercise powers and responsibilities to implement this 
Memorandum with due regard to internationally accepted norms of human rights and 
the rule of law, and will be guided by the need to protect the public, respect human 
dignity, and avoid harassment." However; this paragraph looks as conflicting with 
previous paragraphs in the same article that urge the PA to fight anti-Oslo groups 
under the guise of fighting terror and incitement. 
 
Of the PA's security obligations that can be problematic to the enforcement of 
human rights include outlawing and combating terrorist organizations343 and 
preventing incitement344 that would require as the memorandum says, apprehending 
"the specific individuals suspected of perpetrating acts of violence and terror for the 
purpose of further investigation, and prosecution and punishment of all persons 
involved in acts of violence and terror." The memorandum, however; did not give 
definitions for violence and terror; moreover; the investigations and punishment the 
PA is obliged to conduct in this concern could lead to abuses to human rights, 
including use of torture, that are not even mentioned in the memorandum. 
 
4.1.1.e Juridical Consequences 
 
In fact, the Palestinian Israeli interim agreements were mainly criticized for 
failing to tackle the fundamental issues of refugees, Jerusalem, borders and 
settlements, all of which were postponed to the final status negotiations, providing 
                                                 
343 Wye River Memorandum; Article (II) Paragraph (A-1). 
344 Ibid; Article (II) Paragraph (A-3). 
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Israel with an opportunity to impose facts on ground as Israel did not stop imposing 
conditions, forcing the PA to implement the security obligations imposed by the 
agreements and so bringing the armed resistance to an end. 
 
Although the DoP did not define the "future nature of the entity in the territories, 
or as to its future territorial jurisdiction," the PA, after assuming civil responsibilities, 
started playing a state-like role by effective control, bearing a kind of responsibility.345 
 
The accords have kept Israel's military control over the Palestinian Territory. 
Article (III) paragraph (1) of the Agreement on the GS and the Jericho Area of May 4, 
1994,346 stipulates the transfer of the civil administration responsibilities to the PA, 
allowing Israel in Article (V) paragraph (3-b) to "exercise its authority through its 
military government, which for that end, shall continue to have the necessary 
legislative judicial and executive powers and responsibilities, in accordance with 
International Law." 
 
Eyal Benvenisti, meanwhile, explains that the reference to IL in this article as a 
source of power means reference to the law of occupation.347 
 
Benvenisti, further elaborates on the occupant's obligations towards protected 
persons upon Article (47) of the Fourth Geneva Convention that grants protected 
persons inviolable rights that cannot be deprived "by any change introduced …. nor 
                                                 
345 Eyal Benvenisti, “The Status of the Palestinian Authority,” in The Arab-Israeli Accords: Legal 
Perspectives, ed. Eugene Cotran and Chibli Mallat, (London: Kluwer Law International, 1996), 48. 
346 Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, May 4, 1994; available at: http://www.mfa. 
gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Agreement+on+Gaza+Strip+and+Jericho+A
rea.htm. 
347 Benvenisti, 1996, Ibid 50. 
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by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and 
the Occupying Power."348 
 
Despite stipulating the transfer of powers from the Israeli military government 
and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian Council, the DoP talked about 
dissolution of the Civil Administration but not the military government, which would 
remain as the upper hand in the Territory. Article (VII) paragraph (5) of the 
Declaration provides; "After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration 
will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn." 
 
Joel Singer349 depended on this article to declare his argument that the PA is 
replacing the "Civil Administration of Israel."350 Whether Singer's argument that the 
PA is operating as the Civil Administration can be adopted as correct or not; what is 
proved here is that the PA is a non-sovereign body. 
 
Singer argues that the DoP brought no change on the status of the territory as 
long as the Israeli military authority would remain the source of authority in the 
territory, upon which the PA would operate. Moreover; the exclusion of a group of 
issues during the interim stage and delaying their discussion until talks on permanent 
status was meant as Singer admitted to avoid any Palestinian claims to these issues 
during the transitional period.351 
 
                                                 
348 Ibid, 50 n.11. 
349 Joel Singer was the Legal Advisor of the Israeli Foreign Ministry and member of the Israeli 
negotiations team with the Palestinians. 
350 See, Joel Singer. “The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements: Some 
Legal Aspects,” Justice 1 (1994): 4-13. In his article Singer notes that his views in the article do not 
necessarily reflect those of the Israeli government. 
351 Singer. Ibid, 6. 
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According to Singer, three criteria limit the jurisdiction of the Palestinian 
Council during the transitional period:352 First; territorially, the Council is not 
supposed to control all the WB and the GS upon Article (IV) of the DoP; second; 
Israelis are excluded from the Palestinian jurisdiction and law; third; the PA's 
functions are limited to the powers transferred to it, whilst many other issues, 
including external security and foreign relations, are excluded from the Council's 
jurisdiction and remained under Israeli control. 
 
The result then as Singer concluded, is "that the jurisdiction of the Council shall 
be limited to a specific territory. Within that territory its jurisdiction shall only extend 
to non-Israelis, situated outside the Israeli settlements and military locations, and will 
apply only in spheres which have been specifically transferred to the Council."353 
 
4.1.2 Palestinian Authority and International Human Rights Standards 
 
The Palestinians' undertaking to respect international human rights norms is not 
new. In 1977, the PLO was allowed full membership in the Economic and Social 
Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), which recommended the UN ECOSOC in 
April 1977 to amend ESCWA's terms of reference for this purpose. The ECOSOC 
responded positively in July 1977.354 
 
                                                 
352 Ibid, 7. 
353 Ibid, 7. 
354 The Permanent Observer of Palestine to the UN, official web page: http://www.un.int/palestine/ 
seventies.shtml. 
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Moreover; articles (157) and (158) of the PLO Revolutionary Penal Code of 
1979 include provisions ensuring protection of the wounded and the sick during 
armed conflicts and punishment of those who try to prevent them their right to life. 
 
In 1982 the PLO demanded applying for the signing of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention and the 1977 Additional Protocols.355 The Palestinian Declaration of 
Independence of 1988 expressed the commitment of the coming Palestinian State to 
human rights norms,356 and a committee was authorized by the Palestinian National 
Congress, which was formed to represent the Palestinians in the world, started work 
on drafting a constitution.357 
 
On May 4, 1989, following the signing of the Declaration of Independence, the 
PLO Executive Committee confirmed commitment to the Fourth Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 and Additional Protocols of 1977. The PLO's official application to adhere to 
the Conventions and Protocols came in a letter, dated on June 21, 1989 to the Swiss 
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.358 The letter was directed by the Permanent 
Observer of Palestine to the UN Office at Geneva. 
 
                                                 
355 Human Rights Situation in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories, Human Rights Council, 
A/HRC/8/17, 6 June 2008, available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/8session/ 
A.HRC.8.17.doc. 
356 See Section (2.2.1.a) of this study. 
357 Nathan Brown, The Third Draft Constitution for a Palestinian State: Translation and Commentary 
(Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 2003), 1. 
358 The letter can be viewed at the official web page of the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the UN: 
http://www.un.int/palestine/tenth/expmeet.html. 
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But the Swiss Federal Council on September 13, 1989, replied that due to the 
absence of a State of Palestine, "it was not in a position to decide whether the letter 
constituted an instrument of accession."359 
 
Shortly after the signing of the DoP in 1993, the PLO in Tunis decreed 
commitment to protecting human rights.360 
 
In the same year, Yaser Arafat confirmed to an Amnesty International 
delegation the PA's respect of human rights norms that will be incorporated in the 
Palestinian domestic laws. The UN Human Rights Council cited that the PLO 
chairman Yaser Arafat had repeatedly reiterated his government's commitment to the 
respect of international human rights standards to representatives of Amnesty 
International in1993 and 1996.361 
 
Arafat further briefed the Amnesty delegation in 1993 on a decree, he signed, to 
establish a higher commission for human rights to supervise the performance of the 
Palestinian government in this regard to ensure respect of human rights and rule of 
law.362 
 
                                                 
359 The answer of the Swiss Federal Council to the PLO's letter can be found at: http://www.icrc.org/ 
ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P. 
360 Irwin Cotler, "Palestinians Undertakings to Respect Human Rights," The Palestinian Human Rights 
Monitor, (1997). 
361 Human Rights Situation in Palestine and Other Occupied Arab Territories, Human Rights Council, 
A/HRC/8/17, 6 June 2008, available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/8session/ 
A.HRC.8.17.doc. 
362 Fateh Azzam, “The Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 20-2 (1998): 340. 
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Upon Arafat's decree,363 the Independent Commission for Human Rights364 was 
established in 1993 and the decree was published in the official Gazette in 1995.365 
The Commission that started its activities in the beginning of 1994, was set to fulfill 
the following duties: “to follow-up and ensure that different Palestinian laws, by-laws 
and regulations, and the work of various departments, agencies and institutions of the 
State of Palestine and the PLO meet the requirements for safeguarding human 
rights”.366 
 
Since it exercises state-like responsibilities in the Palestinian Territory, the PA is 
also obliged under international customary law to adhere to human rights norms,367 
especially as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or some of its provisions 
have become part of International Custom368 as considered by the Teheran 
International Conference on Human Rights in 1968 that urged in its Proclamations 
"all peoples and governments to dedicate themselves to the principles enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,"369 that can be viewed as a contribution to 
International Customary Law.370 
 
Moreover; the incorporation of provisions of the Universal Declaration in 
domestic laws of states proves the argument that the Declaration has become 
                                                 
363 An English translation for the (Decree No. 59 of 1994) is available at: http://www.piccr.org 
364 Upon its establishment, the Commission was named the Palestinian Independent Commission of 
Citizens’ Rights, but changed later on to the Palestinian Commission for Human Rights. 
365 The Palestinian BL referred to the Commission in Article (31). 
366 The Official web page of the Independent Commission for Human Rights: http://www.ichr.ps/ 
etemplate.php?id=6. 
367 Cotler. Ibid. 
368 Vojin Dimitrijevic, Customary Law as an Instrument for the Protection of Human Rights (Milano: 
Istitutu Per Gli Studi Di Politica Internazionale (ISPI), 2006), 8. 
369 See Proclamation of Tehran: Proclaimed by the International Conference on Human Rights at 
Teheran on 13 May 1968; available at: http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/b_tehern.htm. 
370 Dimitrijevic, Ibid, 8. 
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customary law. There is even an argument that some provisions of the Declaration 
have become jus cogens norms.371 
 
Furthermore; in its membership in the Euro Mediterranean Partnership372, the 
PA committed itself to respect international human rights norms as set by the 
Partnership's Declaration, known as the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, upon which 
member states should "act in accordance with the UN Charter and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, as well as other obligations under international law … 
respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee the effective legitimate 
exercise of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of 
association for peaceful purposes and freedom of thought, conscience and religion … 
without any discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, language, religion or 
sex(.)"373 
 
In general, the human rights situation in the OPT is worth a long stop and 
discussion since the Palestinians’ view of human rights is special and quite different 
from the general world view to the issue. 
 
At a time the world is setting up common standards and norms for human rights 
and is increasingly pushing towards respect for and enforcement of these norms, the 
Palestinians continued to face daily human rights abuses, whether these abuses are 
committed by Israel or the PA in both the WB and the GS. 
                                                 
371 Ibid, 9. 
372 The Euro Mediterranean Partnership, known as Barcelona Process, is a framework of political, 
economic and social relations between the European Union member states and countries of the 
Southern Mediterranean. 
373 Barcelona Declaration adopted by the Euro Mediterranean Conference on 27-28 November 195, 
available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/july/tradoc_124236.pdf. 
 131
 
The gloomy atmosphere, overwhelming the human rights situation in the OPT 
has encouraged scholars to argue that it is impossible for the Palestinians to view 
human rights neutrally.374 For how can the Palestinians believe in the justice of 
international human rights norms whilst the world legitimizes the occupier’s abuses as 
self defense and describes the resistance actions of the occupied as terrorist acts?!! 
 
The Palestinians now believe that only power and interests and not human rights 
norms are the main motivators for the world external relations. The human rights that 
should be basis for the achievement of self determination and freedom have lost 
credibility amongst Palestinians.375 
 
This view is, meanwhile, confirmed by the double-standard policy seen in the 
world nowadays as some countries are punished for committing human rights 
violations, whilst other countries are not punished for their grave such breaches. 
 
The “power and interests” motivation that led to the double-standard world 
policy in considering human rights was witnessed in the Palestinian case, especially 
during the deterioration of situation in the OPT in 2002 after Israel stopped seeing 
Yaser Arafat as partner in the peace process and the world powers started putting 
pressures on Arafat and the PA. 
 
The world powers that had long closed eyes on the violations being committed 
by the PA, started pressuring the PA for reforms and fighting corruption. The repeated 
                                                 
374 See Asem Khalil, "Palestinians and 'Human Rights': Impossible Neutrality", Mawared, 12, (2009). 
375 Ibid, 37 
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calls on the PA to draft a constitution along with introducing financial and 
administrative reforms in its institutions were viewed by Palestinians as no more than 
means of pressure to be forced to adhere to Israel’s demands and give the concessions 
it requires. 
 
The real reason behind these calls was undoubtedly not the achievement of 
transparency and accountability as was declared, but it was in fact weakening the 
stands and legitimacy of Arafat and the PA to be shown as violators of human rights 
and consequently Arafat was sidelined to give more authority to the newly created 
post of prime minister. 
 
4.2 Human Rights in Palestinian Law 
 
As the previous section of the Chapter had shown, the Palestinians have many 
times expressed interest in adhering to international human rights norms even long 
before the establishment of the PA. 
 
This section of the chapter will first check on the status of human rights in the 
Palestinian BL and then it will look at some of the human rights violations observed 
in the OPT as result of measures taken by the PA. 
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The focus on the situation of human rights in the BL in this section stems from 
the fact that the BL constitutes basis that the rest of domestic laws should abide by 
without violating.376 
 
4.2.1 Human Rights in Basic Law 
 
Upon international standards, the PA cannot sign international treaties since it is 
not yet a sovereign state, however, the PA has committed itself to abiding by 
international human rights standards in Article (10) of the 2003 amended BL377 that 
provides in paragraph (1) "Basic human rights and liberties shall be protected and 
respected." Paragraph (2) of the Article, further urges the PA to "work without delay 
to become a party to regional and international declarations and covenants that protect 
human rights." 
 
This article had been drafted in a different way in the Draft BL of 1994378 that 
referred to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with regard to human rights 
and freedom. In Article (8), the PA committed itself to adhere to international treaties, 
including, in addition to the Universal Declaration, the ICCPR, the ICESCR and other 
conventions. 
 
The PA’s commitment to the international human rights conventions was also 
stipulated in the 1996 Draft BL that was drafted in cooperation between AL HAQ 
                                                 
376 Yasser Alawna, Human Rights in the Palestinian Basic Law (Ramallah Center for Human Rights 
Studies, 2003), 7 (Arabic). 
377 The 2003 Amended Palestinian BL is available at: http://www.palestinianbasiclaw.org/2003-
amended-basic-law. The 2005 amendment to the BL is available at: http://www.palestinian 
basiclaw.org/2005-amendments. 
378 1994 Draft BL – draft by PLO, available at: http://www.palestinianbasiclaw.org/1994-plo-basic-
law-draft 
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institution and Birzeit University Institute of Law. Article (3) of Title (II) 
“Fundamental Rights and Freedoms”, mentioned more conventions that were not 
mentioned in the 1994 draft, such as CEDAW and the Statute of the ILO. The article 
meanwhile, urged the PA to work for joining these conventions.379 
 
The PA’s adherence to international human rights was also mentioned in Article 
(8) of the Draft Palestinian Constitution that stipulated the PA’s recognition of the 
fundamental rights set in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, the 
ICESCR and other international conventions. However, the article was criticized for 
not including provisions forcing all the PA security apparatuses to act upon the 
international human rights conventions.380 
 
The 2003 BL also included articles ensuring the PA’s commitment to human 
rights. Title Two – Public Rights and Liberties –, in fact, provides basis for a group of 
human rights that encouraged scholars to assume that the BL was the "most liberal in 
relation to constitutions of Arab World."381 However; the BL should be tested with 
regard to how extent it can defend rights and not with the number of freedoms it 
includes.382 
 
Article (9) ensures equality of Palestinians "before the law and the judiciary, 
without distinction based upon race, sex, color, religion, political views or disability." 
                                                 
379 See “Human Rights in Draft Constitution for the National Authority in the Transitional Period and 
the Proposed Palestinian Interim Draft Basic Law,” Al HAQ and Birzeit University Institute of Law, 
Ramallah, (1996). 
380 Ibid, 38 
381 Asem Khalil. "Which Constitution for the Palestinian Legal System?" (PhD diss,. Roma: Pontificia 
Universita Lateranese, 2003), 101. For further comments on the BL, see Nathan Brown, 2003, Ibid. 
382 Nathan J. Brown. Palestinian Politics after the Oslo Accords: Resuming Arab Palestine. (London: 
University of California Press, 2003), 76-77. 
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Title Two further grants the Palestinians civil rights, including personal 
freedom, immunity against torture and arbitrary and unlawful arrest, fair trials,383 and 
freedoms of religion, expression and movement.384 It also grants the Palestinians a 
group of economic, social and cultural rights, including protecting private property,385 
organizing health and social insurance services,386 right to housing, education and 
work.387 It further guarantees the people's right in establishing media means.388 
 
Article (31) urged for the establishment of "(a)n independent commission for 
human rights" upon "a law that will specify its formation, duties and jurisdiction." But 
such a law that is never passed by the Palestinian Legislative Council (hereinafter 
PLC), and the commission continued working through its internal bylaws on basis of 
respect of human rights, good governance and democracy.389 The reports of this 
commission shall be submitted to the PA President and to the PLC.390 
 
However; these rights in the BL can easily be restricted or derogated during 
states of emergency as appears in Article (101) of the BL that grants the PA President 
the right to halt these rights upon a decree in cases of "threat to national security 
caused by war, invasion, armed insurrection or in times of natural disaster," for a 
period of time limited to no more than renewable thirty days with the consent of the 
                                                 
383 Palestinian BL. Ibid. Articles (11-15). 
384 Ibid. Articles (18-20). 
385 Ibid. Article (21) Paragraph (3). 
386 Ibid. Article (22) Paragraph (1). 
387 Ibid. Articles (23-25). 
388 Ibid; Article (27). 
389 The Commission’s official web site: http://www.ichr.ps/etemplate.php?id=2&lid=2. 
390 BL, Article (31) 
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PLC. Article (111), however; excludes "fundamental rights and freedoms" during a 
declared state of emergency. 
 
Meanwhile, despite the existence of many provisions in the BL that ensure 
respect for international human rights norms, there can be observed some failures in 
this regard. Some provisions appear as vague and bear different interpretations, 
making some scholars to believe that the reference to human rights norms in the BL 
as no more than decorous, presenting no actual guarantees for these freedoms and 
rights.391 
 
The BL seems to have focused on the civil and political rights more than the 
economic, social and cultural rights, for there is no mention in the BL for certain 
fundamental rights in this regard, including the rights to health that was confirmed in 
earlier drafts. The 1996 draft Article (39) stressed every person’s right to enjoy the 
highest attainable physical and mental health. 
 
The only mention to the right to health in the 2003 draft BL was in Article (16) 
that banned the conduct of "any medical or scientific experiment on any person 
without prior legal consent," in addition to that "medical examination, treatment or 
surgery" for any person should be performed according to law. Moreover; the Article 
stipulates that "(t)ransplantation of human organs and new scientific developments 
shall be regulated by the law in order to serve legitimate humanitarian purposes." 
Article (22) paragraph (1) talked about ensuring health insurance. 
 
                                                 
391 See Alawna. Ibid. 13. 
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With regard to the right to culture, some scholars considered the absence of 
provisions, ensuring cultural rights in the BL, as a big failure due to the high 
importance of the cultural issue in the lives of nations.392 In fact all previous drafts of 
the BL and draft constitution ignored the right to culture. 
 
The BL also ignored the right to life, which was mentioned in earlier drafts of 
the BL. The 1994 draft confirmed the right to life in Article (9) providing, “Every 
person has the right to life.” Article (6) of title (II) of the 1996 draft also grants the 
right to life and bans death penalty. 
 
Another problem that is observed in the BL concerns its inability to ensure 
separation of the three legislative, executive and judicial powers since the authority of 
the executive power over the legislative and judicial powers is quite obvious.393 
 
The interference of the executive power in the authorities of the legislative 
power has, in fact, weakened its performance and sabotaged the work of the PLC. 
 
One of the PLC members criticized its performance in 1997. Ziad Abu Amro394 
accused the PLC of failing to accomplish its objectives since its inauguration in 
1996.395 The PLC’s failures, according to Abu-Amr, include supervision of the 
executive authority and enacting "substantive legislation" and checking abuses, all of 
which led to the erosion in the popularity of the Council.396 
                                                 
392 Ibid. 33. 
393 Ibid. 45-49. 
394 Ziad Abu Amr was chairman of the Political Committee of the PLC. 
395 Ziad Abu-Amr. “The Palestinian Legislative Council: A Critical Assessment”, Journal of Palestine 
Studies 26-4, (1997): 90. 
396 Ibid. 90-93. 
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Abu-Amr, meanwhile refers the PLC’s failures to several reasons including the 
unclear mandate of the council; the inability of the Palestinians to perform smooth 
"transition from the logic of 'revolution' and exile to the logic of 'state' and civil 
society;" the attempt of the executive power to protect itself by expanding its powers 
and marginalizing the legislative power that finds it difficult to challenge the 
executive power due to the political composition of the council.397 Moreover; the 
Israeli measures, preventing the Gaza legislators from reaching the WB to attend the 
PLC’s meetings led to the failure of the Council in several times to realize the 
required quorum for convening.398 
 
4.2.2 Palestinian Authority Human Rights Violations 
 
The PA limited the functions of its police forces in Article (84) of the BL "to 
defending the country, serving the people, protecting society and maintaining public 
order, security and public morals," and that their duties should remain "within the 
limits prescribed by law, with complete respect for rights and freedoms." 
 
However; in implementation of the security obligations of the Oslo Accords, the 
PA committed several violations, including political detentions and torture in areas 
under its jurisdiction. 
 
As the Israeli troops redeployed in the OPT in implementation of the Oslo 
Accords, there were an urgent need for another force to assume power as to keep law 
                                                 
397 Upon the 1996 elections, Fatah Movement dominated the PLC and so it worked in accordance with 
its interests since the movement is also represented in the government and the person of the President. 
398 Abu-Amr. Ibid. 93-95 
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and order. The Oslo Accords have defined the nature of the Palestinian force to be 
established in the Territory. 
 
The DoP authorizes the PA in Article (VIII) to "establish a strong police force," 
with the goal "to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of 
the WB and the GS." 
 
The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement of 1995, however; set further duties 
for the Palestinian police. The agreement's Annex (I) Protocol Concerning 
Redeployment and Security Arrangements399 obliged the Palestinian police in Article 
(II) paragraph (1-b) to "act systematically against all expressions of violence and 
terror;" and in paragraph (1-d) to "arrest and prosecute individuals who are suspected 
of perpetrating acts of violence and terror;" and in paragraph (3-b) to "actively prevent 
incitement to violence, including violence against the other side or persons under the 
authority of the other side;" and in paragraph (3-c) to "apprehend, investigate and 
prosecute perpetrators and all other persons directly or indirectly involved in acts of 
terrorism, violence and incitement." 
 
This focus on fighting violent and terrorist acts without defining the type of the 
acts addressed in the Article can be viewed as opening wide way for the Palestinian 
security forces to abuse human rights in the name of fighting violence that appeared in 
the form of the many political detentions especially amongst members of the anti-
Oslo factions. 
 
                                                 
399 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement of 1995: Annex (I) Protocol Concerning Redeployment and 
Security Arrangements; available at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+ 
Peace+Process/THE+ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN+INTERIM+AGREEMENT+-+Annex+I.htm#article2 
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In its Article (IV) paragraph (2), Annex (I) of the 1995 Interim Agreement 
stipulated that the Palestinian police should "consist of one integral unit under the 
control of the Council," and added that it shall be composed of six branches: (1) Civil 
Police; (2) Public Security; (3) Preventive Security; (4) Presidential Security; (5) 
Intelligence; and (6) Emergency Services and Rescue. It added that "(t)he Palestinian 
Police shall have a Palestinian Coastal Police unit," and that in "each district, all 
members of the six Police branches shall be subordinate to one central command." 
 
In fact, about nine branches of Palestinian security forces have been observed in 
the Palestinian Territory since the establishment of the PA in 1994 that was deemed 
by some scholars as a factor, helping abuse of human rights since these different 
branches lacked the ability to coordinate with each other and so every branch 
performed separately and even had its own separate jails.400 
 
Over 1,200 opposition members were reported arrested in the first two years of 
the establishment of the PA. The large number of detentions obliged the security 
forces to place the detainees in facilities that were not controlled by the security forces 
responsible for the arrest; in addition to ignoring the implementation of law provisions 
concerning the procedures of arrest as the Palestinian police "rarely presented arrest 
warrants and often held detainees under false names."401 Furthermore; the detainees 
were reported to have been physically tortured and not allowed family visits or access 
to legal consultations.402 
 
                                                 
400 Beverley Milton-Edwards, “Palestinian State-Building: Police and Citizens as Test of Democracy,” 
British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 25-1 (1998): 104. 
401 Elizabeth Freed, "Palestinian Authority Political Arrests, Illegal Detainment, and Torture," The 
Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group, (2008): 6. 
402 Ibid, 7. 
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The recent geographical and political divisions between the WB and the GS 
have added to the escalation of abuses by security forces against Palestinian civilians 
in both parts of the OPT. 
 
The June 2007 events that resulted in the seizure by Hamas Movement of the 
GS and the ousting of Fatah rulers to the WB, led to further political detentions 
targeting the pro-Hamas people in the WB; and the pro-Fatah people by the Hamas 
security forces in the GS. 
 
The Palestinian Independent Commission for Human Rights that operates in 
both the WB and the GS reported deterioration in the situation of human rights in the 
OPT in 2008, accusing the PA, controlled by Fatah Movement in the WB, and Hamas 
Movement, controlling the GS, of violating IL by trading political detentions in both 
regions.403 However; the Commission referred the Palestinian failure to protect human 
rights to several reasons, inter alia, the Israeli violations in the territory. 
 
In its annual report on human rights situation in the Palestinian Territory, the 
Commission said five Palestinians died in 2008 in questionable circumstances in 
prisons under control of the PA forces in the WB and two in jails under the control of 
Hamas Movement in the GS. The report also said that arbitrary arrests based on 
political motives have become part of the daily work of the security services in the 
WB and the GS, adding that it had documented torture in Palestinian prisons in the 
two regions that included beatings, the removal of fingernails and sleep deprivation. 
                                                 
403 PICHR, Human Rights Situation in the Palestinian National Authority Areas. Annual Report (14. 
January 1-December 31, 2008); available at: http://www.ichr.ps/pdfs/aar14.pdf. 
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The Commission said it had received 2,312 complaints of arrests and prisoner 
mistreatment in 2008 compared with 2,007 in the previous year.404 
 
The Commission criticized the existence of military courts along with the civil 
courts that led to violations against civilians in breach of the provisions of the BL and 
the relevant criminal procedures. Furthermore; the Commission criticized the 
Palestinian Ministry of Interior for failing in certain cases to implement some orders 
by the high court to release Palestinians detained in violation of provisions of the 
law.405 
 
4.3 Responsibility Perspectives 
 
The complicated situation and correlated responsibilities between Israel and the 
PA that was discussed in the previous section have brought to mind a complicated set 
of addresses to bear responsibility for any human rights violations in OPT. 
 
In addition to Israel's responsibility for human rights violations in the OPT as 
discussed in previous chapters, this section considers another two levels of 
responsibility in the Territory, including the PA's responsibility as an authority of 
"effective control" and Hamas Movement's responsibility as a de facto authority in the 
GS after the seizure of power in the strip in 2007. 
                                                 
404 Ibid. 39-77. 
405 Ibid. 77-91. 
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4.3.1 Palestinian Authority Responsibility as Authority of 'Effective Control' 
 
The PA as a legal body that controls part of land and a group of people bears 
certain responsibilities under IL. 
 
Regardless of its undertakings to respect human rights, the PA, as an authority 
of effective control, is bound by Customary IL, both the IHL and the IHRL. 
 
Upon the 1994 Cairo Agreement406 and the 1995 Oslo II Interim Agreement, the 
PA assumed some powers in parts of the WB and the GS and so, it is responsible for 
these areas under its jurisdiction. 
 
Moreover; the PA is bound by its own laws. Upon Article (10) of the BL, the 
PA undertakes to protect and respect "(b)asic human rights and liberties" and to "work 
without delay to become a party of regional and international declarations and 
covenants that protect human rights." 
 
Article (VI) paragraph (2-b) of the Cairo Agreement grants the PLO the right to 
negotiate and "sign agreements with states or international organizations for the 
benefit of the Palestinian Authority," that Benvenisti considers absolving Israel from 
                                                 
406 Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (Cairo Agreement), May 4, 1994; available at: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Agreement+on+Gaza+Strip
+and+Jericho+Area.htm. 
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responsibility in this respect.407 However; in fact as long as it is not a sovereign state, 
the PA cannot sign international agreements, including human rights treaties.408 
 
Assessing the human rights situation in the OPT in 2008, the UN Human Rights 
Council409 concluded that the PA with its different organs of the PLO and the PLC is 
bound by the international human rights obligations; especially as it undertook to 
respect international human rights norms on many occasions.410 
 
4.3.2 Hamas Responsibility in the Gaza Strip 
 
Internationally, the GS was not recognized as a sovereign region after the Israeli 
withdrawal in 2005.411 The PA considers the Strip as part of the Palestinian Territory 
even after Hamas took control of the Strip in June 2007. Hamas itself has not declared 
a sate in the Strip after its assumption of power and it insists the Palestinian areas are 
one integral territory, including the WB and the GS. 
 
Hamas Movement as part of the PA and heading the Palestinian government 
until the Gaza events (June 2007), is responsible for the Palestinian people under its 
control and it should make every effort to ensure rights of these people. 
 
As well as the PA, Hamas Movement as a non-state de facto authority in the GS 
after 2007 cannot sign international treaties, including human rights treaties. 
                                                 
407 Eyal Benvenisti. “The Status of the Palestinian Authority,” in The Arab-Israeli Accords: Legal 
Perspectives, ed. Eugene Cotran and Chibli Mallat,. (London: Kluer Law International, 1996), 61. 
408 HRW, 2008, Ibid. 96. 
409 Human Rights Situation In Palestine And Other Occupied Arab Territories, available at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/8session/ A.HRC.8.17.doc. 
410 Human Rights Council, A/HRC/8/17, 6 June 2008. Ibid. paragraph (8). 
411 See Section (2.2.4) of this study. 
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However; it is bound by international standards of human rights that govern political 
parties and armed groups.412 In its 2008 report, the Human Rights Council said Hamas 
Movement in Gaza is "bound by international humanitarian law obligations," 
including ensuring safety of protected persons.413 
 
Moreover; in its National Unity Government Programme, Hamas Movement 
committed itself to respecting IL and to abide by articles of the BL, which also 
stipulates respect of international human rights norms.414 
 
Confirming Hamas commitment to human rights norms, the Human Rights 
Council confirmed "that non-state actors that exercise government-like functions and 
control over territory are obliged to respect human rights norms when their conduct 
affects the human rights of the individuals under their control,"415 citing a joint report 
on Lebanon and Israel, when a group of four Special Rapporteurs concluded that: 
“Although Hezbollah, a non-State actor, cannot become a party to these human rights 
treaties, it remains subject to the demand of the international community, first 
expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that every organ of society 
respect and promote human rights. (…) It is especially appropriate and feasible to call 
for an armed group to respect human rights norms when it exercises significant 
control over territory and population and has an identifiable political structure.”416 
                                                 
412 Human Rights Watch. Internal Fight: Palestinian Abuses in Gaza and the West Bank. (USA, 2008): 
97. 
413 Human Rights Council. 2008. A/HRC/8/17, Ibid. 
414 Programme of the National Unity Government was delivered by then Prime Minister Ismail Haniya 
before the PLC, 17 March 2007. Text of the programme can be found in Arabic at: http://www.islamic 
news.net/Document/ShowDoc09.asp?DocID=91477&TypeID=9& TabIndex=2. 
415 Human Rights Council. 6 June 2008. A/HRC/8/17, Ibid. 
416 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston; 
the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health, Paul Hunt; the Representative of the Secretary-General on human rights of 
internally displaced persons, Walter Kälin; and the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a 
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Furthermore in a speech delivered at a conference organized by the Palestinian 
Center for Human Rights on “The New Government and the Agenda for Human 
Rights” in Gaza in June 2006, Hamas leader Ismail Haniya confirmed Hamas 
determination to "promote the rule of law, the respect for the judiciary, the separation 
of powers, the respect for human rights, the equality among citizens; to fight all forms 
of discrimination; to protect public liberties, including the freedom of the press and 
opinion.”417 
 
The Human Rights Council has also obligated Hamas Movement in Gaza, as 
well as Israel and the PA, to respect IL in treating "the civilian populations."418 
 
In paragraph (6), the Council confirms that Hamas is bound by obligation of 
IHL with regard to the "conduct of hostilities and the rights of civilians and other 
protected persons." 
 
With regard to human rights obligations, the Council concluded in paragraph (9) 
that Hamas as exercising government-like functions and controlling a territory, is yet 
"obliged to respect human rights norms when (its) conduct affects the human rights of 
the individuals under (its) control." 
 
                                                                                                                                            
component of the right to an adequate standard of living, Miloon Kothari, Mission to Lebanon and 
Israel, 7-14 September 2006, (A/HRC/2/7) , paragraph 19. 
417 Speech delivered by Ismail Haniya at the conference organized by the PCHR on “The New 
Government and the Agenda for Human Rights,” Gaza, June 2006; as cited by the Human Rights 
Council, A/HRC/8/17, Ibid. 
418 Human Rights Council Ibid, paragraph 4. 
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In a 26-page report, published on 20 April 2009, Human Rights Watch 
documented a group of acts of extrajudicial killings arbitrary arrests and detentions 
and torture, having been committed by Hamas forces in the GS since late December 
2008, which means during the 22-day Israeli offensive on the GS in December 2008 
and January 2009.419 
 
The report considered these violations as breach to several international 
conventions420 that "apply at all times, even during recognized states of emergency"421 
and a breach to the Palestinian BL that cites PA's commitment to human rights and 
the Palestinian Penal Procedures Law on arrest and detention procedures. 
 
Hamas is also bound by the commitments of the PA to adherence to 
international human rights norms, since it considers itself as the "lawful government 
of the PA."422 
                                                 
419 Human Rights Watch, "Under Cover of War: Hamas Political Violence in Gaza", 2009; available at: 
(http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/iopt0409webwcover.pdf). 
420 These conventions include ICCPR, ICESCR, Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
421 HRW, Ibid, 19. 
422 Ibid, 21. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The debate on the status of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territory is 
unending. Before the signing of the Oslo agreements, Israel's responsibility for the 
Occupied Territory was clear despite Israel's denial of the existence of occupation. 
But this denial has nothing to do with facts on ground, since the occupation 
authorities do not decide the status of the territory, but the state of occupation imposes 
that status. 
 
But since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 and the assumption by the 
PA of certain responsibilities in the WB and the GS, Israel has been trying to 
convince the world that it no longer bears any legal responsibilities towards the 
Palestinian Territory. 
 
Circumstances on ground, however; have since proven the opposite. As the 
entire world witnessed the Israeli 2002 incursions in the Palestinian Territory, 
especially areas, classified as Area (A) that were supposed to have been under 
complete PA control, there became no doubt that Israel remains the Master in the 
Territory. 
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This proved that the Israeli Occupation to the Palestinian Territory has not 
ended and so Israel is yet responsible for the implementation of the IHL in the OPT. 
 
Although the Vienna Convention for Treaties does not apply to the Oslo 
agreements, they are yet binding to the signing parties in reference to Customary IL 
that applies to international treaties and allows a state to sign treaty with non-
international parties or national liberation organizations. 
 
Moreover; it cannot be denied that the Oslo Accords have created a new 
political and legal situation in the OPT that imposed different levels of responsibility 
in the Territory. 
 
Three levels of responsibility for the implementation of human rights in the 
Palestinian Territory were discussed in this study. Israel's responsibility as an 
occupying power has received the main focus as to prove the main premise of the 
thesis that the Oslo Accords, which did not change Israel's status as an occupying 
power in the Palestinian Territory, do not absolve Israel of its human rights 
obligations in the Territory. 
 
The PA also bears certain responsibilities under IL in areas under its 
jurisdiction. As an authority of effective control, the PA is bound by Customary IL 
applicable on non-state international actors or subjects. 
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Furthermore; as a local authority, the PA that practices actual responsibilities 
is obliged to implement IHL due to the continuation of the state of occupation and 
that it is working in time of occupation as stipulates Article (47) of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention of 1949 that can be interpreted as stressing responsibility of a local 
authority under occupation to implement IHL. 
 
Article (47) is aimed at protecting the occupied people against the derogation 
of their rights that can be caused by certain oppressive provisions under an agreement 
between the occupying power and a local authority. Some of the security obligations 
of the Oslo agreements can fall under this interpretation. 
 
The formula of the Article is then that the presence of a local authority under 
occupation creates an obligation towards implementation of IHL in the occupied 
territory. 
 
Furthermore; the PA is bound to respect human rights by its own laws and 
provisions in the Oslo agreements that call for adherence to human rights norms. 
 
The presence of Hamas Movement as a de facto authority in the GS after 2007 
and the ousting of Fatah leadership from the strip also constitute another level of 
responsibility in the Palestinian Territory. Meanwhile, Hamas is also bound by the 
Customary IL to implement human rights in the territory under its control. 
 
There is no way for Israel to absolve itself from its legal responsibility towards 
the OPT. This responsibility is viewed from several angles: 
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First, as shown in the thesis, UN bodies, including the SC, the GA and the ICJ; 
in addition to several other international bodies have confirmed on many occasions 
Israel's responsibility for the implementation of IHL and IHRL in the OPT. 
 
When Israel was admitted to the UN membership, it accepted abiding by IL 
that is composed of IHRL and IHL. 
 
Although Israel signed only several international human rights conventions, it 
is yet bound by IHRL, especially as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights had 
become Customary Law that the world countries started bringing into their domestic 
laws. 
 
Moreover; the Israeli withdrawal from the GS in 2005 had not ended its 
occupation because Israel continued effective control over the strip by controlling the 
strip’s air space and sea and ground terminals and maintained the ability to enter the 
strip whenever it wishes, which was confirmed in the latest offensive on the GS 
between December 2008 and January 2009. 
 
Second; the argument that Israel remains an occupying power and obligated to 
implement human rights in the OPT is not only supported by the consequences of 
Israel's incursions into the Palestinian towns, classified as Area (A), in 2002, 
confirming that those areas are still under Israeli control, but also by the protracted 
nature of the Israeli occupation that imposes a state of human rights enforcement. 
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Third; even if the status of the Israeli occupation to the Palestinian Territory 
after the signing of the Oslo Accords could be deemed as temporary until a final 
settlement is reached and a Palestinian state is established, this claimed temporary 
nature cannot absolve Israel of its responsibilities under the IHRL. 
 
The UN Security Council Resolution No. (1483) of 2003 on the situation in 
Iraq confirmed applicability of IHL during transformative occupation even if the 
occupying powers do not admit that their presence in the territory constitutes 
occupation. 
 
Another level of responsibility for human rights abuses in the OPT that was 
not tackled in this study, but can be addressed in future studies on the issue, is the 
responsibility of third party countries, such as the USA and Europe that can be 
considered as facilitating the PA's abuse of human rights by providing unquestioning 
moral and financial support for the PA’s security forces without this being contingent 
on respect for human rights. 
 
This is supplemented by strong encouragement for fighting any political 
opposition in the guise of fighting terrorism. The PA is further encouraged to spend 
economic support on a bloated police force and security network, whilst limiting 
spending on civil society social needs and other forms of democracy building. 
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At a conference devoted for raising money for the reconstruction of the GS 
following the Israeli December 2008 and January 2009 offensive, and held in Cairo in 
March 2009, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pledged $900 million for the 
Palestinians, $600 million of which would be devoted for supporting the Palestinian 
Security forces, while $300 million only for Gaza restitution.423 
 
Furthermore; in a report on 15 December 2008, the EU Police Coordinating 
Office for Palestine said that $55 million were spent on projects in support of the 
Palestinian police and added that 500,000 Euros of this sum was "spent during 2008 
in equipment, refurbishment and furniture to 38 police stations throughout the West 
Bank."424 
 
Moreover; The International Quartet Committee, consisting of the US, the 
UN, the EU and Russia, has frequently urged the PA to abide by the Oslo security 
obligations, which were proved to include human rights abuses; and so, the Quartet as 
well bears some kind of responsibility for what the PA is doing. 
 
This can fall within the interpretation of Article (18) of the Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the 
International Law Commission in 2001.425 
 
                                                 
423 See ABC news article on the issue at: http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalradar/2009/03/clinton-
pledges.html. 
424 The report is available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/20081215_EUPOL_ 
COPPS_project_in_the_last_18_months.pdf. 
425 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted by the 
International Law Commission at its fifty-third session in 2001; available at: http://untreaty.un.org/ 
ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf. 
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The Article rules provide that a "state which coerces another state to commit 
an act is internationally responsible for that act." The Article further conditions the act 
to be "internationally wrongful act of coerced State," and that the "coercing State does 
so with knowledge of the circumstances of the act." 
 
However, widening the scope of the thesis regarding the Quartet and other 
third party countries can take on a lot and no way to do that in this study. 
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